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This thesis explores how the struggle to rescue Jews from the Soviet Union contributed to 
the rise and recognition of human rights in international affairs.  Just as the United Nations 
General Assembly ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948—recognizing the 
equal and inalienable right to freedom of religion, nationality, and expression—the Soviet Union 
stripped its 2.5 million Jewish citizens of those very provisions.  Even as it denied the basic 
freedoms of Soviet Jews, the USSR refused to grant their only potential relief, also enshrined in 
the Universal Declaration: the right to leave one’s country. 
Jewish communal organizations in the United States soon initiated a movement to 
prevent the disintegration of Soviet Jewry.  Wary of endangering their coreligionists by linking 
them to a broader campaign for freedom in the USSR, the American Jewish political 
establishment initially shunned reference to human rights, seeking to alleviate their 
coreligionists’ plight by conducting quiet diplomacy on behalf of civil rights.  Meanwhile, a 
cadre of Soviet Jewry academics and human rights activists, operating on the fringe of the 
Movement, began formulating a legal foundation for the right to leave.  This thesis first contends 
that the establishment political wing of the Movement converged with its scholarly contingent by 
embracing the 1972 Jackson Amendment, which linked U.S-Soviet trade to free emigration in 
the USSR.  I argue that the establishment embraced the bill—which owed its conceptual 
inspiration to the body of work produced by Soviet Jewry Movement’s intellectuals—as a 
strategic response to two challenges: increased Soviet Jewish demands for emigration, and an 
attempt by militant Soviet Jewry activists, preaching violence and ethnic exclusivity, to co-opt 
the Movement.  
I then examine how the Soviet Jewry Movement’s advocacy for the right to leave 
subsequently aided the transformation of human rights from rhetoric to reality.  This thesis 
proposes that the right to leave served as a “gateway”—to assuring all other rights and freedoms 
for Soviet citizens; to legitimizing the notion that the Soviet Union’s internal affairs could not 
claim exemption from international oversight; and, ultimately, to fostering universal acceptance 
of human rights accords.   
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Personalities and Terms 
Morris Abram: U.S. Representative to U.N. Human Rights Council, honorary president of  
American Jewish Committee (AJC), central organizer of Uppsala Colloquium on the 
Right to Leave and to Return in 1972. 
 
Morris Amitay: Chief legislative aide to Senator Abraham Ribicoff; worked in tandem with  
Richard Perle to ensure Congressional passage of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.  
 
Jacob Birnbaum: Co-founder of Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry (SSSJ) and leading grassroots  
Soviet Jewry activist. 
 
Rene Cassin: Drafter of Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a principle sponsor of the  
Uppsala Colloquium. 
 
Anatoly Dobrynin: Soviet Ambassador to the United States from 1962 to 1986. 
 
Moshe Decter: Managing editor of The New Leader in the 1950s and 60s whose articles  
concerning the plight of Soviet Jewry helped spark the Soviet Jewry Movement in the 
U.S. 
 
Meg Donavan: Employee of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ) who later served  
as a key member of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, and ensured that the Commission  
place high priority on the right to leave.  
 
Establishment Soviet Jewry Movement: the effort initiated on behalf of Soviet Jewry by the  
existing Jewish communal organizations and institutions of the United States.   
 
Dante Fascell: Democratic Congressman from Florida and chairman of the U.S. Helsinki  
Commission. 
 
Millicent Fenwick: Republican Congresswoman from New Jersey who introduced the legislation  
which established the U.S. Helsinki Commission. 
 
Arthur Goldberg: U.S. Supreme Court Justice, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., and U.S.  
Ambassador to the Belgrade Helsinki Review Conference; Goldberg convinced Jewish 
leaders to form an umbrella Soviet Jewry organization in 1963 and later publicly 
challenged the USSR regarding its human rights record at Belgrade. 
 
Jerry Goodman: Executive Director of the NCSJ. 
 
Nahum Goldmann: Head of the World Jewish Congress in the 1950s and 60s; preached quiet  
diplomacy vis-à-vis Soviet Jewry for fear of endangering the Soviet Jewish community. 
 
Grassroots/Activist Soviet Jewry Movement: the effort initiated on behalf of Soviet Jewry  
outside traditional communal organizations; included the Student Struggle for Soviet  
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Jewry and the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews. 
 
Yossi Klein-Halevi: Early SSSJ activist whose later shift to the JDL represented the  
radicalization of the Soviet Jewry Movement in the late 1960s. 
 
David Harris: Current president of the AJC who served as national coordinator for the “Freedom  
Sunday” March on Washington for Soviet Jewry on December 6, 1987. 
 
Jose Ingles: Philippine Judge who worked with William Korey to draft a landmark report on the  
status of freedom of emigration worldwide, with particular focus on Soviet emigration 
policies.  Ingles’ formulation of the right to leave as a “gateway” to securing all other 
freedoms served as the foundation for the Uppsala Colloquium and, by extension, the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment. 
 
Helsinki Final Act: The product of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe  
(CSCE)—a consortium of thirty-three European nations as well as the United States and 
Canada established in 1975 to solidify continental détente.  The Final Act struck a quid 
pro quo between the longstanding Soviet desire to solidify its control of Eastern Europe, 
and Western European insistence upon the improvement of Soviet human rights.   
 
Henry Jackson: Senator from Washington who solicited the establishment Jewish community to  
support his amendment linking U.S.-Soviet trade with Soviet improvements on freedom 
of emigration. 
 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment: Bill linking U.S.-Soviet trade relations to improvement of Soviet  
emigration policy by refusing MFN and “credit, credit guarantees, and investment 
guarantees” to the USSR as long as it denied its citizens the right to emigrate or imposed 
more than a nominal fee on emigration visas.  Significantly, Jackson’s bill required the 
President to submit biannual reports to Congress regarding the status of emigration in 
nonmarket nations, forbidding him from granting a MFN waiver without approval from 
the legislative branch. 
 
Jacob Javits: Jewish Senator from New York who served as a “patron” for Soviet Jewish issues  
in Congress; key ally of Jackson in securing the passage of the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment. 
 
Meir Kahane: Founder and leader of the Jewish Defense League. 
 
Max Kampelman: U.S. Ambassador to Helsinki Review Conference at Madrid. 
 
Yasha Kozokov: Soviet Jew who renounced his USSR citizenship seven days after the  
conclusion of Israel’s Six-Day War, declaring that he sought to emigrate to the Jewish  
State. 
 
Henry Kissinger: National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State to Presidents Nixon and  
Ford; Kissinger attempted to implement a strategy of détente and opposed the insertion of  
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human rights in U.S. foreign affairs.  He became the chief opponent to Jackson-Vanik. 
 
Boris Kochubyevski: Soviet Jew imprisoned for refusing to condemn Israel at local worker’s  
union meeting. 
 
William Korey: International Director of B’nai B’rith and representative of the Coordinating  
Board of Jewish Organizations at the U.N.; Korey made a vital contribution to Jose  
Ingles’ report on the right to leave and championed the Soviet Jewry Movement as a 
human rights cause. 
 
Nehemiah Levanon: Leader of the Israeli Liaison Bureau who quietly influenced the direction of  
the American Soviet Jewry Movement. 
 
Sidney Liskofsky: Director of AJC’s Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human 
Rights and initiator of the Uppsala Colloquium; played a vital role in  
 
Richard Maass: Chairman of the NCSJ during negotiations over the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. 
 
Richard Perle: Chief legislative aide to Senator Henry Jackson and lead advocate for the  
Jackson-Vanik Amendment. 
 
Glenn Richter: Co-director of the SSSJ. 
 
Lou Rosenblaum: Founder of the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews (UCSJ), the leading  
grassroots activist Soviet Jewry organization. 
 
Andrei Sakharov: Father of Soviet nuclear bomb who later became a leading democratic  
dissident and ally of the Soviet Jewry Movement within the USSR. 
 
Anatoly Sharansky: Leading Soviet Jewish refusenik who bridged the Jewish and dissident  
Movements in the USSR by serving as Sakharov’s spokesperson and co-founding the  
Moscow Helsinki Watch.  He was later imprisoned for a decade on charges of espionage 
and released in 1986. 
 
Leonard Schroeter: Seattle lawyer and confidant of Senator Henry Jackson who participated in  
the Uppsala Colloquium and brought its ideas to Senator Jackson, laying the foundation  
for the Senator’s Amendment. 
 
Tina Silber: Aide to Senator Jackson who maintained a close connection with Schroeter. 
 
Charles Vanik: Congressman from Ohio who cosponsored the Jackson Amendment. 
 
Elie Wiesel: Holocaust survivor and respected author who toured the Soviet Union in 1966 and  
wrote a book that criticized American Jewry for failing to assist its coreligionists in the  
USSR. 
 
             
         THE GATEWAY 




 As the Aeroflot plane taxied to the gate at Smolny Airport in the Soviet Union at 8:30 
AM on June 14, 1970, nine Jews prepared to board the aircraft, already resigned to their fate.  
Victims of state-sponsored anti-Semitic repression in all spheres of life—and forbidden by 
Soviet law from emigrating—these Jews, as the KGB already discovered, hoped to stage a 
desperate and symbolic act of defiance by hijacking the plane and flying it to the West.  As the 
Jews walked onto the tarmac, a swarm of special agents enveloped them, battering the group 
with clubs and apprehending them for attempted illegal “flight abroad,” tantamount to treason.  
Six months later, on Christmas Eve, the Soviet Union declared that it would spare them no 
mercy.  The two leaders of the failed hijacking received the maximum penalty for sedition—
death.1  
The execution sentences stunned the Western world.  The sheer brutality of the 
punishment appeared to confirm that, secure in its superpower status, the USSR cared little for 
international public opinion.  Yet to Morris Abram, former U.S. Representative on the U.N. 
Human Rights Commission, the hijacking sentences reflected something far different than 
strength.  Writing in the New York Times in January 1971, Abram contended that the “vengeful 
trial” of the would-be hijackers revealed that “the Soviet Government is afraid to honor a basic 
and internationally recognized human right: the right of everyone to leave any country and to 
return to his own country.”  The seemingly mighty Soviets, according to Abram, were actually 
scared.  
Abram’s article outlined a long history of Soviet resistance to freedom of emigration.  
The inclusion of the right to free emigration in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
                                                 
1 Bernard Gwertzman, “Soviet Said to Arrest 20 in Plot to Hijack a Plane,” New York Times, June 21, 1974; 
“Soviet Reported Trying 11, Mostly Jews, in Hijacking,” New York Times, December 16, 1970.  For more on the 
trial, please see p. 29 of this thesis. 
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encountered fierce Soviet opposition, eventually spurring the Communist bloc to abstain from 
the document’s ratification.  When a U.N. subcommission considered a study of discrimination 
“on the right of everyone to leave any country, including his own,” prepared by Philippine jurist 
Jose Ingles, the USSR “opposed [the study’s] publication,” and “demanded the deletion of 
material…giving instances of denials of the right to leave [Soviet] bloc countries.”  Despite the 
fact that it had endorsed the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racism 
and Discrimination—which explicitly reiterated and endorsed the right to leave—the USSR 
continued to demonstrate “hypersensitivity” and “unreasoning” with regard to free exit.  “The 
cruel fact,” Abram concluded, “is that the Soviet Union…is still in some ways a frightened, 
primitive nation.”2 
Abram’s interest in Soviet emigration policy sprung from his intimate association with 
the Soviet Jewry Movement—the three-decade struggle to ensure the survival of the Soviet 
Jewish community.3  His editorial foreshadowed the imminent convergence of two streams of the 
American effort behind the right to leave: one scholarly, which first provided the legal 
foundation for freedom of emigration; and the other political, which, as a response to growing 
radical activist influence, embraced that foundation and secured its central place both in 
American and international legislative arenas.  I argue that the right to leave served as a 
“gateway” not only to achieving the emancipation of Soviet Jewry, but to initiating the 
transformation of human rights from contested principle to global practice.   
* * * 
                                                 
2 Morris Abram, “The Right to Leave: Soviet Union Defies Basic Human Right Adopted by U.N.,” New 
York Times, January 22, 1971.  For more on the Ingles Report, please see p. X of this thesis. 
3 At the time that he published the editorial on the right to leave in The New York Times, Abram served as 
honorary president of the American Jewish Committee and Chairman of the Administrative Council of the Jacob 
Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights (JBI), an AJC subsidiary which framed the Soviet Jewry 
movement within the context of human rights.  Abram would later serve as Chairman of the National Conference on 
Soviet Jewry in the 1980s.  
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 This thesis first proposes a modified interpretation as to why the mainstream Soviet 
Jewry organizations began to advocate for emigration—and why they elected to frame 
emigration as a human right—by emphasizing the influence of militant Soviet Jewry activists in 
the U.S., such as the Jewish Defense League, upon the establishment.  Secondly, it offers new 
perspective to existing scholarship in seeking to demonstrate the Soviet Jewry Movement’s role 
in the development and implementation of human rights, by framing the right to leave as a nexus 
between them.   
The sparse but growing body of research addressing the Soviet Jewry Movement accords 
little attention to its grassroots activist element—the effort initiated on behalf of Soviet Jewry  
outside traditional communal organizations.  Most discussions of the movement’s mainstream 
organizational institutions glorify the establishment at the expense of activist groups.4  This 
thesis follows an effort to correct that imbalance and secure a place in Soviet Jewry Movement 
historiography for the grassroots organizations, one which began with William Orbach, and has 
continued in recent years with the contributions of Yossi-Klein Halevi.  More importantly, 
accounts of the establishment Soviet Jewry Movement significantly undervalue the importance 
of Meir Kahane’s Jewish Defense League (JDL) in compelling the Soviet Jewry Movement 
establishment—advocacy for Soviet Jewry organized by existing Jewish communal institutions 
in the U.S.—to frame the struggle for Soviet Jewish emigration as a human right.  I rely upon 
primary and secondary sources to demonstrate that nonviolent grassroots groups, as well as the 
militant JDL, forced the establishment to retake control of the Soviet Jewry Movement by 
adopting the language of human rights. 
                                                 
4 See Albert Chernin, “Making Soviet Jews an Issue: A History,” Nehamiah Levanon, “Israel’s Role in the 
Campaign,” and Myrna Shnbaum, “Mobilizing America: The National Conference on Soviet Jewry,” in A Second 
Exodus: The American Movement to Free Soviet Jewry, ed. Albert Chernin and Murray Friedman (Massachusetts: 
Brandeis University Press, 1999). 
             
         THE GATEWAY 
      
 
12 
While the fields of both general human rights history and the Soviet Jewry Movement 
occasionally reference the connection between the Soviet Jewry effort and the right to leave—
either offering a small element of its overall history, or glossing it in passing—they fail to 
provide the comprehensive linkage sought by this thesis.5  Most general human rights 
scholarship rarely delivers more than a cursory mention to the Soviet Jewry Movement, and 
tends to ignore its involvement entirely.  For example, prominent historian Kenneth Cmiel’s 
account of human rights politics in the U.S. demarcates a timeline for the rise of human rights, 
from 1973 to 1978, that closely matches the moment in which the Soviet Jewry Movement 
embraced and then championed the right to leave.  Yet Cmiel devotes merely a single line to the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment—the bill which tied U.S.-Soviet trade to improved Soviet 
emigration policy in 1975 and referenced the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—let alone 
the Soviet Jewry Movement more broadly.6  Other such examples abound, rendering the Soviet 
Jewry Movement’s contribution to the evolution of human rights largely unrecognized within the 
broader discipline of human rights studies. 
                                                 
5 See Michael Galchinsky, Jews and Human Rights: Dances at Three Weddings (New York: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, 2007), and Sidney Schwartz, Judaism and Justice (New York: Jewish Lights Publishing, 
2006), which both devote individual chapters to a general history of the Soviet Jewry movement’s relationship with 
human rights, but avoid detailed explorations of the subject.  For example, Galchinsky’s book directly refers to the 
Uppsala Colloquium on the Right to Leave and the Right to Return as directly assisting with the passage of the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which, by extension, contributed to the Helsinki Final Act (p. 117).  Yet it does not 
provide historical context for that statement and neglects to explore the intellectual heritage of the right to leave at 
any depth. 
6 Kenneth Cmiel, “The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States,” Journal of American 
History, Vol. 86, No. 3: 1233, 1235.  Cmiel neglects to mention the Soviet Jewry movement despite the fact that he 
addresses several of its products at length.  This is especially true in the case of Human Rights Watch, founded by 
Robert Bernstein in 1981 as the U.S. Helsinki Watch at the behest of U.S. Ambassador to the Belgrade review 
conference of the Helsinki Final Act, Arthur J. Goldberg.   
For more general histories of the evolution of human rights that make like mention of the Soviet Jewry 
movement, see Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998); Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2003); Brian Orend, Human Rights: Concept and Context (Ontario: Broadview Press Ltd., 
2002); David P. Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations (England: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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Soviet Jewry Movement histories also tend to minimize or entirely neglect the effort’s 
connection to human rights.  Books and articles produced during the course of the Soviet Jewry 
Movement itself tend to document Soviet violations of Jewish rights rather than interpret the 
Movement more broadly.7  Fred Lazin’s work leads a collection of studies dedicated to 
addressing the “dropout controversy,” in which increasing numbers of Soviet Jews emigrated to 
the United States instead of Israel, causing a rift between the American and Israeli factions of the 
Movement.8  While he references important aspects of the human rights connection such as the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment and Helsinki Final Act, Petrus Buwalda chiefly details the 
complexities of the Soviet Jewish emigration process and also devotes much of its space to the 
“dropout controversy.”9  Albert Chernin, Yaacov Ro’i, Paul Appelbaum, and William Orbach 
present broad historical overviews of the Soviet Jewry Movement that merely hint at its ties to 
the growth of human rights.10 
Paula Stern, Noam Kochavi, and William Korey offer intricate accounts of the legislative 
history contained within this thesis.  Stern, who served on Capitol Hill during the time of the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment’s passage, details the political negotiations behind the Amendment 
                                                 
7 See Leonard Schroeter, The Last Exodus (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1979); William 
Korey, The Soviet Cage (New York: Viking Press, 1973).  
See also Natan Sharansky, Fear No Evil (New York: Public Affairs, 1998).  Sharansky’s memoir offers an 
intricate portrayal of life in the USSR as a Soviet refusenik and dissident, and relates his decade-long imprisonment 
on charges of treason in the Soviet gulag.   
8 See Fred Lazin, The Struggle for Soviet Jewry in American Politics: Israel versus the American Jewish 
Establishment (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2005); Steven F. Windmueller, “The ‘Noshrim’ War: Dropping Out,” 
in A Second Exodus: The American Movement to Free Soviet Jewry, ed. Albert Chernin and Murray Friedman 
(Massachusetts: Brandeis University Press, 1999). 
9 See Petrus Buwalda, They Did Not Dwell Alone: Jewish Emigration from the Soviet Union 1967- 
1990 (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997). 
10 See Albert Chernin, “Making Soviet Jews an Issue: A History,” Nehamiah Levanon, “Israel’s Role in the 
Campaign,” in A Second Exodus: The American Movement to Free Soviet Jewry, ed. Albert Chernin and Murray 
Friedman (Massachusetts: Brandeis University Press, 1999); Yaacov Ro’i, The Struggle for Soviet Jewish 
Emigration, 1948-1967 (England: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Paul Appelbaum, “The Soviet Jewry 
Movement in the United States,” in Jewish American Voluntary Organizations, ed. Michael Dobkowski (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1986); and William Orbach, The American Movement to Aid Soviet Jews (Massachusetts: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1979). 
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as an exploration of the influence of ethnic groups upon American foreign policy.  Her book 
serves as a critical resource for an account of the struggle to secure the bill’s passage, offering a 
particularly vivid recounting of the fierce battle between Senator Henry Jackson and Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger over support from the American Jewish political establishment.  Yet her 
work neglects to explore material outside the concrete political process behind the bill, and 
entirely avoids discussing the intellectual antecedents so crucial to its origins in the Soviet Jewry 
Movement.11  Kochavi’s article provides a succinct and balanced portrait of Kissinger’s strategy 
in opposing Jackson-Vanik, and ultimately faults him for political miscalculation, especially with 
regard to his attempt to woo the Jewish community away from Jackson’s camp.12   
Korey’s collection of materials regarding Jackson-Vanik stands among the only to 
emphasize the connection between the Jackson Amendment, Soviet Jewry, and human rights.  
He dedicates particular attention to the bill’s explicit reference to Article 13-2 of the Universal 
Declaration, the provision for the right to leave, and highlights the influence of Soviet 
democratic dissident Andrei Sakharov’s letter to Congress in September 1973, urging it to pass 
Jackson-Vanik an affirmation of human rights.  Though Korey explicitly draws the connection 
between the Soviet Jewry Movement and its integral role in securing the passage of Jackson-
Vanik in his histories of the bill, he, like Stern, disregards the intellectual history of Jackson-
Vanik and its roots in the Soviet Jewry Movement, which this thesis, in part, aims to supply.13 
                                                 
11 See Paula Stern, Water’s Edge: Domestic Politics and the Making of American Foreign Policy 
(Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1979).  For Kissinger’s perspective on the legislative battle, see Walter Isaacson, 
Kissinger (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993).  For a portrayal more sympathetic to Senator Jackson, see Robert 
G. Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000). 
12 See Noam Kochavi, “Insights Abandoned, Flexibility Lost: Kissinger, Soviet Jewish Emigration, and the 
Demise of Détente,” Diplomatic History Vol. 29, No. 3 (June 2005): 503-530. 
13 See Korey, “Jackson-Vanik: Its Origin and Impact as Russia Nears ‘Graduation,’” Harriman Review, 
Vol. 14, No. 1-2 (Nov. 2002); Korey, “Jackson-Vanik and Soviet Jewry,” The Washington Quarterly Vol. 7, No. 1 
(1984); and Korey, “The Struggle Over Jackson-Mills-Vanik,” American Jewish Yearbook (1974-5): 199-225. 
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While Korey’s Jackson-Vanik literature does not address the Amendment’s legal history, 
his broader histories of the Helsinki Final Act and the role of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) at the U.N. serve as the most extensive basis upon which to explore the connection 
between Soviet Jewry, the right to leave, and human rights.14  Korey—who spearheaded initial 
efforts to tie the right to leave to Soviet Jewry during the 1960s and served as the Movement’s 
foremost human rights expert—traces the legal foundations of the right to leave and records the 
Soviet Jewry Movement’s lobbying efforts on behalf of free emigration, especially during the 
Helsinki review conferences.  Korey’s contributions make the most extensive case to date for the 
relationship between the struggle to rescue Soviet Jews and the rise of human rights.  I also draw 
heavily upon recent additions such as Gal Beckerman’s upcoming book on the Soviet Jewry 
Movement, which includes an extended treatment of how the Soviet Jewry Movement assisted in 
concretizing the Universal Declaration.15  This thesis utilizes their work as a launching point for 
a more extensive inquiry into the origins of the right to leave and its later application in 
legislative politics. 
 Several works aided my exploration of the origins and influence of the right to leave.  
Books by Hurst Hannum and Alan Dowty delineated the historical scope of the right to leave.16  
Most significantly, however, the published proceedings of the Uppsala Colloquium on the Right 
to Leave and to Return outline the intellectual heritage and framework of free emigration as a 
                                                 
14 See William Korey, “The ‘Right to Leave’ for Soviet Jews: Legal and Moral Aspects,” Soviet Jewish 
Affairs, No. 1 (1971); “NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “A Curious Grapevine” (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1998); Korey, “The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the Helsinki Process, and American 
Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993).   
15 See Gal Beckerman, When They Come for Us, We’ll Be Gone: The Epic Struggle to Save Soviet Jewry.  
Unpublished manuscript, and Henry Feingold, “Silent No More”: Saving the Jews of Russia, the American Jewish 
Effort, 1967-1989 (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2007). 
16 See Hurst Hannum, The Right to Leave and Return in International Law and Practice (Boston:  
Martinus Nijoff Publishers, 1987), and Alan Dowty, Closed Borders: The Contemporary Assault on Freedom of 
Movement (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). 
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human right.  It served as a source text for exploring the Colloquium, which, as I suggest, 
constituted the direct intellectual inspiration for the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and thus assisted 
in bridging the scholarly and political wings of the Soviet Jewry effort.   
* * * 
This project does not intend to present a sweeping history of the Soviet Jewry Movement, 
nor of the development of international human rights norms.  Instead, it locates specific moments 
in history that illustrate how the Soviet Jewry Movement came to embrace emigration as a 
human rights struggle, and how its advocacy for the right to leave contributed to ascendance of 
human rights in international affairs.  I also do not contend that the establishment Soviet Jewry 
Movement adopted right-to-leave activism solely as a result of the threat posed by the JDL.  
Rather, I aspire to integrate the JDL phenomenon within the variety of influences that likely 
induced the shift.  Additionally, I not argue that the Soviet Jewry Movement can claim full 
responsibility for the rising prominence and acceptance of human rights, but attempts to situate 
the Movement’s advocacy for the right to leave within a broader series of contingent factors.   
 While utilizing secondary literature as a historical frame with which to formulate my 
guiding questions, I grounded the central findings of my thesis in primary research.  Newspapers 
and periodicals record the Soviet Jewry Movement in the media, documenting the prominence of 
the cause for Soviet Jewry and coloring the historical narrative.  Personal interviews functioned 
in much the same manner, forming an essential aspect of my thesis by contributing first-person 
knowledge of Soviet Jewry activism and, perhaps most significantly, offering a broad intellectual 
scope with which to shape my central contentions. 
I additionally relied upon former National Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ) executive 
director Jerry Goodman’s papers currently housed at the American Jewish Historical Society.  
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Goodman’s records provided key insight into the evolution of the establishment as it began to 
demand free emigration within the context of the right to leave.  I then studied the “Ethnic 
Groups and American Foreign Policy” oral history collection at Columbia, whose testimonies 
contained an intimate account of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment campaign and the Soviet Jewry 
Movement’s central place within it.   
Archives at the American Jewish Committee and especially at the University of 
Washington constitute an essential element of my thesis.  They tell the story of the Uppsala 
Colloquium and Ingles Report, and sketch the role of one man—Leonard Schroeter—in 
transferring their legal foundation for the right to leave to Senator Henry Jackson.  These papers 
form crux of my new findings: that the intellectual heritage for the right to leave, as established 
by Soviet Jewry advocates through the Ingles Report and the Uppsala Colloquium, directly 
informed the creation of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. 
* * * 
 Chapter I of this thesis recounts the repression faced by Soviet Jews in the USSR during 
the early years of the Cold War and formulates the early beginnings of the Soviet Jewry 
movement and its efforts to persuade the Soviet Union, through quiet diplomacy, to grant equal 
rights to its Jewish citizens.  Chapter II features the development of both the establishment 
Jewish organizational effort for Soviet Jewry, and its grassroots activist counterpart.  I outline the 
establishment’s inability to respond to grassroots demands for a more public campaign as Soviet 
Jews began to send pleas for emigration, and how activist frustration soon morphed into violence 
with the creation of Meir Kahane’s Jewish Defense League (JDL).   
In Chapter III, I argue that the JDL briefly usurped control of the Soviet Jewry 
Movement, successfully incorporating elements of its political platform—public protest and 
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demands for Soviet Jewish emigration—into the movement’s agenda.  I contend that to recapture 
its leadership, the establishment movement adopted the emigration battle and extracted it from 
Kahane’s framework of tribal victimhood by replacing it with the language of human rights—an 
opportunity provided to them by endorsing Senator Henry Jackson’s amendment linking U.S.-
Soviet Trade to freedom of emigration in the USSR.  I then establish the intellectual foundation 
for Jackson-Vanik and tells the story of its passage through Congress, expounding upon the 
meaning of the amendment for Soviet Jewry and human rights activism. 
Chapter IV addresses the internationalization of the principle established by Jackson-
Vanik—that a nation’s internal affairs are not only a legitimate topic of international relations, 
but in fact central to them—by investigating the Helsinki Final Act.  In it, I suggest that the 
Soviet Jewry Movement’s role in Helsinki assisted in transforming the right to leave into an 
internationally recognized standard.   
The conclusion considers the meaning behind the Soviet Jewry Movement’s sponsorship 
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Chapter I: Deep Freeze 
Twenty-Thousand Surprises 
 Israel’s first female Prime Minister, Golda Meir, earned a reputation for steely resolve 
and formidable toughness during her half-century political career.  Yet in October 1948, Meir 
lost her legendary composure as she experienced the euphoric cries of over 20,000 Russian Jews.  
Shouting, “shalom, shalom!” and chanting “Nasha Golda” (Our Golda), the massive crowd 
clamored outside Moscow’s Choral Synagogue during the Jewish High Holy Days to glimpse 
Meir, the first ambassador appointed to the Soviet Union from the newly sovereign Jewish state 
of Israel.  Overcome with emotion, Meir could only muster a single message to the throng 
surrounding her: “A dank eich vas ihr seit geblieben Yidden” (Thank you for having remained 
Jews).”17 
 
Figure 1: Israel's first Ambassador to the USSR, Golda Meir, stands amidst a crowd of an estimated 50,000 Jews who 
arrived to greet her at High Holiday services in September, 1948.  In previous years, an average of only 2,000 Jews 
attended High Holiday services. 
“We of course expected to attract attention,” related Modechai Namir, one of Meir’s 
assistants in the embassy who accompanied her, “but what happened was far beyond anything 
we could have imagined.”  As the delegation made its way into the synagogue, Soviet Jews 
                                                 
17 Golda Meir, My Life (New York: Dell, 1976): 235. 
             
         THE GATEWAY 
      
 
20 
thronged around it and said, “You’ve no idea how much Jewish pride and joy you’ve brought us.  
For the love of G-d, take us to Israel too—don’t dessert us.”18   
Meir’s visit to Moscow dramatically revealed that the Soviet Union’s Jews remained 
alive and unafraid to demonstrate their identity.  The Moscow High Holiday gathering 
constituted a miraculous surprise for Jews in Israel and the Diaspora (all Jewish communities 
remaining outside Israel, centered in the United States), who feared that thirty years of Soviet 
government repression and forced assimilation directed toward its approximately 2.5 million 
Jews had all but eradicated their community.19   
Soviet policy regarding its Jewish population starkly contradicted its constitutional 
pledges of “equal rights for all citizens of the USSR, irrespective of nationality or race,” and 
laws forbidding “advocacy of racial or national…hatred and contempt.”20  Communist 
authorities forbade the publishing of Jewish religious materials, outlawed the study of Hebrew, 
restricted Jewish communal ties, and banned all contact with Jews outside the USSR.21  Prior to 
Meir’s appearance in Moscow, then, Jews in the United States and Israel feared that “Jews in the 
Soviet Union had become almost a lost tribe.”22  
Yet Soviet treatment of its Jewish population ironically ensured the community’s 
survival.  The Soviet government sought to eliminate all national, religious, and ethnic 
attachments through propaganda and coercion.  But Jews—or rather, Soviet attitudes toward 
them—presented a conundrum.  While the Communist Party applied its assimilationist model to 
                                                 
18 Mordechai Namir.  Shlilut Le-Moskva [Mission to Moscow], Tel Aviv, 1971, p. 65.  As cited Benjamin 
Pinkus, “Israeli Activity on Behalf of Soviet Jewry.”  In Organizing Rescue: National Jewish Solidarity in the 
Modern Period.  Edited by Selwyn Ilan Troen and Benjamin Pinkus (London: Frank Cass, 1992): 375. 
19 Moshe Decter, “The Status of the Jews in the Soviet Union,” Foreign Affairs, January 1963: 420. 
20 Bucknell University, English Translation of 1936 Soviet Constitution, 
http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/36cons04.html#chap10 (accessed 2/3/10). 
21 Decter, 423. 
22 Nehemiah Levanon, “Israel’s Role in the Campaign,” in A Second Exodus: The American Movement to 
Free Soviet Jewry, ed. Albert Chernin and Murray Friedman (Massachusetts: Brandeis University Press, 1999): 70. 
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the Jews, stripping them of the opportunity to flourish as a distinct community.  Yet official and 
unofficial anti-Semitism in the USSR specifically prevented Jews from assimilating, endlessly 
reinforcing their alien status.23  In Soviet society, “the Jew could not be a Jew but neither could 
be a non-Jew.”24 
Soviet Jews’ paradoxical position within the USSR—in addition to their connection with 
Jews in the U.S. and especially Israel—posed a particular threat to the Soviet system.  Such ties 
suggested that Soviet minorities desired something beyond the USSR, a near-heretical notion 
only reinforced by Golda Meir’s visit to Moscow.  Though he had recently recognized the State 
of Israel, Soviet Premiere Joseph Stalin feared the effect of Israel’s founding upon Soviet Jews in 
the wake of their passionate welcome for Meir.25  The Soviet regime accelerated a campaign of 
murder and suppression that had already begun early in 1948 with its assassination of S.M. 
Mikhoels, a central figure in Jewish theatrical life and head of the Jewish Antifascist 
Committee.26   
Thus began what Jews called the “Shvartze Yoren,” or Black Years, which lasted for the 
next half decade.  Soviet authorities shuttered the remaining Yiddish-language magazine and 
theater, cleared Jewish books from library shelves and bookshop counters, and dismantled all 
Jewish schools.  Meanwhile, Russian officials disbanded the Jewish Antifascist Committee and 
                                                 
23 In addition to enduring various forms of unofficial discrimination, Jews carried a separate nationality in 
the internal Soviet passport, which they needed to display when applying for jobs, registering at universities, or 
enlisting in the army.  This very fact alone probably kept hundreds of thousands of Jews who felt no inherent 
connection to Judaism from integrating fully.  See Gal Beckerman, When They Come For Us, We’ll Be Gone: The 
Epic Struggle to Save Soviet Jewry, Unpublished Manuscript: 89-90; Harry Feingold, Silent No More: Saving the 
Jews of Russia, the American Jewish Effort, 1967-1989 (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2007): 40. 
24 Elie Wiesel, The Jews of Silence (New York: Schocken, 1966): 68..  
25 Avidor Dagan, Moscow and Jerusalem: Twenty Years of Relations Between Israel and the USSR 
(London: Abelard Schuman, 1970): 22. 
26 The USSR established the Jewish Antifascist Committee during World War II to promote the Soviet 
Union among Jews in the West.  The organization continued to function after the war as the de facto representative 
body of the Jewish community in the Soviet Union.  For more on Stalin’s wave of repression against Soviet Jews, 
see Henry Feingold, Silent No More: Saving the Jews of Russia, The American Jewish Effort, 1967-1989 (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 2008): 40-2. 
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imprisoned its members, then expanded its sweep of arrests to over a dozen prominent Soviet 
Jewish writers, who were later executed.27  The grim climax of the Black Years, the infamous 
“Doctor’s Plot,” came in January 1953, when the Soviets charged a number of doctors who had 
treated Stalin with conspiracy to commit murder.  Their deaths—and perhaps wider reprisals 
against the Jewish population—were only averted by Stalin’s death soon thereafter on March 5.   
The Communist regime merely furthered its repression of Jews in the post-Stalin era, 
continuing to discourage and punish all political, social, and cultural activity among Soviet Jews, 
who remained scattered and quiescent.  Vocal Soviet Jewish opposition and organized protest 
would not arise for another decade, well after American and Israeli efforts to alleviate their plight 
had already begun.28   
* * * 
The American and Israeli Response 
American Jews only slowly recognized the peril faced by their brethren in the USSR.  As 
knowledge of Soviet anti-Semitic brutality reached the American Jewish organizational 
                                                 
27 William Orbach, The American Movement to Aid Soviet Jews (Boston: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1979): 13.  
28 Zvi Gitelman, “Soviet Jews: Creating a Cause and a Movement,” in A Second Exodus: The American 
Movement to Free Soviet Jewry, ed. Albert Chernin and Murray Friedman (Massachusetts: Brandeis University 
Press, 1999): 84-5.   
Note: Early Zionist activity did begin to occur in the mid 1960s, especially in Riga, Latvia, where a group 
of Jews gathered at Rumbuli, an area on the outskirts of Riga where the Nazis murdered 25,000 Jews and dumped 
them in a mass grave.  Soviet authorities had done nothing to commemorate the site, and grudgingly allowed a small 
group of activists to excavate the remains and create a proper memorial.  See Beckerman, 17. 
Note: The lack of internal Soviet Jewish opposition to the USSR produced a condescending attitude toward 
Soviet Jewry among American Soviet Jewry supporters.  Even after the emergence of overt Soviet Jewish agitation 
for emigration in the late 1960s—largely the product of Israel’s 1967 Six-Day War—the Soviet Jewry movement 
continued to adopt a paternalistic attitude toward Soviet Jews, portraying them as “silent” and “invisible,” incapable 
of independent organization.  In its “Matzah (unleavened bread) for Hope” program for Passover, which called on 
Jews to affirm their commitment to the Soviet Jewish cause by setting aside a piece of Matzah at their Passover 
meals, the American Jewish Conference for Soviet Jewry (AJCSJ) described itself as “the voice” of Soviet Jews.  
Later, it revised the paragraph to read, “we add our voices to theirs (Soviet Jews).”  See Shaul Kelner, “Ritualized 
Protest and Redemptive Politics: Cultural Consequences of the American Mobilization to Free Soviet Jewry,” 
Jewish Social Studies: History, Culture, Society Vol. 14, No. 3 (Spring/Summer 2008): 26.  The accusation of 
paternalism would return in the 1970s and 80s as well. 
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establishment, it neglected to educate the broad spectrum of American Jewry about the issue, let 
alone organize a collective effort aimed at marshalling public opinion against the USSR.29 
While the U.S. Jewish establishment engaged in spasmodic and temporary reactions to 
Soviet repression of its Jewish population throughout the 1950s, the Israeli government more 
rapidly embraced responsibility for the fate of Soviet Jewry.30  It responded to Stalin’s 
oppression by establishing the Liaison Bureau, an organization dedicated to bringing Soviet Jews 
to Israel.31  Headed by Shaul Avigur, a veteran of the operation that illegally ferreted European 
Jews into Palestine past the British mandate blockade, the Bureau operated discreetly and 
reported directly to the Prime Minister.  It sent three Russian-speaking Israeli families to its 
embassy on a mission to assist and maintain contact with Soviet Jews by providing them 
information, smuggling in Jewish cultural and religious material, and potentially assisting them 
with emigrating.32   
                                                 
29 Historian Howard Sachar has suggested that, eager to escape their own “black years” of the Holocaust, 
many U.S. Jews devoted their energies to securing their place in American life rather than defending world Jewry, 
either in Russia or in Israel. Although some Jews in the United States continued to harbor sympathetic views toward 
the Soviet Union—either because they remained hardened Soviet supporters, or because they appreciated Stalin’s 
recognition of Israel—the majority of American Jewish leadership no longer held romanticized perceptions of the 
USSR.  Howard M. Sachar, A History of Jews in America (New York: Knopf, 1992): 108. 
According to Soviet Jewry scholar and former activist Albert Chernin, their reluctance likely stemmed from 
fear that the Soviets would paint any American activism on behalf of Russian Jewry as an international Jewish 
conspiracy to undermine the USSR, perhaps placing Soviet Jews in even greater jeopardy.  See Albert Chernin, 
“Making Soviet Jews an Issue,” in A Second Exodus: The American Movement to Free Soviet Jewry, ed. Albert 
Chernin and Murray Friedman (Massachusetts: Brandeis University Press, 1999): 17-18. 
30 See Yaacov Ro’i, The Struggle for Soviet Jewish Emigration, 1948-1967 (New York: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1991): 92-101, as well as Chernin, 19-23.  The Doctors’ Plot temporarily brought the issue of Soviet Jewry to 
the public eye in Israel and the United States.  The Israeli government broke its prior policy of sensitivity toward the 
plight of Soviet Jewry, and announced that Soviet policy could not help but “arouse the most vigorous resentment 
and condemnation by the State of Israel.”  Meanwhile, American Jewish communal organizations lobbied Congress, 
picketed the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, and organized the first protest rally of the Soviet Jewry 
movement on February 16, 1953, in which 3,500 people gathered in New York.  The momentum from the campaign 
in the United States quickly evaporated as the threat from the Doctors’ Plot receded. 
31 Israel’s leaders believed that their fledgling state depended ideologically and pragmatically on the 
ingathering of Jewish exiles as rapidly as possible.  The country’s Declaration of Independence embodies this 
ideology even today, stating that Israel must “be open to the immigration of Jews from all countries of the 
dispersion.” 
32 Levanon, 71-2 
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Following precise instructions issued by Avigur’s office, the Bureau agents toured the 
country and established contacts with Jews in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, and 
elsewhere—connections that inculcated Jewish national consciousness within the Soviet Union 
and that would later prove invaluable to the Soviet Jewry movement’s information network 
within the USSR.  Nehemiah Levanon, one of the special delegates sent by Israel to establish 
communication with Soviet Jews and later expelled by the Soviet Union in 1955 on charges of 
espionage, returned to Israel convinced that the emergence of Israel had galvanized elements of 
Soviet Jewry.  While Israel could not rescue the Soviet Jews community on its own due to its 
small size and delicate political reality vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Levanon believed that in its 
post-Stalinist attempt to improve its global image, the Soviet leadership might prove susceptible 
to sustained pressure from public opinion in the United States.  He recommended to the Liaison 
Bureau that “the time had come to launch a campaign in the West.”33   
Recognizing its limitations, the Bureau agreed.  It organized a second branch meant to 
place Soviet Jewry on the public agenda in Western countries.  The Bureau hoped that an aware 
and concerned American Jewish community, in particular, would influence the U.S. government 
to pressure the Soviet Union to permit Jewish immigration to Israel.  Their message to American 
audiences sought to “separate the problem of Soviet Jewry from the ‘cold war’ between the 
Power blocs.”34  The Bureau thought that by divorcing the issue from the Cold War, it would 
potentially win the allegiance of the leftist individuals and other influential non-Jewish public 
figures.  Concurrently, the Bureau utilized the Soviet constitution itself in assembling its case, 
contending that the Soviets had failed to uphold their legal pledges to permit Jewish cultural 
expression.  Importantly, the Bureau also introduced the notion of Jewish emigration from the 
                                                 
33 Levanon, 72. 
34 Pinkus, 387. 
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Soviet Union.  It contended that the USSR should allow Jews to exit the Communist bloc based 
on the principle of “family reunification,” the notion that relatives could leave to rejoin their 
family members abroad.  American Jewish leaders would not prominently feature this element of 
the Israelis’ case into their own Soviet Jewry activism, preferring to lobby the Soviets directly 
for Jewish civil rights within the USSR rather than their emigration. 
* * * 
A Slow Awakening 
 The American Jewish Committee (AJC) launched the first American Jewish diplomatic 
efforts on behalf of Soviet Jewry in 1959 by securing a meeting with Soviet first deputy premier 
Anastas Mikoyan.35  The AJC arranged the summit to confront Mikoyan directly about reports 
that his government was considering a proposal to forcibly resettle a substantial portion of Soviet 
Jews—then mostly living in urban areas—to the Jewish Autonomous Region of Birobidzhan in 
Siberia.  When presented with a well-documented memorandum on the status of Soviet Jews, 
Mikoyan reacted indignantly, denying any intention to deport Jews and rejecting charges of 
official discrimination.36   
Though fears of a mass Jewish exodus to Birobidzhan proved unrealized, the incident 
cemented a growing realization among American and Israeli Jewish leaders that despite modest 
liberalization undertaken by Khrushchev to undue Stalin’s legacy in the USSR, Soviet authorities 
did not intend to allow the rebirth of Jewish communal activity.37  At Mikoyan’s refusal to 
acknowledge the mistreatment of Soviet Jewry, American Jewish organizations concluded that 
they would need to enlist public intellectuals and the U.S. government in their enterprise. 
                                                 
35 Interview with David Harris, February 2010. 
36 Naomi W. Cohen, Not Free to Desist: American Jewish Committee, 1906-1966 (Philadelphia: Jewish 
Publication Society, 1972): 504-5 
37 Ro’i, 60. 
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The Liaison Bureau initiated the effort to broaden the Soviet Jewry coalition by recruiting 
Moshe Decter, the managing editor of The New Leader, a highly influential liberal anti-
communist magazine in New York.38  Decter worked secretly alongside the Israelis to establish 
the Jewish Minorities Research Bureau, one of the first American organizations dedicated 
exclusively to Soviet Jewry.  Decter utilized his contacts in liberal political spheres to elevate the 
status of the Soviet Jewry issue, cultivating support from such notable figures as Eleanor 
Roosevelt, Socialist Party leader and perennial presidential candidate Norman Thomas, Supreme 
Court Justice William O. Douglas, National Association of the Advancement of Colored Peoples 
(NAACP) President Thurgood Marshall, and Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, each of 
whom signed a petition drafted by Decter and sent to Khrushchev on behalf of Soviet Jews. 39   
Decter became an invaluable asset.  His January 1963 Foreign Affairs article, “The Status 
of Jews in the Soviet Union,” signaled a turning point in the Soviet Jewry Movement.  The piece 
detailed the uniquely precarious conditions faced by the Soviet Jewish community as the “only 
nationality deprived of the basic cultural rights accorded to all others in the USSR,” including 
restrictions on prayer, publishing, education, and employment opportunities.  Decter noted that 
the 22nd Soviet Congress had recently reaffirmed the “complete freedom of each citizen of the 
USSR to speak and to rear and educate his children in any language”—those very rights 
specifically denied to Jews.  In sum, he concluded: 
Soviet policy places Jews in an inextricable vise.  They are allowed neither to assimilate, 
or live a full Jewish life, nor to emigrate (as many would wish) to Israel or any other 
place where they might live freely as Jews…Soviet policy as a whole, then, amounts to 
spiritual strangulation—the deprivation of Soviet Jewry’s natural right to know the 
Jewish past and to participate in the Jewish present.  And without a past and present, the 
future is precarious indeed.40   
                                                 
38 Lazin, 26. 
39 Lazin, 27. 
40 Decter, “Status of Soviet Jews,” 421-2.   
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The article resonated widely among academics and intellectuals not previously aware of 
the unique predicament of Soviet Jewry.  In fact, many of those who eventually became active in 
the struggle credited the piece with awakening their interest.41  Decter seized on the momentum 
generated by the piece to organize a Conference on the Status of Soviet Jews at the Carnegie 
International Center in New York in October 1963, the first American conference on Soviet 
Jewry.  The assembly enjoyed the prestigious sponsorship of Supreme Court Justice William O. 
Douglas, Martin Luther King, Jr., Leonard Bernstein, Arthur Miller, Linus Pauling, and Norman 
Thomas—all of whom signed an appeal to Soviet authorities to remedy their treatment of Jews.   
The appeal issued seven demands on the USSR, demanding permission of Jewish 
education, cultural institutions, and contact with Jews worldwide.  Their efforts demonstrated 
concrete non-Jewish concern for Soviet Jewry amongst America’s civil and religious rights 
luminaries, a critical ingredient in later attempts to fashion the Soviet Jewry Movement as a 
human rights campaign.42  More significantly, however, it indicated that the American Jewish 
establishment believed that it could assist in remedying Soviet Jews by lobbying for their civil 
rights.  American Jewish leaders would remain wedded to this notion throughout the 1960s, even 
as Soviet Jews themselves began indicating that they had forsaken hope for equal station in 
Soviet society, and instead hoped to emigrate.   
Decter’s conference coincided with a burgeoning Movement within the American Jewish 
establishment, spurred by Meir Rosenne and the Liaison Bureau, to establish an umbrella 
organization dedicated solely to advocating on behalf of Soviet Jewry.43  Indeed, the forum 
occurred just one week before a scheduled meeting between Senators Jacob Javits (R-NY), 
                                                 
41 In Cleveland, Decter’s article inspired Lou Rosenblum and Herb Caron to form the Cleveland Committee 
on Soviet Anti-Semitism (CCSA), the first grassroots Soviet Jewry organization.  It formed several days after 
Decter’s Soviet Jewry conference at Carnegie Hall in New York.   
42 Orbach, 20. 
43 Lazin, 28. 
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Abraham Ribicoff (D-CN) and Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg and Soviet Ambassador 
to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin.  Javits, Ribicoff, and Goldberg viewed the parlay as an 
opportunity to register official U.S. disapproval with Soviet policy toward its Jews, and provide 
the Soviets with a last chance at quiet diplomacy.  After four hours of obstinate denials from 
Dobrynin regarding anti-Semitism in his nation, Goldberg decided that the American Jewish 
community should officially shift from backroom negotiations to responsible protest.44  The 
emerging fundamental changes in the approach of American Jewish leadership regarding 
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Chapter II: Battle Forge 
 Columbia’s many years of infamous student protests often define the school’s reputation.  
The University’s Philosophy Hall remained largely unscathed over the years, escaping 
occupation during the violent 1968 student takeover and retaining its reputation as a place of 
contemplation and philosophical inquiry.  On April 27, 1964, however, about 200 college 
students from across New York City disrupted Philosophy Hall’s atmosphere of reflection to 
gather in room 301, where they declared the formation of the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry 
(SSSJ).  Glenn Richter, soon the organization’s co-director, later described the atmosphere in 
Philosophy Hall as “electric.”45  Students denounced the “silence” of the American Jewish 
community during the Holocaust, “vowing that their response to Jewish suffering would be 
different.”  As SSSJ founder Jacob Birnbaum declared in the leaflet for the event, “the time has 
come for mass grass-roots Movement—spearheaded by the student youth… we believe that a 
bold, well-planned campaign…can create a climate of opinion, a moral power, which will 
become a force to be reckoned with.46 
 Several young activists demanded immediate action.  Birnbaum and Richter agreed, 
planning to stage a rally outside of the Soviet Union’s Mission to the U.N. on May 1 (otherwise 
known as May Day, a major workers’ celebration in communist countries), just four days after 
the Philosophy Hall meeting.  Despite hurried preparation, the SSSJ’s demonstration produced 
one of the first mass rallies of the Soviet Jewry Movement, as over 1,000 students from across 
Manhattan picketed the Soviet Mission for hours.  The protesters marched two-by-two like the 
                                                 
45 Interview with Glenn Richter, February 2010. 
46 Gal Beckerman, When They Come for Us, We’ll Be Gone: The Epic Struggle to Save Soviet Jewry, 
Unpublished Manuscript: 76.   
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early civil rights protests in the south and sang “Ani Ma’amin,” a repetition of the Hebrew phrase 
I Believe over and over again.47 
 
Figure 2: A New York Times photograph of the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry's first rally outside the Soviet Mission to 
the United Nations on May 1, 1964.  Over 1,000 people marched, including Manhattan Congressman Leonard Fabstein.  
“Soviet U.N. Mission is Picketed by 700 Over Anti-Semitism,” New York Times, May 2, 1964. 
The SSSJ came into existence less than a month after 500 delegates from 24 leading 
American Jewish organizations had convened at the Willard Hotel in Washington, D.C. to 
discuss the creation of a new umbrella coalition to coordinate all efforts on behalf of Soviet 
Jewry.  In front of reporters from across the United States and even the Soviet Union, conference 
representatives announced the creation of the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry 
(AJCSJ).   
The new national organization would draw upon the resources of its constituent groups to 
“bring to the attention of the world the facts about the oppression of Soviet Jewry, through every 
means at its command.”  In its first resolution, the AJCSJ declared that “the approximately three 
million Jews of the USSR have a special claim on the conscience of all who are zealous of 
                                                 
47 Yossi Klein Halevi, “Jacob Birnbaum and the Struggle for Soviet Jewry,” Azure, No. 17, Summer 2004. 
http://www.jewishagency.org/JewishAgency/English/Jewish+Education/Educational+Resources/More+Educational
+Resources/Azure/17/birnbaum.htm; Beckerman, 78. 
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securing human rights, and, more particularly, on the conscience of all Jewry.”  It determined “to 
mobilize public opinion into a moral force that will save Soviet Jewry from spiritual 
annihilation.”  Soviet leadership, it contended, “is not impervious to such world opinion.”48   
Ostensibly, then, the AJCSJ’s inception marked a profound evolution in the philosophy 
and strategy of the Soviet Jewry Movement.  The conference’s stated goal of mounting a 
vigorous public campaign to rally global sympathy seemed to discard old preferences for quiet 
diplomacy and shed fears that open dissent might spawn Soviet reprisals against Soviet Jews. 
American Jewish organizations appeared willing to launch a concerted effort “to protest the 
plight of [their] Jewish brethren in the Soviet Union.”49  The AJCSJ quickly became the 
representative of the established and organized Jewish community.50 
Yet according to former SSSJ and Jewish Defense League (JDL) activist Yossi Klein-
Halevi, Soviet Jewry advocates outside the AJCSJ quickly realized that its expressed dedication 
to “mobilize public opinion” and utilize human rights would “exist mostly on paper.”51  As a 
coordinating body of autonomous organizations, the AJCSJ suffered innate institutional 
handicaps.  Its founding members, constantly jockeying for funds and supporters, did not easily 
welcome a new organization into an already crowded field.  They felt it “neither necessary nor 
desirable” to form a completely independent body, and refused to provide the new Soviet Jewry 
conference with either a full-time staff or permanent budget.52   
                                                 
48 Resolution adopted by the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry, April 6, 1964, Papers of Jerry 
Goodman, Box #5, Folder #1, Collection of the American Jewish Historical Society, New York, NY. 
49 Resolution adopted by the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry, April 6, 1964, Papers of Jerry 
Goodman, Box #5, Folder #1, Collection of the American Jewish Historical Society, New York, NY. 
50 Lazin, 30. 
51 Klein-Halevi, “Jacob Birnbaum.” 
52 Jerry Goodman Meeting Minutes of May 26, 1964 AJCSJ meeting at Hotel Delmonico, Papers of Jerry 
Goodman, Box #5, Folder #1, Collection of the American Jewish Historical Society, New York, NY.  Note: Jacob 
Birnbaum and his lead SSSJ activists sat in on this very same meeting to request funding for educational initiatives.  
See p. 32 for further discussion. 
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In the most discouraging sign to the burgeoning activist wing of the American Jewish 
community, however, the AJCSJ immediately announced its intention to meet with the Soviet 
government for a “good-faith exploration” of the Soviet Jewry.53  In Klein-Halevi’s view, this 
sentiment represented a “lack of political self-confidence” and continued “ambivalence about a 
public campaign” among the American Jewish establishment, a sign that its rhetoric about 
capturing “world opinion” would remain unrealized.54   
The AJCSJ’s continued predilection for quiet diplomacy derived from traditional 
American Jewish reticence toward public protest.  World Jewish Congress (WJC) president 
Nahum Goldmann, the elder statesman of international Jewry, opposed “emotional” protests and 
remained a strong proponent of private negotiations, believing he could obtain a personal 
meeting with Soviet leadership.  The AJC—which constituted perhaps the most important 
organization within the AJCSJ—followed Goldmann’s logic and “was shaped by an 
organizational culture that had always been averse to emotional public displays and mass 
rallies,” preferring, like the WJC, to work through diplomatic channels.   
The Israeli Liaison Bureau also played a significant role in exerting influence over the 
AJCSJ to follow its specific vision.  The Israelis did not conceive of the struggle for Soviet 
Jewry as a humanitarian issue, but a Jewish problem alone.  As Rabbi Sidney Schwartz notes in 
Judaism and Justice, because the Israelis viewed the Soviet Jewry issue “as primarily one to 
facilitate Jewish immigration to Israel” in continuation of the Zionist enterprise of ingathering 
Jewish exiles, they were not interested in “being drawn into a broader campaign to hold the 
Soviets accountable for other human rights abuses.”55  In addition to their ideological opposition 
to linking the SJM with a broader human rights appeal, the Israelis also feared that any such 
                                                 
53 Orbach, 26. 
54 Klein-Halevi, “Joseph Birnbaum.” 
55 Schwartz, Sidney.  Judaism and Justice (New York: Jewish Lights Publishing, 2006), 133. 
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association might hinder diplomatic efforts to elicit Soviet cooperation.  Anxious to avoid 
antagonizing Moscow in the years before the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel still preferred a cautious, 
patient campaign that kept its own involvement hidden. 
* * * 
Louder and Prouder 
The SSSJ saw the AJCSJ as a colossal disappointment.  Motivated by a sense of urgency 
that it saw lacking in the Jewish establishment effort for Soviet Jewry—and an acute sense of 
moral obligation only two decades removed from American Jewish silence regarding the 
Holocaust—the SSSJ fashioned itself as the Jewish version of America’s wider youth protest 
counterculture of the 1960s.  Birnbaum captured the spirit of the new Movement: 
“Just as we, as human beings and as Jews, are conscious of the wrongs suffered by the 
Negro and we fight for his betterment, so we must come to feel in ourselves the silent, 
strangulated pain of so many of our Russian brethren…  We, who condemn silence and 
inaction during the Nazi Holocaust, dare we keep silent now?56 
 That Birnbaum’s stirring message helped to inspire 1,000 people to rally four days later 
at the Soviet UN Mission came as little surprise to his chief SSSJ deputy, Glenn Richter.  In his 
view, “many Jewish college students were tremendously moved by the American civil rights 
Movement, then in its pristine, idealistic stage, but weren’t going to demonstrate for [civil 
rights].  We provided a Jewish alternative for that pent up emotion.”57 
 Indeed, the SSSJ drew much of its vision and tactical doctrine from the civil rights 
movement.  According to a 1973 study of the organization, nearly a third of its members had 
participated in the campaign for civil rights, including Richter himself.58  Their experience as 
                                                 
56 Klein-Halevi, “Jacob Birnbaum.”  
57 Interview with Glenn Richter, February 2010. 
58 Kelner, 12; Beckerman, 77.  Richter had worked at the New York office of the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the youth civil rights group spearheading voter registration in Mississippi.  He 
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civil rights activists led to a “transference of confrontational tactics” from one movement to 
another, as Birnbaum embarked on a campaign to “shame an apathetic American Jewry into 
action.”59  
 Based on their civil rights experience, Richter noted, the SSSJ modeled activities “to 
attract media attention—creative demonstrations, marches, many news releases, talking to the 
press.”  Cultivation of public opinion became “key” to the SSSJ’s efforts.60  Klein-Halevi agreed, 
writing that the SSSJ “appealed to “pubic opinion” as a galvanizing force.61  “The greater we 
could make the [Soviet Jewry] issue visible,” Richter recalled, “the more self-validating it 
became.”  Visibility turned the cogs of public pressure envisaged by Birnbaum, forcing 
“Congress, the State Department, and the White House to respond to our demands and press the 
Soviets.”62  Rather than seek audience with Soviet officials, SSSJ members pamphleted college 
dormitories, flew to the Soviet Union to meet Soviet Jews, and staged demonstrations. 
 SSSJ’s boisterous activism rankled the AJCSJ, which sought to impose “discipline” upon 
the maverick group.  The two shared their first encounter at an AJCSJ gathering in late May 
1964, at which Birnbaum and his closest associates requested funds from the new conglomerate 
organization to print informational kits for Jewish summer camps.  The AJCSJ agreed to supply 
                                                 
left the movement after the rise of Stokley Carmichael, whose more aggressive and exclusionary approach alienated 
non-black supporters.   
SSSJ activists were not alone in drawing inspiration from the civil rights movement.  William Korey, U.N. 
Director of B’nai B’rith and one of the earliest establishment Soviet Jewry activists, as well as Morris Abram, 
president of the AJC as well as later chairman of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ) both stated that 
they originally related to the Soviet Jewry cause through their civil rights activism.  As Abram, a member of the US 
Commission for Civil Rights, stated in 1989:  
“I saw this problem of Soviet Jewry in the context of my general feeling about civil rights.  I saw the Soviet 
Jews as experiencing that which the blacks had experienced in the South and I saw the Soviets in violation 
of all the constitutional principles they say they adhere to, as we in the US were in violation, and it sort of 
reverberated to me with particular intensity because of the fact that it was a terrible totalitarian state—it 
is—and particularly against Jews.”  See Reminiscences of Morris Abram (10/5/89), p. 37, AJCOHC. 
59 Feingold, 55; Klein-Halevi, Memoirs of a Jewish Extremist: An American Story (New York: Little, 
Brown, and Co., 1995): 52. 
60 Interview with Glenn Richter, February 2010. 
61 Klein-Halevi, Memoirs, 53. 
62 Interview with Glenn Richter, February 2010. 
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funds only on the condition that the SSSJ follow orders from the establishment.  Birnbaum 
adamantly rejected the offer and refused to accept any form of oversight.  Yet according to 
Richter, the AJCSJ set financial conditions on the SSSJ not only out of a desire to reign it in, but 
because “it could hardly fund itself.”  When asked why the SSSJ chose not to enter the 
establishment fold, Richter was dismissive.  “They weren’t doing much or achieving much,” he 
said.  “Why join that crowd,” Richter asked, while the SSSJ went “barreling ahead with 
demonstrations, programs, printed material, [and] getting students involved?”63 
 
Figure 3: Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry (SSSJ) Exodus Rally, April 1970.  The American Jewish Conference on Soviet 
Jewry (AJCSJ) cosponsored the event, marking a rare occasion of cooperation between the establishment Soviet Jewry 
organization and the grassroots youth activists of the SSSJ.  Over 20,000 people attended.  Temple Beth El of New 
Rochelle, New York, “Archive Committee Looks Back at the Campaign to Rescue Soviet Jewry: 
http://www.bethelnr.org/images/sitepicts//SSSJexodusmarch.jpg (accessed 2/10/2010). 
Despite their stormy initial meeting, the SSSJ’s growing success impelled the AJCSJ to 
assimilate grassroots public relations tactics.  Already by June 1965, the AJCSJ flexed its 
considerable potential by staging a rally of 20,000 people in New York’s Madison Square 
Garden.64  Like the SSSJ and Moshe Decter before it, the AJCSJ fostered non-Jewish support, 
garnering a roster of speakers that included Robert F. Kennedy, Norman Thomas, and a taped 
                                                 
63 Interview with Glenn Richter, February 2010. 
64 Already at this rally, SSSJ students carried placards that read “Let My People Go,” a fact which greatly 
disturbed the quietist Nahum Goldmann.  See Beckerman, 136. 
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message from U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson.  It organized the first Soviet Jewry rally in the 
nation’s capital soon thereafter, integrating an interfaith component of Catholic and Protestant 
clergymen that uncannily resembled an SSSJ rally from the previous year.65  By December 1965, 
the rhetoric—if not yet the practice—of the AJCSJ could easily have been mistaken for an SSSJ 
manifesto:  
The AJCSJ…seeks to bring about removal of the restrictions and deprivations imposed 
upon Jews in the Soviet Union through an intensive program…designed to expose those 
restrictions and deprivations to the world and thereby to bring an outraged world public 
opinion to bear upon the Soviet government…Soviet leadership is sensitive and troubled.  
Moscow is vulnerable; it is susceptible to the pressure of world opinion; it does move in 
response to it.66 
 
The AJCSJ even appeared to follow the SSSJ’s lead by introducing references to human 
rights in its campaign material.  At a conference for Soviet Jewry in April 1966, it issued a 
Declaration of Rights for Soviet Jewry from Congress Hall in Philadelphia.  The resolution, 
signed by the vast majority of the U.S. Senate, invoked the U.N. Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and its affirmation of “faith…in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women of all nations large and small,” to chastise the Soviet Union and 
“protest the violation of the human rights of three million [Soviet Jews].”67  Continuing to lend 
                                                 
65 AJCSJ Press Release Regarding Eternal Light Vigil Rally, Washington D.C., 9/19/65, Papers of Jerry 
Goodman, Box #5, Folder #1, Collection of the American Jewish Historical Society, New York, NY.   
Note: This followed several interfaith efforts, including the establishment of the Conference on the Status 
of Soviet Jews, which created a panel in 1965 and released its findings in 1966 regarding the situation of Soviet 
Jewry.  The committee, headed by Bayard Rustin, an African-American civil rights leader, included Dr. John 
Bennett, president of the Union Theological Seminary; Father George Ford, pastor emeritus, Corpus Christi Church 
(on 121st Street); Samuel Fishman, head of United Automobile Workers; Telford Taylor, professor of law at 
Columbia; and Norman Thomas, the veteran socialist leader.  It concluded that an official USSR campaign existed 
to eliminate the separate religious and cultural identity of Soviet Jewry.  The report included a statement by Bertrand 
Russell, the British lord and philosopher who engaged in a series of letter exchanges with Soviet Premiere Nikita 
Khrushchev regarding the plight of Soviet Jewry.  See AJCSJ Press Release, 3/19/66, Jerry Goodman Papers, Box 
#5, Folder #1, Collection of the American Jewish Historical Society, New York, NY.   
66 AJCSJ Interim Report,12/20/65, Papers of Jerry Goodman, Box #5, Folder #1, Collection of the 
American Jewish Historical Society, New York, NY. 
67 Declaration of Rights for Soviet Jewry in Congress Hall, Philadelphia, Papers of Jerry Goodman, 
4/18/66, Papers of Jerry Goodman, Box #5, Folder #2, Collection of the American Jewish Historical Society, New 
York, NY. 
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crucial moral legitimacy and publicity to the Soviet Jewry Movement, Martin Luther King, Jr. 
delivered a telephone address to AJCSJ community heads in late 1966 that confirmed the 
growing centrality of human rights to the Soviet Jewry issue.  “No person of good will can stand 
by a silent auditor while there is a possibility of the complete spiritual and cultural destruction of 
a once flourishing Jewish community [in the Soviet Union],” he declared.  “The denial of human 
rights anywhere is a threat to human rights everywhere.”68 
These tantalizing references to human rights served as one of the earliest indications that 
the Soviet Jewry Movement might begin to link its parochial concern for Jewish civil rights to a 
universalized appeal for the Soviet Union to uphold the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights.69  
The allusion to the Declaration offered the potential to redefine the focus and scope of the entire 
Soviet Jewry campaign, both broadening its appeal and positioning it in direct confrontation with 
the very underlying ideology of the USSR by holding it responsible for all human rights its 
domain, as opposed to advocating on behalf of Jewish rights alone.   
Yet even with the marked increase in references to international human rights 
agreements, the AJCSJ had not completed the Soviet Jewry Movement’s transformation from 
parochial to universal.  This evolution would later be defined by its insistence upon “right to 
leave” for Soviet Jews as its fundamental tenet.  Instead, the AJCSJ continued to reference civil 
and religious rights in its 1966 Philadelphia Declaration, neglecting to reference free emigration 
in six demands made of the Soviet Union.  
                                                 
68 Text of Address Delivered by Martin Luther King, Jr., to AJCSJ Community Leaders, 12/11/66, Papers 
of Jerry Goodman, Box #5, Folder #2, Collection of the American Jewish Historical Society, New York, NY. 
69 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.  Article 13(2) of 
the Declaration—“Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country”—
would later come to play a vital role in the Soviet Jewry movement, and served as the legal lynchpin of the 
American and Israeli campaign to foster Jewish emigration from the USSR.  Movement activists would not begin to 
utilize this provision until the end of the 1960s. 
             
         THE GATEWAY 
      
 
38 
Six days in June 1967, however, would make the question of Soviet Jewish emigration 
unavoidable.  
* * * 
A Mediterranean Awakening 
 At nightfall on June 4, 1967, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan appeared ready to launch a three-
pronged military assault on Israel, with the declared intention of destroying the nascent Jewish 
state.  By dawn, Israeli planes had wiped out the Egyptian air force.  Israel’s pre-emptive strike 
guaranteed it air superiority for the next five days, as it not only defeated the combined Arab 
armies, but nearly quadrupled its size.  
The overnight transition from an Israel besieged by Arab forces poised for its destruction 
to an Israel whose guns threatened Arab capitals and whose flag flew over Jerusalem’s Temple 
Mount catapulted world Jewry from a position of vulnerability to one of unprecedented 
empowerment.  For Soviet Jews, Israel’s stunning victory tore a gaping hole through the small 
crack already opened by Khrushchev during the post-Stalinist liberalization, allowing Jews to 
imagine an alternate reality of empowerment without fearing arrest or death.70  Yet the USSR 
simultaneously severed diplomatic relations with Israel, providing impetus for renewed and ever 
more ferocious Soviet anti-Zionism.  Soviet Jews decisively influenced the Movement in the 
United States, impelling it to greater activism.  The very questioning of Jewish loyalty to the 
Soviet fatherland aggravated Soviet Jewish ambivalence, and Jews came to realize the 
incompatibility of life in a Soviet society.  Emigration emerged as the solution.71 
                                                 
70 As noted earlier in Beckerman, Jewish cultural activity had already increased considerably during the 
mid-1960s.  Zvi Gitelman writes that a Jewish samizdat (underground publications) developed, with materials of 
censored books passed form one city to another.  Loosening Soviet restrictions permitted Jews to form Yiddish 
theater ensembles and to congregate at synagogues.  Jews also began to gather at the sites of Nazi mass murders, 
such as Rumbuli.  See Gitelman, 85. 
71 Orbach, 36. 
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Indeed, Soviet Jews had already sought emigration visas from the USSR for several 
years, but with little success—Soviet authorities permitted only 2,436 Jews to depart for Israel 
prior to 1965.72  Soviet Premiere Alexei Kosygin sparked hope for increased emigration rates in 
December 1966, when he told a Paris press conference that “we, on our side, shall do all possible 
if some [Jewish] families want to meet or even if some among them would like to leave us…this 
does not raise here, actually, any problem of principles.”73  While Jews left the USSR at slightly 
higher rates in 1966 and 1967, the flow ceased immediately after the Six Day War began. 
Yet the Soviets could not contain the energy released by Israel’s triumph.  A young Jew 
from Moscow, Yasha Kozokov, ignited the first explosion of Soviet Jewish demand for 
emigration when he renounced his Soviet citizenship a mere seven days after the war, an 
unprecedented action that baffled the Communist party leadership.  A year later, declared in a 
letter to Soviet leaders, “I consider myself a citizen of the State of Israel.  I demand to be freed 
from the humiliation of Soviet citizenship.”  Kozokov managed to smuggle the letter abroad, 
where it was published in The Washington Post and attracted immediate publicity.  Unwilling to 
withstand international pressure, the Soviets relented and allowed Kozokov to emigrate in 
February 1969.74   
Meanwhile, a Kiev Jew named Boris Kochubyevski shocked Soviet officials when he 
refused to vote for a “unanimous” condemnation of Israel at a factory meeting.  He penned an 
essay called “Why I Am a Zionist,” which circulated as samizdat (censored unpublished 
material) and declared that “as long as I am capable of feeling, I will do all I can to leave for 
Israel.”  Yet Kochubyevski’s essay went unnoticed in the West for far longer than Kozokov’s, 
                                                 
72 See Lazin, “Freedom of Choice,” 409. 
73 Quoted in Ro’i, 246. 
74 “The Russian Jews Wonder Whether Israel Is Really Ready for Them,” Sol Stern, New York 
Times, April, 16, 1972. 
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allowing the Soviets to punish him without fear of global condemnation.  Kochubyevski spent 
the next three years in a hard labor prison and became one of the first refuseniks—those Jews 
whose applications for exit visas to Israel were rejected by the Soviet administration. 
Kozokov and Kochubyevski, however, fomented a gathering avalanche of Soviet Jewish 
resistance that dovetailed and began mingling with a broader intellectual revolution springing to 
life in the USSR.  The image of Soviet tanks rolling into Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968 
to snuff out the Prague Spring—a short period of political and economic liberalization which ran 
counter to USSR desires—outraged the younger generation of Soviet citizens, who saw a post-
Khrushchev Soviet leadership powerful enough to deploy an iron fist but deeply insecure about 
popular discontent.  They formed protest groups throughout the mid to late 1960s that soon 
gained the endorsement of far more esteemed figures—most notably, the father of the Soviet 
hydrogen bomb and democratic dissident leader Andrei Sakharov, who published his first 
groundbreaking essay on civil rights in the spring of 1968.75 
Buoyed, perhaps, by the dissident fever spreading across the Soviet Union—as well as 
increased Jewish emigration, permitted in a Soviet attempt to decapitate the budding refusenik 
effort by exiling its leaders, which only served to boost Soviet Jewish desire to emigrate—
eighteen Georgian Jewish families embarked on another boldly rebellious act in August 1969.  
They addressed a letter to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and Israeli Prime Minister 
                                                 
75 Beckerman, 108-109.   
Note: Sakharov’s first essay, “Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom,” called for “convergence,” 
which Sakharov described as “the rapprochement of the socialist and capitalist systems.”  This, according to 
Sakharov, would involve “democratization, demilitarization, and social and technological progress.”  He pointed to 
anti-Semitism as a stain upon Soviet society.  His activism drew the ire of Soviet authorities, who removed him from 
his employment as a chief member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and stripped him of all state privileges.  Also: 
Significant overlap existed between the democratic dissident movement and the Jewish refusenik effort—according 
to Leonard Schroeter, sixty to seventy percent of the democrats were either Jewish or married to Jews.  More on the 
relationship between the democrat and Jewish activists will be discussed later.  See Leonard Schroeter, The Last 
Exodus (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1979): 377.  
For more on Sakharov’s transformation from Soviet nuclear scientist to human rights activist, see Philip 
Spiegel, Triumph Over Tyranny: The Heroic Campaigns that Saved 2,000,000 Soviet Jews (New York: Devora 
Publishing, 2008): 181-185. 
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Golda Meir which insisted upon the right to emigrate to Israel—the first instance of such a 
statement emanating from the lower economic classes rather than Moscow’s intellectual elite.76   
The letter did not receive a response from either the Israeli government or the United 
Nations for 100 days.  Still determined, the Georgian Jewish families addressed another appeal—
this time, to the U.N. Secretary General himself, in which they remarkably drew upon legal 
documentation to state their case.  “We are convinced [of the right to return],” the Georgian Jews 
wrote, based on documents “well known” to the Secretary General: “The Universal Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, signed by the USSR as well.  These agreements, they reminded the Secretary 
General, confirm “the right of everyone ‘to leave any country, including his own.’”  The letter 
thus featured perhaps the first public connection between the U.N. Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the Soviet Jewry Movement—and came from Soviet Jews themselves.   
Even so, neither the American Jewish establishment nor the Israeli government seemed to 
notice, let alone capitalize upon, the reference to the right to leave within the Georgian letter.  
The American Jewish establishment continued its dedication to lobbying for Jewish civil rights, 
largely ignoring the burgeoning emigration movement among Soviet Jews.  This lack of 
awareness assisted in fomenting a rising sense of frustration among younger and more militant 
American Soviet Jewry activists seeking Jewish emigration from the USSR—one that would 
lead to a disaster for the establishment.  
* * * 
The Jews of Silence, No More? 
 Just as Israel’s Six-Day War seemed to release the floodgates of previously hidden Soviet 
Jewish energy and pride, the war released a crescendo of emotion among student-age American 
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Jews yearning to shed the specter of American Jewish silence during the Holocaust.77  Revered 
Holocaust survivor and author Elie Wiesel brandished that burden of inaction against the broader 
American Jewish world when he published Jews of Silence in 1966.78  Reporting from a tour of 
the Soviet Union in which he visited with Jews across the empire, Wiesel excoriated American 
Jews for their indifference toward Soviet Jewry.  For Wiesel, the Jews of silence were not the 
oppressed Jews of Russia, but the Jews of America who remained shamefully unconcerned about 
their brethren.  “What torments me most is not the Jews of silence I met in Russia,” Wiesel 
wrote, “but the silence of the Jews I live among today.”79  According to him, such apathy 
“[bordered] on the criminal.”80  His message especially shook the American Jewish community. 
The Six-Day War empowered American Jews to respond to Wiesel’s admonishment with 
a burst of determined activism.  Letters from Soviet Jews spurred an unprecedented level of 
assertiveness.  The personal tribulations of those refuseniks such as Kozokov and Kochubyevski 
gave individual Soviet Jews a name and voice for the first time, allowing them to replace Matzah 
bans and synagogue closings as flesh-and-blood symbols of the Movement.  The SSSJ, writes 
Klein-Halevi, felt that the Soviet Jewish awakening vindicated its “entire premise”—that young 
Soviet Jews still desired to maintain their Judaism, and that “with enough Western attention to 
their cause, the Kremlin would relent.”81  The AJCSJ inched closer to the activist philosophy, 
adopting the strategy of exposing Soviet persecution of individual Jews by rallying behind 
                                                 
77 Klein-Halevi, Memoirs, 50. 
78 Beckerman (140) writes that Wiesel “single-handedly represented the Holocaust,” becoming the image of 
the “quintessential survivor, righteous in his insistence that we never forget” with his autobiographical account of 
Nazi atrocities, Night. 
79 Wiesel, 76. 
80 Wiesel, 52. 
81 Klein-Halevi, Memoirs, 69. 
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Kochubyevski and the Georgian Jews in late 1969, organizing protests and vigils across the 
country on their behalf.82 
 The revitalized connection with Soviet Jewry continued to propel the Soviet Jewry 
Movement in the United States toward embracing the struggle for the right to leave.  The AJCSJ 
issued a crucially expanded demand for the right to emigrate in 1969, when it successfully 
lobbied U.S. representative to the U.N., Charles Yost, to announce his support for the right of 
Soviet Jews to emigrate, an “elementary human right” according to then-AJCSJ chairman Lewis 
Weinstein.83  For a more militant brand of Soviet Jewry activists in the U.S., however, the 
establishment’s first calls for the Soviets to grant free emigration, came too little and too late. 
* * * 
“A Yiddish Franz Fanon” 
 Underneath its increasingly fervent surface the establishment Soviet Jewry Movement  
lacked dynamism and direction.  Its dramatic increase in activity, according to William Orbach, 
“merely demonstrated its unwieldiness.”  Given its nature as a framework rather than an 
independent organization, the AJCSJ could act only on the funding and manpower whims of its 
24 benefactor groups, an inefficient situation at best.  “Semi-viable during the Movement’s first 
years,” wrote Orbach, the AJCSJ buckled under the increased energy and pressure in the 
aftermath of the Six-Day War.84   
 The activists took note.  To Klein-Halevi and his fellow grassroots comrades, The AJCSJ 
continued to behave as if it were “business as usual,” neglecting to mobilize its resources to 
                                                 
82 Chernin, 56.  
83 AJCSJ Press Release, “Ambassador Yost Asked to Support Soviet Jewish Plea for Emigration,” 
11/25/69, Papers of Jerry Goodman, Box #5, Folder #2, Collection of the American Jewish Historical Society, New 
York, NY.  When Rita Hauser, U.S. Delegate to the Human Rights Commission, attempted to read a letter from the 
refusenik associated with the AJCSJ campaign, she was interrupted three times by the Soviet and Ukrainian 
delegates. Though she could not complete the letter, the interruptions succeeded in garnering media attention.  See 
Chernin, 57. 
84 Orbach, 46. 
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galvanize the American Jewish community.  While Soviet Jews “gambled their lives on the near-
impossible prospect of an exit visa from the most sealed country in history,” American Jews 
remained “trapped by their easy lives, afflicted with an impaired sense of empathy.”85   
The frustration felt by the young activists toward the establishment had already boiled 
into righteous indignation by the Six-Day War.  Yet in the seething dystopia of late 1960s 
America—with its burgeoning counterculture, radicalized identity politics, and concomitant 
violence—the activists’ disillusionment mutated into rage.86  The Jewish community turned 
inwards as civil rights coalitions between blacks and Jews disintegrated.  Against the model of 
the Black Panthers and newly infused with ethnic and nationalistic pride, American Jews began 
to embrace a sense of tribal embattlement.  This explosive, paradoxical sense of eternal 
victimhood and newfound power produced a Jewish version of the ethnic warrior in June 1968: 
donning a blue beret, army fatigues, and dark sunglasses, wielding a baseball bat in one hand 
while throwing a clenched fist into the air with the other, the Jewish Defense League (JDL) street 
brawler was born.87 
                                                 
85 Klein-Halevi, Memoirs, 71. 
86 Beckerman discusses the breakdown of the black-Jewish civil rights coalition at length.  He locates the 
an early rupture during the summer of 1966, when the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) voted 
to exclude white activists from leadership positions, frustrated with the slow pace of change and increasingly 
convinced that white liberals had imposed too much moderation and compromise.  According to Beckerman, 
however, the definitive break occurred in the fall of 1968 during a battle over three local community education 
boards in Brooklyn.  The battle—between African-American community organizers and the overwhelmingly Jewish 
teachers force—resulted in harassment of Jewish educators, three successive teachers’ union strikes, and anti-
Semitic poetry being read over the radio.  “The threat of riots hung like a noose over the whole city,” Beckerman 
wrote, as Black Panther activists in berets patrolled the streets with shotguns, and militant Jews responded by 
forming the Jewish Defense League.  See Beckerman, 146-150.  
87 Beckerman, 150; Klein-Halevi, Memoirs, 77-9. 
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Figure 4: An undated photo from the Jewish Defense League website of current JDL head Shelley Rubin participating in 
target practice at a JDL training camp.  The JDL's founder, Rabbi Meir Kahane, established such weapons training 
facilities in the Catskill Mountains in the late 1960s.  Jewish Defense League, 
http://www.jdl.org/images/uploads/jdl/shelley_firing.jpg (accessed 3/4/10). 
The JDL—a motley collection of poor urban Jews on the frontlines of inter-ethnic strife, 
children of Holocaust survivors, and general misfits—first formed in reaction to black-Jewish 
tension in urban areas.  Its charismatic founder, the 38-year old Rabbi Meir Kahane, dedicated 
the first several years of his new organization to fighting the Black Panthers, Neo-Nazis, and 
pro-Palestinian demonstrators while inculcating a message of Jewish self-reliance.  The JDL’s 
political theater earned it condemnations from Jewish establishment organizations, but far more 
importantly to Kahane, elicited rapt attention from the media.  Well aware of the JDL’s rising 
notoriety, right-wing Israeli Parliament member Geula Cohen visited Kahane in December 1969.  
A former operative of the Stern Gang, widely considered the most violent organization fighting 
for Jewish independence in Mandatory Palestine, Cohen despised the leftist Israeli government’s 
hesitancy with regard to Soviet Jewry.  She urged Kahane to quit wasting his efforts on local 
political scuffles and turn his attention to Soviet Jewry.88   
                                                 
88 Robert I. Friedman, The False Prophet: Rabbi Meir Kahane—From FBI Informant to Knesset Member 
(Michigan, Lawrence Hill Books, 1990): 105-7. 
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 The JDL struck three weeks later.  Kahane and three teenagers began a simultaneous JDL 
assault at 1:00 PM on December 29th by breaking into the Rockefeller Center office of TASS 
(the Soviet press agency), spray-painting the walls with “Am Yisrael Chai” (“The Nation of 
Israel Lives”), while two other groups stormed the offices of Aeroflot (the Russian airline 
service) and Intourist (the Soviet travel agency).  In their most “dramatic touch,” however, a 
group of JDL members raided a Russian passenger jet at Kennedy Airport, rushing onto the 
tarmac to spray graffiti on the plane and chain themselves to its front wheel.   
The incident earned the JDL (and, by extension, Soviet Jewry) unprecedented publicity, 
but Kahane was far from finished.  JDL activists returned the next day to spearhead a 200-person 
riot outside the Soviet UN Mission in which protestors attempted to break through the New York 
City police line that guarded the Mission compound.  Law enforcement officers placed over 
twenty people in custody, including Kahane himself for the second night in a row.  The next day, 
Kahane learned that the police would now permit demonstrators to picket on the block of the 
Soviet Mission itself, an action previously banned.  Vindicated, Kahane announced that this 
would only constitute the “first shot” of a coming war.  “Violence was always bad,” he reflected 
in his memoir, “but sometimes it was successful.”89 
 The JDL capitalized on the establishment’s ineptitude.  Both the AJCSJ and grassroots 
organizations stood dismayed as a Jewish version of the Weathermen commandeered the 
Movement and proffered its mystique to draw young Jews to its cause.  “[Kahane] is ruining 
years of our work with wild acts of self-aggrandizement,” Jacob Birnbaum told Klein-Halevi at 
the time.  “Meir is a violent soul, he dreams of chasms of blood.”90  But such chasms of blood 
finally converted many youth activists—including Klein-Halevi—in June 1970, when Soviet 
                                                 
89 Meir Kahane, The Story of The Jewish Defense League (Pennsylvania: Chilton Book Company, 1975): 1-
3. 
90 Klein-Halevi, Memoirs, 86. 
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authorities arrested eleven individuals, nine of them Jews, for allegedly planning to hijack a 
Soviet aircraft to escape the USSR.91 
 Soviet Jewry activists immediately recognized Moscow’s intention.  Troubled by the 
increasingly bold Soviet Jewish emigration movement, Kremlin officials attempted to strangle it 
in its infancy by exploiting international fears of terrorist skyjacking, and painting the Jews as 
radical extremists.  Klein-Halevi thought that “a hundred thousand people” needed to flood the 
streets in protest—a number only the establishment groups could summon.  Instead, the AJCSJ 
responded by organizing a meeting with State Department officials and staging a press 
conference covered by national media.92  When the Soviet State Court condemned two of the 
defendants to death on Christmas Eve, many Jewish activists resolved to answer Kahane’s 
charge: “It’s time to bury respectability before it buries us!”93  A frenzied crowd of nearly 2,500 
people burst out of the Hunter College Auditorium where Kahane shouted those words on 
December 27th and raced toward the Soviet U.N. Mission to confront riot police.  The cops 
forcefully dispersed the mob and arrested Kahane yet again. 
 The Soviets retaliated by warning the U.S. that because protection for Soviet citizens had 
not been secured, Americans “cannot expect that such conditions will be provided [for them] in 
the Soviet Union.”  The U.S. responded angrily, announcing that it would consider staged 
retaliation by the Soviet government “most disturbing.”  Kahane keenly recognized that he could 
wield considerable influence, despite his miniscule forces, by endangering what U.S. President 
                                                 
91 Chernin, 57.  For a detailed account of the hijacking plot itself, see Beckerman, 164-91.  A group of 
dissidents and Jewish refuseniks spent over six months planning an operation to hijack a small airplane and fly it to 
Sweden.  Soviet intelligence discovered the plot and laid a trap for the prospective hijackers, preventing them from 
committing the act.  The two main conspirators were thus charged with murder without having committed a crime. 
See introduction of this thesis. 
92 Klein-Halevi, Memoirs, 84; Chernin, 57.  Despite Klein-Halevi’s disparagement of the AJCSJ’s press 
conferences, Chernin claims that they had “considerable impact.” 
93 Kahane, 25. 
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Richard Nixon and Soviet Premiere Leonid Brezhnev desired most—détente.94  Détente hoped to 
construct a bridge of intersecting interests between the two superpowers, seeking Soviet support 
on strategic arms limitations (SALT) and Vietnam in return for desperately-desired economic 
assistance.  Détente threatened to subsume Soviet Jewry under a framework that disregarded 
Soviet internal affairs.   
Kahane, however, foresaw the potential fragility of détente.  He understood before all 
other Soviet Jewry activists that the key to extracting Soviet concessions on emigration was not 
to appeal to the Soviets themselves, but to levy international pressure against the Communist 
bloc and threaten “what it wanted more than anything,” improved economic relations with the 
U.S.  “Look, you want your détente, take your détente,” Kahane told the New York Times.  “Pay 
us off.  Give us 8,000 Jews, 10,000 Jews, 12,000 Jews.”  Should the Soviets prove recalcitrant, 
Kahane warned, “we want the President and the Soviets to know is it doesn’t take much to 
plunge the world into a terrible, terrible crisis.”95  Caring little whether the Soviets would grant 
free emigration on principle, Kahane simply sought to barter economic prosperity for persecuted 
Jews. 
Kahane’s marriage with violence bore fruit yet again.  His antics filled newspaper 
headlines as the international community—including Communist parties across the world—
                                                 
94 Numerous histories address the definition of détente, which according to the Princeton online dictionary, 
means broadly the “easing of tensions or strained relations (especially among nations).” Eminent Yale Cold War 
historian John Lewis Gaddis defined détente in 1983 as “the calculated relationship of ends and means, whether in 
the realm of military, political, economic, ideological, or psychological competition.”  Walter Isaacson concisely 
defined détente as the era in which “Washington and Moscow sought to modulate their global competition by 
pursuing areas of mutual interest and indulging in occasional displays of friendship.”  The policy sustained heavy 
criticism from staunch anti-Communists, who believed Nixon had “gone soft” on the USSR, as well as those 
interested in a “moral dimension” for U.S. foreign relations, who felt that détente ignored internal affairs and human 
rights violations in favor of stability.  See John Lewis Gaddis, “Rise, Fall, and Future of Détente,” Foreign Affairs 
Vo. 62 p. 354, 1983-1984 and Walter Isaacson, Kissinger (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993): 437.  Discussion 
continues here on p. 57. 
95 Beckerman, 206; Kahane, 16; Walter Goodman, “I’d Love to See the J.D.L. Fold Up, But—,” The New 
York Times Magazine, November 21, 1971.  For more on the JDL’s institutional philosophy, see p. 16-18 of The 
Story of the Jewish Defense League. 
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united to condemn the death sentences meted out to the two Soviet Jews.96  The outcry forced the 
Soviets to capitulate.  On December 31, Soviet authorities announced that they had accepted the 
appeals of the two defendants sentenced to death and commuted their punishment to fifteen 
years’ imprisonment, while reducing the penalties levied against the other conspirators as well.  
The public relations campaign seemed to offer concrete proof that the loud tactics so long 
decried by the Jewish establishment actually succeeded.  “I confess that I thought the Soviets too 
rigid to bend with the wind of world opinion in the Leningrad sentences,” wrote Max Lerner in 
the New York Post.  “[Their leniency] suggests a new emerging force whose potency bears no 
relation to its lack of hard power.”97 
A growing realization that world opinion mattered to the Soviets—and ample evidence 
that violence cultivated world opinion—elevated Kahane to the top of the Soviet Jewry 
movement.98  He seized the initiative following Leningrad, announcing that his followers would 
begin harassing Soviet diplomats and their wives on the streets of New York, following them 
into supermarkets, stores, and movie theaters shouting Russian slurs.  The Soviets responded by 
again targeting American diplomats and citizens in Moscow.  JDL harassment and Soviet 
counter-harassment made headlines for weeks, and the JDL had caused a superpower crisis.  On 
January 11, 1971, Soviet U.S. Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin returned to the USSR for 
“consultations” without informing American officials, a breach of diplomatic protocol.  A New 
                                                 
96 Orbach (54), Beckerman (208), Chernin (56), and Feingold (81) discuss the worldwide outcry provoked 
by the Soviet miscalculation of sentencing two of the Leningrad hijackers to death.  Among the protests, Italian 
longshoremen in Genoa went on a 24-hour strike, worshippers in Rome interrupted the Pope’s weekly address form 
St. Peter’s Basilica, and newspapers in the United States, France, and England called the sentencing outright murder.  
Meanwhile, The USSR received 24 diplomatic requests asking for clemency, while U.N. Secretary General U Thant 
issued an appeal on behalf of his organization.  According to Feingold, the international outrage “was greater than 
that over the [Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.” 
97 As quoted in Chernin, 59. 
98 Kahane documents press clippings, editorials, and public statements highlighting the JDL’s growing 
popularity.  See p. 46-8. 
             
         THE GATEWAY 
      
 
50 
York Daily News headline read the next day “Dobrynin Goes Home and Ice Gets Thicker.”99  
Kahane—whom the FBI referred to as “a Yiddish Franz Fanon”—seemed to hold in his trigger-
happy hands both the Soviet Jewry Movement and US-Soviet relations more broadly.100 
* * * 
A Belgian Nadir 
The establishment leaders who eschewed mass movements and public attention watched 
helplessly as their ineffectual efforts on behalf of Soviet Jewry hemorrhaged momentum to the 
JDL and the non-violent activist organizations.  In a letter to the Washington Post after a JDL 
disruption of a Soviet cultural event in New York, the AJC vented its frustration to the media 
when it wrote that “a carefully planned, lawful peaceful demonstration is ignored by the press 
while the disruptive tactics of a mere handful of persons is noted.  This…eventually leads to the 
argument that the only time that things get done in our country is when there is violence”—
precisely what Kahane would have said himself.101  Richard Maass, later chairman of the 
National Conference on Soviet Jewry, recalled that Leningrad and Soviet Jewish letters pleading 
for emigration forced the establishment to realize “that the old format could not apply 
anymore.”102 
Facing Kahane’s challenge as well as the energy produced by the Leningrad trials, Jewish 
leaders believed that the time was ripe to retake the Movement.  The organizations comprising 
                                                 
99 Kahane 32-3 
100 Beckerman, 224. 
101 AJCSJ letter to Washington Post, 9/30/70, Papers of Jerry Goodman, Box #7, Folder #1, Collection of 
the American Jewish Historical Society, New York, NY. 
102 Reminiscences of Richard Maass (3/5/1975), p. 2, Columbia University Oral History Research Office 
Collection (hereafter CUOHROC). 
While Kahane posed the most vocal threat, non-violent grassroots groups such as the Union of Councils for 
Soviet Jews (UCSJ), a coalition of local activists organizations across the country that formed under the direction of 
Cleveland Soviet Jewry leader Lou Rosenblum, also usurped establishment authority.  As Kahane targeted Soviet 
officials and relished in spectacles of violence, Rosenblum established the first contact between American Jews and 
their Soviet coreligionists that circumvented the establishment framework.  Rosenblum arranged for American Jews 
to call a network of Soviet Jews behind the Iron Curtain, personalizing the Movement in a way that rallies and 
policy papers likely could not.  See Beckerman, 212-4. 
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the AJCSJ resolved to organize an international conference that would truly globalize the Soviet 
Jewish cause.  The resultant Brussels Conference, held February 23-25, 1971, gathered 800 
delegates from thirty-eight countries.  The Soviets added publicity to the conference by 
launching a barrage of propaganda against it, even sending leading Soviet Jewish personalities to 
Brussels to speak with reporters and counter claims of Soviet anti-Semitism.103   
Yet Kahane continued to haunt the establishment.  He flew to Brussels to issue his own 
ten-point platform for the conference and win the allegiance of a majority of the delegates.  
Within ten minutes of arriving at the lobby where the conference convened, however, 
establishment leaders decided to expel Kahane and requested that Belgian police detain him for 
the remainder of the event.104  His incarceration dominated headlines, and the tame proposals 
announced by the establishment groups the next day—calling for direct contacts with the 
Kremlin and establishing a youth conference for Soviet Jewry—only added to the embarrassment 
caused by his arrival.  It appeared that the “Yiddish Franz Fanon” had won again.   
But Kahane’s theatrical appearance at Brussels marked the pinnacle of his efforts.  The 
JDL’s January 1971 campaign against Soviet officials posed such a threat to détente that 
President Nixon asked the Justice Department and FBI to wage war upon the JDL.105  Kahane 
decided to flee the U.S. and move to Israel in September 1971.  With him went the JDL’s 
                                                 
103 Beckerman, 218. 
104 Kahane, 51-5 
105 An unexpected and much-maligned alliance between the JDL and the Italian-American Civil Rights 
League, founded by new York Mafioso Joe Colombo, alienated many erstwhile JDL supporters.  Though Colombo 
bailed Kahane out of prison once, the coalition seemed to mock Jacob Birnbaum’s vision of the Soviet Jewry 
movement uniting Jews and gentiles in a human rights struggle when he proclaimed the coalition “a human 
brotherhood,” despite its obviously cynical nature.  Klein-Halevi recalled feeling an increasing sense of doubt 
toward Kahane’s leadership, unable to stomach the “alliance of despair” with fellow outlaws.  See Klein-Halevi, 
Memoirs, 105. 
             
         THE GATEWAY 
      
 
52 
momentum.  The organization soon devolved into an undisciplined gang of youngsters 
committing random acts of violence over the next two years that increasingly tapered off.106   
 While bloodshed eventually “sowed the seeds of [the JDL’s] own destruction,” according 
to SSSJ leader Glenn Richter, “Kahane and JDL got publicity for the cause in a way neither SSSJ 
nor the Establishment could.”  Indeed, Richter even admitted that the JDL “shamed the 
Establishment, and in doing so, pushed them harder than we at SSSJ could.”107  The number of 
emigrants permitted to leave the USSR during the peak moment of JDL activism seem to 
validate Richter’s assertion—whereas a little over a thousand Jews had left in 1970, an 
unprecedented 13,000 Jews had emigrated by the end of 1971, more than in the previous ten 
years combined.108   
The JDL ended the question of whether public pressure against the Soviet Union might 
prove worthwhile and precipitating action from the establishment to retake control of the Soviet 
Jewry effort.  Though Kahane’s violence never gained complete hold of the Movement, elements 
of his political platform of fighting for Soviet Jewish emigration—as opposed to the prior 
establishment battle for civil rights emancipation—survived the JDL’s downfall.  In a confluence 
of time, place, and action, the establishment groups, seeking at last to reclaim ownership of the 
Soviet Jewry Movement, incorporated the public campaign and the right to emigrate as core 
tenets of its effort.  At the urging of a principled U.S. Senator from Washington State and his 
                                                 
106 A Washington D.C. rally organized by Kahane in March 1971 also bankrupted the JDL.  Even so, it 
sparked the largest mass arrest in the capital in American history, with over 1200 JDL protesters taken into custody 
after blocking traffic.  Weeks later, 10,000 people broke the new record in a Vietnam War protest.  Later that year, a 
suspected JDL sniper fired for shots into the Soviet U.N. mission, while in January 1972 the JDL bombed the offices 
of Sol Hurok, an American businessmen who facilitated the performance of Soviet ballet troupes in the U.S.  The 
bombs killed a young Jewish secretary, permanently marginalizing the JDL’s reputation.  For a detailed account of 
the JDL’s demise, see Beckerman 224-235. 
107 Interview with Glenn Richter, February 2010. 
108 Beckerman, 235. 
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energetic aides, the establishment would extract the emigration battle from Kahane’s framework 



















             
         THE GATEWAY 
      
 
54 
Chapter III: Linkage and Leverage 
 Senator Henry M. Jackson—the Lutheran son of Norwegian immigrants who had settled 
in the Pacific Northwest—took to the floor of the United States Senate on March 15, 1973, to 
commandeer the Soviet Jewry Movement and link it irrevocably with human rights.109  Backed 
by 75 senators and 272 congressmen, Jackson introduced an Amendment to the East-West Trade 
Relations Act of 1971 which had provided the President with the authority to negotiate 
commercial agreements, including the granting of most-favored-nation (MFN) status, to 
“nonmarket economies,” or communist countries, the Soviet Union chief among them.110  
Senator Jackson, however, did not believe that the United States should grant MFN to the Soviet 
Union without obtaining a concession in return—namely, increased emigration rates for those 
wishing to leave the USSR, in the name of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
I am today joined by more than 70 of my colleagues in sponsoring legislation which will 
help secure a basic human right for thousands of human beings behind the Iron Curtain.  
We propose to deny the benefits of our abundant economy—most favored access to our 
market, credits, credit guarantees, and investment guarantees—to any nonmarket 
economy country that denies its citizens the right or opportunity or imposes more than 
nominal taxes on emigration.111 
The Amendment constituted one of the first attempts by the U.S. government to condition 
its legal and economic policy on performance of human rights in another nation.112  Jackson 
immediately established the centrality of human rights to his proposal.  “Our tradition and the 
                                                 
109 Ognibene, Peter J.  Scoop: The Life and Politics of Henry M. Jackson (New York: Stein and Day, 1975): 
31.  
110 According to the Financial Times “Lexicon” database, most-favored-nation (MFN) status is granted 
when a country is given the same advantages, such as import taxes and higher quotas (numbers of goods it is 
allowed to import), as the best ones given to other countries, putting it on the same level as these other countries. 
The United States is forbidden by law to grant MFN status to communist countries that do not have free-
market economies. The practical effect is that imports from these countries are subject to much higher tariffs.  
The 1971 East-West Trade Bill sought to provide President Nixon with the authority to circumvent that law 
and grant the USSR MFN status, which would have boosted trade between the two nations.  See Financial 
Times Lexicon, http://lexicon.ft.com/term.asp?t=most_favored-nation.  Accessed March 10, 2010.  
111 Congressional Record, 93rd Cong., Vol. 119, Rec. 8071, March 15, 1973.   
112 Interview with Richard Perle, December 2009. 
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course of history have placed upon us a most awesome responsibility, and our economic and 
technological advantages have now given us a unique opportunity to help secure a basic human 
right for those who are already risking everything in its pursuit,” he stated in his Senate speech.  
But most significantly, Jackson articulated the very first piece of American legislation that 
expressly drew its inspiration from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:113   
We are upholding our traditional commitment to individual liberty—a commitment that 
was enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights unanimously adopted by the 
United Nations more than 25 years ago.  That declaration, in article 13, affirms the deep 
conviction of the American people that “Everyone has the right to leave any country, 
including his own, and to return to his country.” 
As a Senator from Washington, a state whose Jewish community constituted half-a-
percent of its total population, Jackson initially seemed an unlikely figure to become the primary 
patron for Soviet Jewry in Congress, let alone spearhead the Soviet Jewry Movement’s shift 
from a parochial to universal cause.  Indeed, along with the Jewish community, he would debunk 
the détente-era doctrine that a nation’s internal affairs did not represent a legitimate subject of 
international diplomacy.114  Yet a number of dynamics combined to place “Scoop,” as he was 
best known, at the forefront of three rapidly converging streams: the Cold War, the rise of human 
rights upon the international stage, and the plight of Soviet Jewry.  
* * * 
The Cold Warriors from the West 
 By March 1973, when he formally introduced his Amendment, Jackson had cemented his 
famously principled stance as the “quintessential Cold War Liberal—at home a supporter of civil 
rights, organized labor, and activist government, abroad a supporter of a strong military and of 
                                                 
113 William Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “A Curious Grapevine” (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998): 190. 
114 Jewish Population in the United States, American Jewish Yearbook (1974-5): 306.  Jackson’s chief aide, 
Richard Perle, later described Jackson’s early exposure to Jews as extremely limited.  He grew up in the Pacific 
Northwest, an area with very few Jews, I would be surprised that there was a “minyan” in his home town.  There 
may just have been a “minyan” in his hometown.  See Reminiscences of Richard Perle (2/7/1975), p. 4, CUOHROC. 
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the readiness to intervene in order to check Communist expansionism.”  Jackson’s views defined 
him as a mainstream Democrat during the early and mid-1960s, but the Vietnam War alienated 
him from the increasingly leftward party base, resulting in his disastrous presidential run in 
1972.115  His loss reinforced his image as a maverick politician adamant in his worldview.  As 
Nixon embarked on détente—seeking quid-pro-quo arrangements with the Soviets on issues such 
as trade policy and arms control by linking them together—Jackson grew increasingly concerned 
with the direction of U.S. foreign relations.  He suspected that the USSR merely pursued détente 
as roundabout means of achieving hegemony rather than reconciliation, and would thus swindle 
the U.S. into making disadvantageous concessions.  To Jackson, the goal should not have been 
détente-inspired stalemate, but the Soviet Union’s collapse.116   
 
Figure 5: Senator Henry M. Jackson (better known as "Scoop") stands arm-in-arm with Soviet dissident Aleksandr 
Solzhenitsyn, author of The Gulag Archipelago.  Jackson became a champion the Soviet Jewry and Soviet democracy 
movements in Congress, and a leading proponent of human rights.  University of Washington Archives, Senator Henry 
M. Jackson.  http://www.lib.washington.edu/specialcoll/images/ead/jackson5.jpg (accessed 3/4/10). 
                                                 
115 Arch Puddington, review of Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics,” by Robert G. Kaufman, 
Commentary, December 2000.   
116 Robert G. Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
2000): 248-250; Beckerman 266. 
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Most significantly, however, Jackson disagreed with détente’s attempt to deemphasize 
the role of ideology in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.  According to later Jackson aide Douglas 
Feith, the Senator “saw the Cold War as, in part, an ideological clash between totalitarian 
communism and liberal democracy.”  This stood in stark contrast to the “so-called realist view 
that underlay détente,” which tended to stress “power politics” and dismissed the notion that the 
internal policies of the Soviet Union mattered to international affairs or America’s national 
interest.117  Jackson, in contrast, believed that the Soviet Union’s internal structure played a key 
role in determining its international behavior, and that as long as the USSR remained totalitarian, 
it would continue to challenge the U.S.  Jackson thus felt deeply motivated, on a pragmatic and 
moral level, by the need to “damage détente” as well as defend human rights.118  In early August 
1972, the Soviets would provide him the opportunity to fulfill both aspirations simultaneously.   
* * * 
An Education in Taxing 
 President Nixon spent the summer of 1972 basking in perhaps the peak of détente.  
During his May visit to Moscow, he and Soviet Premiere Leonid Brezhnev signed the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) limiting antiballistic missile sites, and struck a preliminary 
agreement which stipulated that the U.S. would extend MFN to the Soviet Union in return for 
repayment of the USSR’s World War II lend-lease debt.  Heralding a “new relationship between 
the two most powerful nations on earth,” Nixon returned home promising Soviet Jewry activists 
concerned about his seeming disregard for Soviet internal affairs that his preferred method of 
“quiet diplomacy” had secured greater numbers of Jewish emigrants.  Initially, Nixon enjoyed 
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numbers to support his contention, with a record-setting 13,000 Jews leaving the USSR in 1971, 
a number which would more than double to 31,000 by the end of 1972.119 
 Two months later, however, the Soviets committed what proponents and detractors of 
détente would universally recognize as an extraordinary blunder.  On August 15, Jewish 
refusenik sources reported to the New York Times that Soviet authorities had enacted a decree 
requiring potential emigrants who had acquired a higher education in the USSR to pay a 
“diploma tax,” as it became known, as repayment for their state-financed education.  The 
refuseniks, mainly “highly qualified scientist and educated Jews,” according to the Times, read a 
statement in a rare news conference which declared that Jews were in danger of becoming “a 
new category of human beings—the slaves of the 20th century.”   
The refuseniks had good reason for alarm.  The measures implemented by the Soviet 
Union virtually entrapped Jews with higher-education degrees.  Government officials tied the 
diploma tax to the aspiring emigrant’s level of education—from $5,400 for a graduate of a 
teachers’ institute to $13,200 for a university degree and over $25,000 for the Soviet equivalent 
of a Ph.D.  With teachers and scientists earning less than 300 rubles per month, the exit fees 
would more thank bankrupt any potential émigré.  Fearing a drain of intellectual talent, the 
Soviets meant to intimidate the elite refusenik movement into submission.120 
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The diploma tax represented the latest impediment in a convoluted and dangerous process 
for Soviet Jews seeking to emigrate, referred to by Russian Jews as “the ten circles of hell.”121  
Emigration for most Soviet citizens, let alone Jews, contradicted Communist ideology, which 
deemed treasonous any individual seeking to leave the Soviet “workers’ paradise.”  Soviet 
authorities ostensibly permitted emigration only in cases of “family reunification.”  Russian Jews 
only received the opportunity to leave once they received a vysov (literally, “summons”) from a 
family member abroad.  This often meant receiving a manufactured invitation from the Israeli 
government, ferried through the Dutch Embassy in Moscow in the wake of the Six-Day War.122   
Those Soviet Jews able to obtain a vysov presented their invitation to the OVIR, the 
Soviet Ministry responsible for emigration requests.  OVIR required applicants to complete a 
detailed questionnaire which demanded data concerning immediate family members and friends.  
The most significant obstacle for most Soviet Jews—especially the educated class targeted by 
the diploma tax—came with attaining security clearance.  Soviet authorities forbade anyone 
privy to “state secrets” from emigrating, a term which they applied liberally, citing three-quarters 
of their refusals to emigrate based on “national security.”123 
The consequences for applying for emigration often proved severe.  The OVIR requested 
character references from a would-be emigrant’s co-workers and employers, who were required, 
as loyal Communist Party members, to condemn those seeking permission to exit as traitors.  
Jews often lost employment and suffered social ostracism as a result, with scientists and 
                                                 
121Buwalda, 47. 
122 According to Buwalda, a former Dutch Ambassador to the Soviet Union, such invitations from Israel 
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engineers forced to take jobs as window cleaners and security guards.  Their children sometimes 
suffering harassment at the hands of school administrators and fellow students if their school 
discovered emigration attempts.  This social and economic demotion often proved permanent if 
the OVIR refused to grant an exit visa, creating a new refusenik family.124 
The Soviet diploma tax seemed to confirm Jackson’s twin fears about Communist 
brutality aided and abetted by détente and Nixon’s disregard of human rights.  Indeed, Jackson 
declared it “reminiscent of the Nazi practices.”125  The Senator’s office had already begun 
investigating methods to undermine the East-West Trade Bill negotiations before the 
announcement of the head tax.  The new Soviet decree, however, offered Jackson the opportune 
“political climate” to combine his attempt to slow the development of trade between the U.S. and 
Soviet Union with a new initiative to liberalize Soviet emigration policy.126  Although Jackson’s 
staff has claimed ownership of the notion of drafting legislation to secure free emigration, the 
Senator’s effort, in fact, emanated directly from an intellectual foundation that carries an 
unheralded but significant history. 
* * * 
Right Building 
On the periphery of the Soviet Jewry Movement’s more public struggles during the 1960s 
and early 1970s, a small cadre of intellectuals, academics, and legal scholars collaborated to 
construct a case against the Soviet Union rooted in the universal language of human rights—and 
                                                 
124 Interview with David Harris, February 2010.  For a detailed description of the emigration process in the 
USSR, see Buwalda, 47-56.  A separate discussion in the next chapter addresses Soviet Jews who used Israeli vysovs 
to emigrate to the United States rather than Israel, in what became known as the “Dropout Controversy.”  See 
introduction for explanation. 
125 Senator Henry Jackson Speech on Soviet Emigration, August 1973, Leonard Schroeter Papers, Special 
Collections, Box #6, University of Washington Libraries, Seattle, Washington. 
126 Reminiscences of Richard Perle (2/7/1975), p. 4, CUOHROC. 
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in particular, the right to leave.127  Their efforts began in 1960, when B’nai B’rith, the oldest 
functioning Jewish service organization in the world, assigned Dr. William Korey to represent its 
interests at the U.N. as part of the Coordinating Board of Jewish Organizations (CBJO—
comprised of B’nai B’Brith, the British Board of Jewish Deputies and the South African Board 
of Jewish Deputies).  B’nai B’rith chose Korey for his previous experience as a leading civil 
rights and integration advocate in Washington D.C., where he had served as regional director of 
the Anti-Defamation League.  A doctoral graduate of the first class of Columbia’s Russian 
Institute (later the Harriman Institute), Korey offered exactly what B’nai B’rith sought: 
“somebody that had a kind of combination of skills, who knew international and Soviet affairs, 
and who also knew civil rights and human rights.”128 
Korey immediately played a vital role in preparing a seminal U.N. report on the status of 
the right to emigrate.129  The study, conducted by Philippine judge and statesmen Jose Ingles for 
the U.N. Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
sought to explore the “background, condition, and future” of Article 13(2) of the U.N. 
Declaration of Human Rights.130  Ingles’ investigation—spurred largely by the issue of Soviet 
                                                 
127 The first effort on behalf of the right to emigrate began in June September 1971 as a grassroots Soviet 
Jewry initiative.  The Union of Councils for Soviet Jews (UCSJ), the leading non-violent grassroots organization in 
the Soviet Jewry movement, first introduced the notion announcing in its platform that “a condition of any exchange 
or agreement with the Soviet Union [should] include a guarantee of the right of free emigration for Soviet Jews.”  It 
even established an office in Washington D.C. and initiated an earnest lobbying campaign in Congress attempting to 
establish the trade-emigration linkage through various pieces of legislation. Though the effort faded by middle of 
1972, the trade-emigration concept may have germinated throughout the Senate, reaching the ears of aides who soon 
began drafting the Jackson Amendment.  See Orbach, 130-1; Stern, Paula, Water’s Edge: Domestic Politics and the 
Making of American Foreign Policy (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1979): 10-12.   
128 Reminiscences of William Korey (9/12/89), p. 5, American Jewish Committee Oral History Collection, 
Dorot Jewish Division of New York Public Library (hereafter AJCOHC). 
129 Reminiscences of William Korey (9/12/89), p. 1-2, AJCOHC.  According to Ro’i (138), Korey was 
recruited and funded by the Israeli Liaison Bureau. 
130 Ronald I. Rubin, “Soviet Jewry and the United Nations: The Politics of Non-Governmental 
Organizations,” Jewish Social Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3 (July, 1967): 139.  According to Rubin, the provisions for 
human rights outlined in the Universal Declaration remained in the realm of rhetoric for much of the U.N.’s early 
history.  Indeed, the U.N. itself issued a press release in 1962 describing the Universal Declaration as “a statement of 
what ought to be, not necessarily what is.”  Rubin noted that the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter 
remained unfulfilled due to “the inability of the world organization to intervene and redress the balance between 
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Jewry—represented the first time that the question of the right to emigrate was raised at an 
international forum.   
Ingles began his endeavor in 1960 and spent the next three years collecting information 
on the status of the right to leave across the globe.  He relied on research from over thirty Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) with consultative status at the U.N., drawing most heavily 
from Korey’s CBJO, which contributed “substantive data” regarding official Soviet 
discrimination against Jews.131  According to Korey, Ingles’ decision to feature NGO research 
represented a “courageous departure from tradition” and set a “valuable [new] precedent” at the 
U.N., where the legitimacy of NGO testimony remained limited through the 1960s.  Korey 
estimated that the report marked “one of the first if not the only time” that NGO material was 
directly included in a U.N. Subcommission study.132  
Yet as Ingles demonstrated, only a third of the ninety countries investigated in his study 
guaranteed some level of formal or informal right to leave.  Nations that prevented certain 
individuals from emigrating, he discovered, often discriminated against their other elementary 
rights, preventing them from practicing a certain form of religion, marrying other nationalities, 
                                                 
individual liberty and state authority,” and to solve the perennial debate about intruding upon a country’s “internal 
affairs.”  As a result, he contended, the U.N. needed to rely upon non-state actors to provide it with human rights 
oversight—a role played by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).  See Rubin, 140-2. 
131 The Jewish organizations contributing to the Ingles report besides the CBJO included the Consultative 
Council of Jewish Organizations (CCJO), which represented, among others, the American Jewish Committee; the 
Agudas Israel World Organization, an Orthodox Jewish advocacy group; the World Jewish Congress, chaired by 
Nahum Goldmann; and the World Union for Progressive Judaism, a political arm of the Reform Jewish movement.  
All except for the CBJO were known to prefer quiet diplomacy and had not raised the issue of Soviet Jewry publicly 
at the UN.  See Rubin, 143-4. 
NGOs granted consultative status participated in U.N. sessions as observers at the discussions of various 
committees and commissions, and could submit material to U.N. bodies upon invitation. Korey’s CBJO played an 
integral role from the beginning of Ingles’ effort, in emigration and specifically upon the question of Jewish 
emigration from the USSR. See Ro’i, 166, 138 and Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration, 63-4. 
132 Korey, quoted in Rubin, 146.  The Soviet Union continued to criticize the role of NGOs in the UN 
through the end of the decade, with an April 1969 Izvestiia (Russian state newspaper) article calling NGOs “rubbish 
which should be thrown out” and “weeds in the field” that desecrated the UN landscape and required uprooting.  
Still angry as a result of the Ingles report, perhaps, the Soviets also launched a concerted and nearly-successful effort 
to ensure that the CBJO did not obtain consultative status upon its standard review in 1969.  See Korey, NGOs and 
the Universal Declaration, 77-89. 
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and freely associating with all members of society.  According to Ingles, then, disregard of the 
right to leave “frequently gives rise to discrimination in respect of other human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, resulting at times in the complete denial of those rights and freedoms.”  
As a result, he declared, the right to leave is “an indispensible condition for the full enjoyment by 
all of other civil, political, economic, and social rights.”133  Ingles thus established the notion of 
the right to leave as a “gateway right”—a prerequisite for the protection of all other civil 
freedoms enshrined in the Universal Declaration. 
While the actual content of Ingles’ draft largely avoided referring to countries by name, 
his structures and attached reports, including Korey’s on Soviet anti-Semitism, clearly targeted 
the USSR.  Communist bloc delegates reacted swiftly, attacking Korey’s documentation in 
particular as “slanderous” and “colored by cold war accusations.”134  Likely fearing the potential 
impact of Ingles’ recommendations—an unequivocal restatement of the right to leave, a call to 
eliminate financial requirements for exit and provisions for expeditious emigration, among 
them—the USSR successfully blocked its consideration in the full Commission on Human 
Rights at every session until March 1971, when it again was deferred due to “lack of time.”135   
The Soviet Union’s desire to quash the Ingles Report proved prescient.  Soviet Jewish 
activists seized upon Ingles’ work by the end of the 1960s and cited article 13 (2) of the 
Universal Declaration in appeals and letters addressed to Soviet and world leaders expressing 
their desire to emigrate—including the eighteen Georgian Jewish families who petitioned Israeli 
                                                 
133 Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration, 65. 
134 Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration, 66. 
135 Alan Dowty, Closed Borders: The Contemporary Assault on Freedom of Movement (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1989): 139-140; Jose Ingles, “The United Nations Study of Discrimination in Respect of the Right 
of Everyone to Leave Any Country, Including His Own, and to Return to His Country,” in The Right to Leave and to 
Return: Papers and Recommendations of the International Colloquium Held in Uppsala, Sweden, 19-21 June 1972, 
ed. Sidney Liskofsky and Karel Vasak (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1976): 476.  Ingles’ study finally 
received consideration in 1969, but the U.N. Subcommission requested an update of the document, given that his 
original research occurred earlier in the decade.  Ingles resubmitted his report in 1971, only to have it tabled again. 
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Prime Minister Golda Meir and the U.N. Secretary General U Thant in 1969.136  Despite the 
USSR’s best efforts, Ingles’ legal foundation for the centrality of the right to leave, and 
suggestions for its implementation, planted an intellectual seed among activists in the USSR and 
across the globe.  In Korey’s words, it offered “the first study of its kind to demonstrate how 
Soviet Jews were deprived of the right to leave their country,” and constituted “a landmark in the 
evolution of human freedom” that is “still considered in various quarters as one of the most 
important human rights analyses ever published.”137 
 By early 1971, the U.N.’s inaction regarding the report convinced then-director of the 
American Jewish Committee’s Foreign Affairs Department, Sidney Liskofsky, that the “NGO 
community and academia” needed to “fill a serious gap in the human rights work of the U.N.” by 
“[resuming] the public dialogue” on the right to leave and attempting to implement the Ingles’ 
recommendations.138  Soon appointed as the founding director of the AJC’s Jacob Blaustein 
Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights (JBI), Liskofsky undertook a project to rekindle 
the Ingles Report.  He and honorary AJC president Morris Abram—author of the January 1971 
New York Times editorial on the right to leave—collaborated with Karel Vasak, the Secretary-
General for the International Institute for Human Rights in France, to develop a conference of 
NGOs and intellectuals who would elevate the question of the right to leave upon the 
international stage.139 
 Despite its initial conception as a method of improving Soviet Jewish emigration, the 
symposium—later known as the Uppsala Colloquium on the Right to Leave and the Right To 
                                                 
136 Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration, 66; for the Georgian Jewish letter and its citation of article 
13 (2), see p. 22-3 of thesis. 
137 Reminiscences of William Korey, (9/12/89), p. 1, AJCOHC; Korey, “The ‘Right to Leave’ for Soviet 
Jews: Legal and Moral Aspects,” Soviet Jewish Affairs, No. 1 (1971): 5; Korey, NGOs and the Universal 
Declaration, 64.  
138 Sidney Liskofsky, “The Contribution of Jose D. Ingles,” in The Right to Leave and to Return: 491-2. 
139 Abram later served as the Chairman of the Administrative Council for the Jacob Blaustein Institute and 
participated in the right to leave conference planned by Liskofsky.  See introduction. 
             
         THE GATEWAY 
      
 
65 
Return—embraced a distinctly universal tone on Liskofsky’s orders.  While JBI “was especially 
concerned with the fate of Soviet Jews barred from leaving their country,” an AJC pamphlet 
noted, it “perceived the problem as a far more universal one, affecting many people across the 
globe.”140  Liskofsky himself outlined a strategy of placing his particular concern about the 
plight of Soviet Jews into a broader context at the colloquium: 
Since the conference would be concerned with the right [to leave] in general and not 
alone with the Soviet Jewish situation, it has, presumably, a better chance, than a project 
concerned solely with Jews, of eliciting the interest and participation of “experts” from a 
variety of interest groups (religious, legal, human rights, civic) from as many geographic 
regions as possible.”141 
  
The Colloquium, held at Uppsala University in Sweden in June 1972, vindicated 
Liskofsky’s belief that the Soviet Jewry Movement could secure international alliances by 
situating itself in the language of human rights.  Featuring seventy scholars and human rights 
experts from twenty-five countries, the gathering aimed “to elucidate the background of the right 
to leave” and formulate a “declaration to serve as the expression of expert opinion on the status 
of the right.”  The conference preamble, directly echoing Ingles, asserted that the protection of 
the right to leave “is essential for the effective enjoyment of other human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.”142  Led by Rene Cassin—President of the International Institute of Human Rights, 
recipient of the 1968 Nobel Peace Prize, and an original drafter of the Universal Declaration—
                                                 
140 American Jewish Committee Pamphlet, “The Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human 
Rights,” AJC online archives, 1984.  According to the pamphlet, JBI “has sought to narrow the gap between the 
promise of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and all other international human-rights agreements—and 
the realization of those rights in practice.”  Later on, it notes that the JBI has sought “from its earliest days… to 
clarify the concept of the ‘right to leave’ one’s country—or to return to it if one chooses—and to ensure the 
observance of this freedom in international law.” 
141 Sidney Liskofsky to AJC President Bert Gold, memorandum, “Proposal for a conference of Experts on 
the ‘Right to Leave,’” January 29, 1971, Bert Gold Memos 1970-1971.  In Michael Galchinsky, Jews and Human 
Rights: Dancing at Three Weddings (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008): 116. 
142 Text of Colloquium Aims, in The Right to Leave and to Return, xix, xxi. 
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and Judge Ingles himself, the Colloquium issued a Declaration of the Right to Leave which 
represented a concrete platform for implementing the right to leave across the globe.143  
Indeed, the Uppsala Declaration remains a standard in the field of human rights.144  The 
prominence of the conference’s members garnered international attention, with its proceedings 
translated into several languages and published in numerous journals worldwide.  Russian 
émigrés themselves joined the Colloquium and forwarded its conceptual foundation and 
Declaration to dissidents still within the Soviet Union.145  Rene Cassin led a public charge in the 
United States and Europe, publishing an editorial in the New York Times in March 1973 which 
stated that the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva had considered the Uppsala 
Declaration due to its “particular meaning…for Russians (both Jews and non-Jews) who are 
being held within national borders and people detained in other countries.”  “Our intent,” he 
wrote, “is to encourage the liberal application” of the right to leave.146   
 
Figure 6: Rene Cassin (far right), French representative to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and co-author of the 
U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, joins Eleanor Roosevelt for an interview in June 1947 at the U.N.’s 
temporary headquarters in Lake Success, New York. .N. Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute website for the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, http://www.udhr.org/history/Biographies/biorc.htm (accessed 3/15/10).  
                                                 
143 The Conference rapporteur noted plans to introduce the recommendations of the colloquium through 
official channels at the UN, and discussed disseminating the Declaration to international organizations and 
governments (552-3).  See AJC Pamphlet on Jacob Blaustein Institute, 1984: 10. 
144 See Hurst Hannum, The Right to Leave and Return in International Law and Practice (Boston: Martinus 
Nijoff Publishers, 1987). 
145 Roman Rutman, “Jews and Dissenters: Connections and Divergences,” East European Jewish Affairs, 
Vol. 3, Issue 2, 1973: 34.   
146 Rene Cassin, “For a Right to Leave and a Right to Return,” New York Times, March 23, 1973.  
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Perhaps most importantly to the Jackson Amendment, however, Senator Ted Kennedy 
(D-MA) introduced the Uppsala Colloquium in Congress two weeks before Senator Jackson 
brought his bill to the Senate floor in March 1973.  Kennedy placed Uppsala’s Declaration on the 
Congressional Record and hailed it as “a good example of current nongovernmental efforts in the 
field of human rights,” and a “forthright statement on the freedom of movement…of interest to 
Members of the Senate.”147 
Kennedy’s speech lends credence to both internal AJC documents and historians who 
claim that the Uppsala Declaration “served as a resource for the drafters of the Jackson 
Amendment” and “played a significant role in persuading Congress to pass…the 
Amendment.”148  It seems clear that Uppsala stimulated discussion and consideration of the right 
to leave in academia, the public sphere, and Congress.  Jackson himself echoed the Declaration 
in the Senate on March 15, 1973, declaring to his colleagues that  
One might well ask why we are moving to secure the right to free emigration when there 
are so many other fundamental liberties that continue to be denied behind the Iron 
Curtain.  We believe there is a unique international quality to the right of free 
emigration…the right and opportunity to emigrate…offers a kind of ultimate relief.  No 
matter what the cause of the desire to emigrate—whether it be for the right to worship or 
to dissent, to publish or to speak…all of these and any of them can be realized by 
emigrating.  Of freedoms, the right to emigrate is first among equals.149 
                                                 
147 Congressional Record, 93rd Cong., Vol. 119, Rec. 5825-6, February 28, 1973.  Kennedy was an early 
and constant supporter of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, though he was at some points suspected of wavering on 
his endorsement.  See Stern, Water’s Edge, 31.  
148 AJC Pamphlet on JBI, “On the Cutting Edge of Human Rights: Twenty-Five Years,” AJC online 
archives, 1992; Galchinsky, 117.  Galchinksy later contends that Jackson-Vanik then helped convince the Soviet 
Union to engage in the Helsinki process, resulting in its pledge in the Helsinki Final Act (1975) to permit both 
freedom of movement within its territory, and family reunification.   
Note: an AJC document written by Sidney Liskofsky in November 1972 explicitly connected the Soviet 
diploma tax and the Uppsala Declaration, arguing that the tax directly violated several articles of the Declaration and 
thus “general international norms,” and encouraging readers to reference the Declaration in combating the tax in the 
public sphere.  See Sidney Liskofsky, “The Soviet ‘Head Tax’ and International Human Rights,” November 1972, 
American Jewish Committee Archives, Box #205, Folder #3, Collection of AJC, New York, NY. 
149 Congressional Record, 93rd Cong., Vol. 119, Rec. 8071, March 15, 1973. 
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Yet an even more tangible connection existed between Uppsala and Jackson, one which may 
have contributed directly to the Washington Senator’s specific emphasis on emigration as a 
human right, enshrined in the Universal Declaration. 
* * * 
Jackson’s Marching Orders 
As the diploma tax remained in effect through September 1972, a Seattle lawyer recently 
returned from a clandestine visit to the Soviet Union began to pressure the Nixon administration 
to act.  Leonard Schroeter, a former advisor to Israel’s Minister of Justice on mobilization of 
world opinion regarding Soviet Jewish human rights, believed that Nixon’s most recent visit to 
the USSR earlier that year constituted a “disaster for Soviet Jews and intellectuals,” and believed 
that the President “gave the green light for [further] repression].”150  He spent early September 
lobbying Leonard Garment, Nixon’s Special Counsel and unofficial White House liaison to 
Jewish organizations with regard to Soviet Jewry, to employ the Soviet desire for trade as 
leverage for the withdrawal of the diploma tax.  Despite the fact that Schroeter’s proposal 
garnered “wide publicity in the press,” the Nixon administration shunned his entreaties, likely in 
the interest of preserving the spirit of the East-West Trade Act.151   
Dedicated to battling for the Soviet Jewish right to leave, Schroeter turned to his friend 
and Senator from Washington, Henry Jackson.152  Though Schroeter hardly stood alone in 
persuading Jackson to pursue linkage between trade and emigration, documentary evidence and 
                                                 
150 “Ex-Israeli Official Blames Nixon for Russian Jews’ Plight,” Associated Press, September 14, 1972. 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=Vr0RAAAAIBAJ&sjid=gOwDAAAAIBAJ&pg=6162,4279550&dq=leonar
d+schroeter+soviet&hl=en (accessed 3/20/10). 
151 Nixon National Security Files, 1969-1974, as cited in Pauline Peretz "Nixon and the Jewish vote," 
Twentieth Century History Review Vol. 2, No. 90, 2006: 109-120.   
152 Leonard Schroeter Papers, Finding Guide, Special Collections, University of Washington Libraries, 
Seattle, Washington.  Note: Schroeter would also become the author of one of the first histories of the Soviet Jewry 
movement, The Last Exodus (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1979), and a lawyer for Jewish samizdat 
writers and human rights advocates in the USSR. 
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confirmation from Schroeter himself via interview demonstrate that he shared an intimate 
working relationship with Jackson.153  Schroeter’s personal files, held within the Henry M. 
Jackson collection at the University of Washington, contain the draft of a speech later delivered 
by Senator Jackson regarding his Amendment, upon which Schroeter had provided comments 
and corrections.  Schroeter strikes an authoritative and friendly tone in his notes, making no 
qualms about specifying where the draft language is “wrong” or “misleading,” and adding 
detailed information about Soviet emigration policy where Jackson remained sparse.  This 
suggests that Schroeter’s familiarity with Jackson gave him the liberty to be blunt.154  
Most critically, however, Schroeter specifically referenced the Ingles Report and the 
Uppsala Declaration.  In comment on a section of the speech in which Jackson cites the “unique 
international character of the right of free emigration…recognized in the Universal Declaration 
of Human rights and a number of other international conventions,” and calls the right to emigrate 
“first among equals,” Schroeter urged Jackson to insert the following citation of the Ingles 
Report: 
As the Ingles Report states from p. 9-13: ‘Denial of the ultimate right to move elsewhere, 
to a man seeking to leave a country because he is being persecuted, may be tantamount to 
the total deprivation of liberty, if not life itself.’155 
Schroeter’s knowledge of Ingles’ intellectual foundation for the right to leave likely 
derived from the Seattle lawyer’s contribution to the Uppsala Colloquium, whose records list 
him as a chief participant.156  His citation of the Ingles Report strongly indicates that Senator 
Jackson was not only aware of the precedent for the right to leave, but employed its principle 
                                                 
153 Interview with Leonard Schroeter, March 2010.  Though the interview was brief due to Schroeter’s 
ailing health, he did manage to confirm his close relationship with Jackson, especially regarding the Soviet Jewry 
campaign.   
154 Senator Henry Jackson Speech on Soviet Emigration, August 1973, Leonard Schroeter Papers, Special 
Collections, Box #6, University of Washington Libraries, Seattle, Washington. 
155 Jackson Speech, p. 5. 
156 Vasak and Liskofsky, Right to Leave, 570. 
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logic—as defined by Ingles and Uppsala—when he declared that the right to emigrate offers “for 
the right to worship or to dissent, to publish or speak… a kind of ultimate relief.”157  Schroeter’s 
comments on the speech and his broader connection to the Senator, then, demonstrate a 
compelling connection between the Jackson Amendment and the intellectual antecedents of the 
right to leave. 
 Schroeter also developed a close association with Jackson’s staff.  Handwritten notes in 
his personal papers record a conversation between Schroeter and Tina Silber, a member of 
Jackson’s Subcommittee on International Security Operations and key aide, regarding 
establishment Jewish organizational reluctance to continue supporting the Jackson Amendment 
following Israel’s Yom Kippur war in October 1973.158  Silber disclosed intimate details about 
meetings between Jackson and Jewish leaders and strategized with Schroeter about how to retain 
the allegiance of those seeming to waver from Jackson’s position.   
Schroeter’s contact with Silber seems to suggest that he potentially worked alongside 
Jackson’s actual legislative assistants in convincing the Jackson to sponsor the linkage concept.  
By mid-August, the famously tenacious Richard Perle met with other Senate aides to explore a 
strong response to the diploma tax announcement, convening Morris Amitay, advisor to Senator 
Abraham Ribicoff, and Peter Lakeman, foreign policy aide to Senator Jacob Javits—to deliberate 
a legislative proposal. 159 
                                                 
157 Jackson Speech, p. 5. 
158 Silber, a former AIPAC employee, played a key role in liaising between Senator Jackson and the Jewish 
community and worked closely with Richard Perle.  See Stern, 39, 98. 
The confrontation between Jewish leaders and Jackson discussed between Silber and Schroeter is detailed 
later in this thesis. 
159 For more on Perle’s biography, see Beckerman, 268-69 and Alan Weisman, Prince of Darkness, 
Richard Perle: The Kingdom, The Power, and The End of Empire in America (New York: Sterling Publishing, 
2007).  According to Beckerman, Perle “shared Jackson’s worldview completely and wasn’t afraid to throw his 
elbows around in the service of his boss.”  Perle co-lead Jackson’s team with Dorothy Fosdick, a chief advisor to 
Jackson for decades previously and another loyal advisor who shared Jackson’s political perspective.  They formed 
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Perle and Amitay, in particular, would lead the charge for Congressional action against 
the education tax over the two months and indeed throughout the two-and-a-half-year course of 
the Jackson Amendment’s passage.160  Already in their first meeting, Perle recalled, one of the 
advisors suggested linking a piece of legislation on emigration to the Trade Act (which later 
became the Trade Reform Act of 1974).  The idea cleverly borrowed from détente theory, which 
proposed that the superpowers assist each other in areas where their political goals overlapped—
another form of linkage.  Understanding that any trade agreement with the Soviets would require 
Congressional approval, the solution seemed readily apparent: grant the Soviets MFN status and 
trade credits upon condition of removing the diploma tax and freeing emigration.161   
As offered by Jackson on October 4, 1972, the Amendment refused MFN and “credit, 
credit guarantees, and investment guarantees” to the USSR as long as it denied its citizens the 
right to emigrate or imposed more than a nominal fee on emigration visas.  Significantly, 
Jackson’s bill required the President to submit biannual reports to Congress regarding the status 
of emigration in nonmarket nations, forbidding him from granting a MFN waiver without 
                                                 
the nucleus of Jackson’s closely-knit foreign policy team, known in Washington as the Bunker because of the 
cramped, windowless office where its members worked.  See Beckerman, 269 and Kaufman, 83-5. 
Javits (R-NY) and Ribicoff (D-CN) represented the two senior Jewish members of the Senate and thus 
were respected voices on the question of Soviet Jewry.  Amitay, later the Chairman of the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee (AIPAC), later made an off-the-record comment about the role of Jewish Senate aides in 
pursuing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment which was nonetheless quoted by Steven D. Isaacs book Jews in American 
Politics.  “There are now a lot of guys at the working level up here who happen to be Jewish, who are willing to 
make a little bit of extra effort, and to look at certain issues in terms of their Jewishness, and this is what has made 
this thing go very effectively in the last couple of years.  These are all guys who are in a position to make the 
decisions in these areas for these Senators.”  The statement would be cited by critics of the pro-Israel and Jewish 
lobby in the United States as evidence of its wide-ranging influence.  See John Mearshemier and Stephen Walt, The 
Israel Lobby (New York: Macmillan, 2007): 153. 
160 Included in the first meeting with Perle, Amitay, and Lakeman were AIPAC representative I.L. Kenen, 
National Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ) executive director Jerry Goodman, Conference of Presidents director 
Yehuda Hellman, and the Senate aides to Hubert Humphrey, Walter Mondale, and Birch Bayh.  All except for Perle 
and Amitay rejected the notion of linkage at the first meeting, including the representatives of the Jewish 
organizations, which preferred to exhaust moderate methods first.   
161 Interview with Richard Perle, December 2009. 
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approval from the legislative branch.  Jackson and his team considered the requirement for 
periodic reevaluation and presidential restriction the key element of the Amendment.162   
Jackson needed a powerful base of support to defeat his more conciliatory challengers.  
The natural answer lay in the American Jewish community.  Though the UCSJ and other 
grassroots Soviet Jewry organizations had already endorsed the trade-emigration linkage, Perle 
realized that the bill required the vast resources and institutional support of the establishment 
organizations.  Fortuitously for the Jackson Amendment, the establishment seemed ready to join 
the battle.  
 The February 1971 Brussels Conference debacle, in which the establishment experienced 
the twin shame of witnessing Jewish Defense League head Meir Kahane usurp its publicity and 
failing to pass a single substantive resolution to strengthen the Movement, further convinced 
American Jewish leaders that their current system could no longer sustain itself.  Still powerless 
after Brussels, the establishment could only issue helpless consternation as the JDL continued to 
dominate the headlines and control the momentum.  As current president of the American Jewish 
Committee and key Soviet Jewry activist David Harris recalled, “those of us that practiced 
nonviolence were seen as meek.”163  Richard Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European 
Affairs in the State Department, articulated the frustration of both Jewish establishment leaders 
                                                 
162 Congressional Record, 92nd Cong., Vol. 118 Rec. 33658-60, October 4, 1972.   
Note: According to Korey, the Soviet Union largely considered MFN status as a matter of prestige rather 
than trade benefit.  U.S. tariffs were imposed on finished or partially finished goods, not raw materials.  Since most 
Soviet exports to the U.S. were raw materials, MFN did not often apply to Soviet-American trade, especially since 
Soviet finished goods were “unlikely to find a market in the U.S.” even with lower tariff rates.  Credits, Korey 
wrote, offered a “more concrete and significant” advantage to the USSR.  The Soviet Union was then seeking to 
import quantities of American products, including advanced technological equipment and even entire factories.  As 
it had little to sell the U.S., the Kremlin was interested in sizeable amounts of credits for completing large-scale 
transactions at low interests rates.  Therefore, it needed credits far more than it needed MFN status—a factor which 
would later play a crucial role in the breakdown of negotiations over the Trade Bill in 1974 and 1975, and its 
ultimate rejection by the Soviets.  See Korey, “Jackson-Vanik and Soviet Jewry,” The Washington Quarterly Vol. 7, 
No. 1 (1984): 123.   
163 Interview with David Harris, February 2010. 
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and the White House at continued JDL violence in a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing 
in late 1971: 
The influence…of American public opinion and of the United States Government can 
only be sadly and substantially diminished when a few American citizens break the law 
and resort to vigilante tactics against Soviet…diplomatic officials and commercial 
personnel and their wives and children.  Acts of violence…advance no one’s 
cause…Violence can only lessen the cohesiveness of world public opinion [regarding 
Soviet Jewry]. 
In the same speech, Davies cited the positions of major American Jewish leaders on the 
JDL’s tactics.  The American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry declared that “anyone who 
applauds bombing or its perpetrators violates all principles of responsible behavior in a civilized 
society,” while an internal Anti-Defamation League Memorandum declared the JDL a “G-d send 
to the Soviet Union.”  B’nai B’rith agreed, announcing that “it is morally reprehensible and 
politically self-defeating… the Soviets will seize upon the threats of the JDL as a pretext for its 
own misdemeanors.”  While Jewish leaders could issue sanctimonious condemnations of the 
JDL, it spoke to their powerlessness that Davies spent the over half of his testimony decrying 
Kahane’s organization rather than addressing the issue of Soviet Jews themselves.164   
 The establishment organizations agreed to address their weakness by reconstituting the 
decrepit AJCSJ into an independent umbrella organization with its own financial resources and 
staff.  The newly reconstituted National Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ) began its operations 
in August 1971 with a yearly budget of $250,000 and an enthusiastic duo at the helm—former 
AJC official Jerry Goodman as executive director, and foreign policy expert Richard Maass as 
chairman.  
                                                 
164 Richard T. Davies, “Hearings on Denial of Rights to Soviet Jews,” November 9, 1971, American Jewish 
Committee Archives, Box #210, Folder #2, Collection of AJC, New York, NY; Anti-Defamation League 
Memorandum Regarding Meeting of Council of Jewish Organizations, July 1971, Papers of Jerry Goodman, Box 
#7, Folder #1, Collection of the American Jewish Historical Society, New York, NY. 
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After forming the NCSJ, American Jewish leaders felt compelled to shift focus from 
encouraging minority rights for Soviet Jews to demanding their free emigration—both to co-opt 
Kahane’s stringent demands and respond to Soviet Jewish activists themselves.  William Korey 
stated that once the establishment understood the magnitude of the Soviet Jewish desire to 
emigrate, it began, under pressure from activist groups, to emphasize emigration rather than civil 
rights.165  Beckerman concurred, noting that while a campaign for Soviet Jewish civil rights “had 
real resonance at the time of the civil rights movement,” post-1967 Soviet Jewish pleas for 
emigration revealed that “Soviet Jews themselves wanted to get out.”  The establishment, then, 
appeared ready to struggle for the right to leave, but still lacked an agenda and legitimate 
influence with the White House.166 
Jackson provided the establishment the remedy that it sought.  The NCSJ convened an 
emergency summit on September 26, 1972 in Washington, D.C. to address the Soviet diploma 
tax.  Perle knew of the conference and  arranged for the Washington Senator to address the 
gathering.167  Jackson arrived with the text of his proposed legislation and delivered a rousing 
twenty-minute speech that electrified the convention.  He offered nothing less than to lead the 
Soviet Jewry Movement in to battle: 
The time has come to place our highest human values ahead of the trade dollar by firm 
and immediate action that the Russians can understand.  You want to know what you can 
do?  I’ll give you some marching orders.  Get behind my Amendment.  And let’s stand 
firm.168 
The speech brought the applauding audience to their feet.  Despite attempts by Senator 
Javits and President Nixon himself to prevent an endorsement of the Jackson Amendment, the 
                                                 
165 Reminiscences of William Korey (9/12/89), p. 7-8, AJCOHC. 
166 Email Correspondence with Gal Beckerman, March 2010; Lazin, 37; Beckerman, 271. 
167 Stern relates that Jackson actually violated an agreement that he made with Senator Javits not to send 
any staff to the NCSJ meeting.  See Stern, 32. 
168 Joseph Albright, “The Pact of Two Henrys,” New York Times, January 5, 1975. 
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NCSJ voted to back the initiative in the wee hours the following morning.  By utilizing the 
concepts of an earlier intellectual and legal movement on behalf of Soviet Jews—one which, 
despite a firm connection to the establishment, failed to define its agenda for over a decade—a 
non-Jewish lawmaker proposed to transcend all previous establishment American Jewish efforts 
for their Soviet brethren.  By embracing the Jackson Amendment, the establishment had at last 
resolved to recapture the Soviet Jewry Movement from its more radical elements by battling for 
the emigration as a universal human right rather than a tribalist imperative.   
* * * 
Two Henrys Collide 
The animosity between Senator Henry Jackson and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
simmered on the surface of letters they exchanged on October 18, 1974.  Kissinger closed his 
letter with a curt “Best Regards,” while Jackson signed his with an even less amiable “Sincerely 
Yours.”  Yet this exchange, completed in the Oval Office, heralded what the New York Times 
described as the “Pact of Two Henrys.”169  It represented the final victory of the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment after two years of battle between Jackson and Kissinger, two fervent ideologues 
who sought to demarcate the position of human rights in U.S. foreign policy and international 
affairs by capturing the support and defining the nature of the Soviet Jewry Movement. 
A German-born Jew who escaped Nazi persecution in 1938, Kissinger seemed as 
unlikely a foe of a public, legislative effort on behalf of Soviet Jewry as Jackson did a sponsor.  
Yet Kissinger’s first-hand encounter with Hitler’s regime triggered a life-long pursuit of 
international stability as a cure for catastrophe.  Given a choice of order or justice, he often said, 
he would choose order.170  The architect of Nixon’s foreign policy, Kissinger believed that 
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         THE GATEWAY 
      
 
76 
détente and its mission of preventing global nuclear war transcended human rights issues.  He 
insisted that the plight of Soviet Jewry—no matter how terrible—must not interfere with the 
international stability fostered by his outreach to the USSR.  Kissinger’s contention that quiet 
diplomacy could best facilitate Jewish emigration thus constituted the last challenge to Jewish 
communal acceptance of the Soviet Jewry effort as a human rights cause—and thus the final 
obstacle to human rights assuming an integral role in U.S. diplomatic relations. 
Kissinger initially dismissed the Jackson Amendment with a combination of “malign and 
neglect.”171  Indeed, NCSJ chairman Richard Mass recalled the State Department and White 
House “generally telling the Russians not to worry and to sit tight” about the Jackson 
Amendment throughout the end of 1972, deeming it merely an “election ploy” that would not 
carry over to the next Congressional session in January 1973.172  The administration so 
underestimated the potential impact of the Jackson Amendment that it linked provisions for 
Soviet MFN (which would become Title IV of the Trade Bill) into the larger Trade Bill, thus 
granting Jackson immeasurable control over the fate of the entirety of U.S.-Soviet commerce.173  
                                                 
171 Stern, 46.  Noam Kochavi notes that Kissinger’s dismissal of the Jackson Amendment resulted for 
intentional as well as unintentional reasons.  Constantly emphasizing Moscow’s status sensitivity and need to “save 
face” and avoid international embarrassment, Kissinger believed that the best chance of Soviet backtracking on the 
diploma tax lay in giving the Soviets time to extract themselves from the decision without appearing to have backed 
down to public American pressure.  Yet Kochavi argues that much of Kissinger’s conduct through April 1973 is 
more attributable to “overextension and ineptitude” rather than design, a combination of his preoccupation with 
Vietnam negotiations and disdain for Congress and its influence in foreign policy-making.  See Noam Kochavi, 
“Insights Abandoned, Flexibility Lost: Kissinger, Soviet Jewish Emigration, and the Demise of Détente,” 
Diplomatic History Vol. 29, No. 3 (June 2005): 515-16. 
172 Reminiscences of Richard Maass (3/5/1975), p. 10, CUOHROC.   
The Soviets seemed to trust Kissinger’s dismissals.  They made minimal modifications to the diploma 
tax—exempting payment from all age 55 and above, and reducing the tax payment to correspond with the number of 
years the would-be emigrant had worked for the state.  But even as it did so, the USSR hardened its line by 
publishing and thus solidifying the diploma tax decree in the Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet.  According to Korey, 
this seemed to signal that the Soviets, having made concessions, would go no further, especially after having made a 
fixed public decision from which it would prove difficult to retreat. See Korey, “The Struggle Over Jackson-Mills-
Vanik,” 205. 
173 Stern, 61. 
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Meanwhile, Jackson quickly capitalized on the early endorsement of the Jewish 
establishment.  His Jewish supporters began “sending letters and telegrams to constituent 
agencies and local communities,” lobbying for the Amendment’s passage.174  Momentum 
continued to build as the bill soon gained the co-sponsorship of Ohio Democratic Congressman 
Charles Vanik.  Vanik represented a district in Cleveland that reported an eleven percent Jewish 
population—among them, Soviet Jewry activist Lou Rosenblaum, founder of the grassroots 
UCSJ—as well as many Soviet-bloc refugees interested in securing open emigration from the 
Soviet Union.175  He introduced a bill mirroring the Jackson Amendment in October and utilized 
the Congressional recess through January to launch a furious campaign for its endorsement, 
relying, much like Jackson, on the efforts of the NCSJ and the grassroots Soviet Jewry 
organizations to collect signatures.176  He soon added his name to the bill, thereafter known as 
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. 
Moscow appeared to understand the threat once Senator Jackson formally reintroduced it 
in the Senate on March 15 with large majorities in both Houses of Congress standing beside him.  
Only five days later, the Soviets announced through Victor Louis, a Soviet journalist with KGB 
connections, that the diploma tax would “no longer be enforced.”  Though the law would remain 
“on the books” according to a New York Times report, it would be “suspended indefinitely.”177   
                                                 
174 Reminiscences of Richard Maass (3/5/1975), p. 10, CUOHROC. 
175 Stern, 54; Beckerman, 276. 
176 Mark Talisman, Representative Vanik’s administrative assistant and new ally of Perle and Amitay, 
launched a marathon effort to acquire support for the House version of the bill.  He personally called the offices of 
all 435 members of the House to ask them to co-sponsor the House version of the Jackson Amendment, calling some 
offices as many as 15 times.  Meanwhile, the NCSJ launched a campaign that sent a steady stream of mail and phone 
calls to Congressmen across the nation, even those with few Jewish constituents. See Stern, 54; Albight, “Pact of 
Two Henrys,” and Beckerman, 276-8. 
177 New York Times, March 21, 1973.  Perle and Beckerman relate the sense of confusion and panic in the 
Kremlin at the result of the Jackson Amendment vote on March 15th.  At a meeting of the Politburo, Soviet Premiere 
Brezhnev expressed dismay that “in the last few months, hysteria has been whipped up [in the U.S.] around this so-
called education tax on individuals emigrating abroad.”  He asked whether the headache of the tax was worth the 
money collected from the tax, and ordered his government officials to think more creatively and “find a solution.”  
See interview with Richard Perle, December 2009; Beckerman, 279-80. 
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Senator Jackson welcomed the apparent concession but insisted that the wider issue of 
Soviet emigration policy—and the right to leave—remained at stake.178  As Richard Maass 
noted, the unofficial removal of the diploma tax failed to address “the more fundamental 
problem of the denial of the basic human right to emigrate without arbitrary restrictions or 
procedures.”179  Yet the Soviet decision to waive the diploma tax provided Kissinger with the 
ammunition to launch an offensive at Jackson and his most important source of support: the 
establishment Jewish community.   
The President invited fifteen American Jewish leaders to the White House on April 19, 
1973—the first time an American commander-in-chief had chosen to dedicate such time to the 
issue of Soviet Jewry.180  Armed with two letters from Soviet U.S. Ambassador Anatoly 
Dobrynin affirming the indefinite suspension of the tax, Kissinger rattled his audience’s 
confidence in the Jackson Amendment.  Nixon’s assurances that Brezhnev would never bow to 
the public pressure levied by the Jackson Amendment and that emigration rates would reach 
35,000 with the end of the diploma tax further enticed them away from Jackson’s bill.  “We’re 
not battling the battle of Sakharov, and the dissidents” American Jewish Congress president 
Arthur Hertzberg later declared, echoing the sentiment of two men particularly open to Nixon’s 
viewpoint: Conference of Presidents chairman Jacob Stein, and Jewish Republican Max 
Fisher.181   
                                                 
178 Perle elaborated in our interview: “Many of us felt that the future was so uncertain that it was worth 
making an effort to stabilize [emigration], and by agreement to get a predictable long term outflow, that no matter 
how good the situation appeared to be at any moment, it could turn dramatically worse in the next.” 
179 Richard Maass, as quoted in Korey, “The Struggle for Jackson-Mills-Vanik,” 212. 
180 Beckerman, 283.  
181 Orbach, 139.  Fisher was a longtime Republican activist who, as former president of the Council of 
Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, was credited with lifting Nixon’s support among the U.S. Jewish population.  
He became an “unofficial Jewish advisor” to the president.  As the chairman of the Conference of Presidents, Stein 
also enjoyed close relations with the Nixon administration that he did not want to jeopardize. 
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Kissinger leveraged his origins as a Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany with the 
assembled Jewish leaders, exploiting their assumption that he would undoubtedly understand and 
sympathize with the persecution of Soviet Jews.182  He easily persuaded Fisher of his concern 
and preferred method of quiet diplomacy.  Fisher controlled post-meeting deliberations between 
the Jewish leaders and convinced them to adopt a conciliatory line on the Jackson Amendment.  
The group released a vague statement which praised the President’s commitment to Soviet Jewry 
but neglected to mention the Jackson Amendment, a conspicuous absence which infuriated 
Jackson, undermined unity among establishment leaders, and immediately left the Jewish 
community “caught in the middle” between the administration and Congress.183  
 
Figure 7: Nixon and Kissinger (far back, below portrait) meet with Jewish leaders at the White House on April 19, 1973.  
The meeting ultimately failed to persuade the Jewish establishment to abandon its support for Jackson-Vanik.  See 
Kochavi, 519. 
The resolution to the crisis demonstrated both the continued importance of the grassroots 
Soviet Jewry groups and the newfound centrality of human rights to the Movement.  An enraged 
Richard Perle enlisted the UCSJ and SSSJ, who battered the establishment over their sudden 
vacillation and “provoked an insurrection” and “posed a threat” that Maass, Goodman, and 
others could hardly ignore.184  Yet Soviet Jews themselves provided the decisive blow to the 
                                                 
182 Korey, “The Struggle Over Jackson-Mills-Vanik,” 224. 
183 Reminiscences of Richard Maass (3/5/1975), p. 16, CUOHROC 
184 Reminiscences of Richard Maass (3/5/1975), p. 38, CUOHROC. 
             
         THE GATEWAY 
      
 
80 
momentary collapse in support for Jackson-Vanik.  After 105 Soviet Jewish activists signed an 
open letter to Congress on April 12 encouraging it to remain behind the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment—including budding refusenik and democratic dissident Anatoly Sharansky—they 
sent a direct appeal to Jewish communal leaders, urging them to reiterate their commitment to 
the bill.  In stark terms, they told Jewish leaders in America that their “firmness and 
steadfastness” were the “only hope” of Russian Jewry.185    
The letter all but buried Fisher and Stein’s effort to reverse the Jewish establishment on 
Jackson-Vanik and temporarily ended Kissinger’s courtship of the Soviet Jewry Movement away 
from human rights.186  Buoyed by his solidified coalition, Jackson restated the centrality of 
human rights—and particularly the right to leave—to the cause of his Amendment while 
delivering a commencement address to Yeshiva University, a base for the SSSJ: 
Of all the human rights contained in the Universal Declaration of the United Nations 
none is more fundamental than in Article 13—the right to free emigration.  And as we 
assess the developing détente there is no more basic measure than its impact on the free 
movement of people.  The importance of free emigration stems from the fact that 
whatever other liberties may be denied—speech, press, religion, employment—any and 
all of these can be restored by emigration to the free countries of the West.  Of human 
rights, emigration is first among equals.187 
Yet the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, in which Egypt and Syria invaded Israel, 
provided Kissinger one final opportunity to detach the Jewish establishment from Jackson-
Vanik.  With the Amendment’s final vote in the House scheduled for late October, Nixon aide 
Leonard Garment invited Jacob Stein, Max Fisher, and Richard Maass for a meeting to discuss 
                                                 
185 Korey, “The Struggle Over Jackson-Mills-Vanik,” 217-8. 
186 The National Interreligious Task Force, an interfaith Soviet Jewry organization founded by the AJC, 
echoed the solidified establishment position when it announced that it would “re-affirm [to Jackson its] commitment 
to the continuing struggle which will not end until every Soviet Jew can either live as a Jew or leave for the nation of 
his or her choice.”  See National Interreligious Task Force on Soviet Jewry Memo, “Task Force Meets with Senator 
Jackson and Congressmen Drinan and Vanik, American Jewish Committee Archives, Box #210, Folder #2, 
Collection of AJC, New York, NY. 
187 Henry Jackson commencement address to Yehsiva University, June 4, 1973, from NCSJ Archives, Box 
31, Folder 6.  As quoted in Beckerman, 286. 
             
         THE GATEWAY 
      
 
81 
the cease-fire between Israel and the Arab states, then perilously close to collapse.  Kissinger 
unexpectedly arrived at the meeting and informed them that persistence with the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment might “slap the Soviets in the face” at a moment when he required their cooperation 
to solidify a cease-fire between Israel and the Arab nations.  Painting Jackson-Vanik as an 
“essentially Jewish issue,” Kissinger forged an intentional linkage between Israel’s security and 
Soviet Jewish emigration at a moment of high anxiety for the American Jewish community.188    
Fisher accepted Kissinger’s argument and partially convinced Maass and others that the 
Jewish establishment should retract support for Jackson-Vanik in Israel’s interest.  He scheduled 
a meeting with Jackson on November 5 hoping to request that the Senator eliminate his 
Amendment from the Trade Bill in the midst of Middle East negotiations.  A wavering Maass 
consulted with the NCSJ executive leadership, which countered Fisher by informing Maass 
simply to report Kissinger’s request for a temporary withdrawal of the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment and seek Jackson’s advice.189  Alerted that some Jewish leaders had begun leaning 
toward Fisher’s approach, Jackson expanded the scheduled meeting to invite the most prominent 
supports of his Amendment, including Senator Ribicoff and his assistant Amitay, Jackson 
staffers Perle and Tina Silber, and Vanik aide Mark Talisman.190  By rallying his most dedicated 
allies, Jackson set the stage for a pivotal showdown between those Jewish leaders fully invested 
in his human rights approach, and those clinging to the efficacy of Kissinger’s quiet diplomacy. 
The meeting in Jackson’s office on November 5, 1973, constituted the apogee of the 
Senator’s struggle with Kissinger for the allegiance of the Soviet Jewry Movement.  Jackson 
assured the Jewish establishment that his Amendment would ensure continuing emigration 
without risking Israel’s security.  “If we back down now,” Jackson said, “the Soviets will take 
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advantage” of an obvious betrayal of Soviet Jewry and democratic dissidents such as Andrei 
Sakharov.191  Rejecting Kissinger’s connection between Israel and Soviet Jewish emigration, 
Jackson argued that “the Russians aren’t making the linkage, only Henry [Kissinger] is.”  When 
he told Maass and others that “the administration [was] always using [them],” Senator Ribicoff 
interjected to call Kissinger a “liar.”192   
Jackson’s case had recently received an invaluable boost from Sakharov himself.  
Encouraged by Soviet Jewish refusenik and dissident advocate Anatoly Sharansky, Sakharov 
entered the Jackson-Vanik controversy in September 1973 by publishing an “open letter” to 
Congress which unequivocally endorsed the Amendment by invoking the right to leave in the 
Universal Declaration and echoing the logic of the Ingles Report and the Uppsala Declaration on 
the Right to Leave: 
I consider it my duty to express my view on…the protection of the right to freedom of 
residence within the country of one’s choice.  That right was proclaimed by the United 
Nations in 1948 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  There are tens of 
thousands of citizens in the Soviet Union—Jews, Germans, Russians, Ukrainians, 
Lithuanians, Armenians, Estonians, Latvians, Turks, and members of ethnic groups—
who want to leave the country…I am appealing to Congress to give its support to the 
Jackson Amendment, which represents in my view and the view of its sponsors an 
attempt to protect the right to emigration of citizens in countries that are entering into 
new and friendlier relations with the United States.   
Sakharov explicitly rejected Kissinger’s argument that Jackson-Vanik might represent 
interference in the Soviet Union’s internal affairs and thus and imperil détente.  “The 
                                                 
191 Stern, 99.  Perle explained Jackson’s rationale, recalling that “we felt at the time that a sign of 
weakening would be read by the Soviets as an indication that the influence of the Jewish community in America was 
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192 Reminiscences of Richard Maass (3/5/1975), p. 27, CUOHROC; Stern, 99.  Leonard Schroeter’s notes 
on his conversation with Tina Silber address this meeting, and speak to the animosity between Jackson and some of 
the more reluctant Jewish leaders.  Silber told Schroeter nine days after the meeting that Jackson “never wants to see 
[Conference of Presidents chairman] Jacob Stein again,” and described the Jewish establishment leaders who sided 
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Amendment is simply a defense of international law, without which there can be no mutual 
trust,” he wrote, and thus no basis for détente itself.  He especially derided the notion of the 
Amendment as a specifically Jewish issue whose passage would spawn anti-Semitism.  “Here 
you have total confusion,” he said, “either deliberate or based on ignorance…it is as if 
emigration affected only Jews…as if the techniques of “quiet diplomacy” could help anyone, 
beyond a few individuals in Moscow.”  “The abandonment of a policy of principle,” Sakharov 
concluded, “would be a betrayal of thousands of Jews and non-Jews,” a capitulation with 
potentially dire consequences for détente that could lead to “stronger [Soviet] repression.”193 
Sakharov’s letter combined with Jackson’s impassioned appeal to persuade Maass, who 
informed Kissinger that the establishment would continue to champion the Amendment.194  As 
Maass unequivocally stated in 1974, Jewish support for Jackson-Vanik “[remained] as firm as it 
was seventeen months ago, when the issue was first raised.”195  Clearly influenced by the 
testimony from Soviet refuseniks and Sakharov, NCSJ executive director Jerry Goodman spoke 
in more earnest terms when he told a partner Jewish organization that “to abandon the Jackson 
Amendment would be an abandonment of Soviet Jews, as they see it.  If it is rejected…this 
would be seen by Soviet authorities as a defeat for the Movement in this country, and for Soviet 
Jewry activism.”196  Meanwhile, Kissinger’s maneuvers forever tarnished his image in the eyes 
of Jewish leaders.  His attempt to establish a tradeoff between Jackson-Vanik and an American 
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resupply of Israel’s military arsenal seemed like a cynical ploy, one which could no longer 
frighten an increasingly confident Jewish establishment.197   
More significantly, like Sakharov, both Jackson and the establishment Soviet Jewry 
Movement strenuously denied Kissinger’s attempt to portray Jackson-Vanik as a solely Jewish 
concern.  “Not once did Jackson ever describe [the Amendment] as a Jewish issue,” Perle 
asserted.  “Scoop believed very much that the right to free emigration was a seminal right, a 
source of pressure on governments to treat their citizens well enough so that they wouldn’t 
leave…it might have been easier to get a deal affecting only Jews, but it would have been 
untenable in terms of the principle we were seeking to establish.”198  Senator Jacob Javits 
concurred, arguing that “it was felt by many [Senators] that it would open the [Soviet Union] 
up…and [demonstrate] to other minorities in the Soviet Union that the USSR would not be a 
closed corporation as far as we were concerned, that we should give them an appeal to public 
opinion in the Soviet Union.”199   
Perhaps most significantly, Maass understood the transformation that the Soviet Jewry 
Movement had undergone in the wake of Meir Kahane’s challenge, and recognized its new 
potential to elevate the importance human rights in international politics.  “We knew that if we 
were successful [in pursuing Jackson-Vanik],” he stated, “it would have far greater impact 
worldwide on non-Jews than it would on Jews.”200  Later NCSJ chairman Stanley Lowell 
underscored the evolution of the NCSJ’s approach to human rights—and particularly the right to 
leave—telling the Senate Finance Committee in April 1974 that the Jackson Amendment 
                                                 
197 Kochavi, 520-1. 
198 Interview with Richard Perle, December 2009; Reminiscences of Richard Perle (2/7/1975), p. 32, 
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Symbolizes and gives substance to America’s continuing commitment to human 
rights…[it] envisions a realistic formula to employ American economic resources and 
capabilities to secure the fundamental human right to emigrate… The right to and 
opportunity is not exclusively a domestic or national concern, but rather a concern of all 
mankind.  This transnational concept is expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and is recognized throughout the international community.201 
Lowell would proceed to cite Sakharov’s letter to Congress as a response to Kissinger’s 
latest argument—that Jackson-Vanik would “most likely result in the termination of Soviet 
Jewish emigration.”   “The Soviet Union wants billions in foreign trade,” Lowell noted before 
the Committee.  “All we want are some human rights.  Is this so uneven a trade?”  Congress soon 
delivered its answer, passing the Amendment in the House and eventually the Senate later that 
year.  The direction of U.S.-Soviet relations would now hinge as much on human rights as on the 
status of weapons treaties and armed conflicts. 
After another year of negotiations between Senator Jackson, Secretary Kissinger, and the 
USSR, complicated by Nixon’s demise and ultimate resignation in August 1974, Jackson-Vanik 
at last appeared ready for passage.  Jackson and Kissinger exchanged a convoluted series of 
letters that elucidated the obligations incumbent upon the USSR to achieve a waiver on MFN 
and their desired amount of credits—which included, most notably, a requirement for the Soviets 
to issue 60,000 exit visas per year.202  Just before the Senate approved the Trade Act with the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment attached on December 20, however, Senator Adlai Stevenson (D-IL) 
added a condition to the Act placing a ceiling of only $300 million on credits to the USSR.  The 
                                                 
201 Statement of NCSJ Chairman Stanley H. Lowell on Jackson Amendment Before Senate Finance 
Committee, 4/10/74, Papers of Jerry Goodman, Box #7, Folder #3, Collection of the American Jewish Historical 
Society, New York, NY.  Lowell would also cite Dr. William Korey’s then-recently-published book, The Soviet 
Cage, as evidence that Jackson-Vanik furthered not only “an internationally accepted norm” regarding human rights, 
“but also a long American tradition of tangible action on behalf of human rights.” 
202 According to the agreement, the Soviets could not issue punitive conscriptions or criminal prosecutions 
against those seeking to emigrate, or their families; they could not require that adult visa applicants must receive 
permission of their parents or other relatives to emigrate; they could not deny exit visas to those who had access to 
sensitive secret information for more than three years beyond their last exposure to such secrets; they could not 
interfere with communication by telephone, cable, or letter to interfere with verification of compliance; and they 
could not place an unreasonable impediment in the path of a visa applicant, especially an exorbitant tax.  See 
Albright, “Pact of Two Henrys.” 
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new Amendment ensured that the President could only waive the restriction at the behest of 
Congress, pending Soviet moderation in a variety of foreign policy areas.203   
The bill blindsided both Kissinger and Jackson.  As Perle recalled, Stevenson’s 
Amendment robbed Jackson-Vanik of its “carrot”—access to high amounts of credit—and left it 
only with its “sticks.”  “As long as the Soviets entertained the possibility that the economic 
relationship might flourish,” as a result of Jackson-Vanik, Perle noted, they might accept its 
demands in return for a fruitful amount of cooperation.  Yet as Kissinger later put it, $75 million 
credits per year amounted to “peanuts” for the Soviets, who had already received half a billion 
from the credit bank since 1972.204  When President Gerald Ford signed the Trade Bill into law 
in early 1975, the Soviet Union announced that it intended to withdraw from the original 1972 
agreement that led to the Bill’s enactment. 
The Soviet renunciation of the Trade Bill initially seemed to render Jackson’s victory 
hollow.  Though emigration rates rose to an all-time high of 51,000 in 1979, they never reached 
the 60,000 stipulated by Jackson’s bargain with Kissinger, and indeed sank to the lowest levels 
in two decades by 1984.205  While Soviet abrogation of the trade treaty temporarily limited the 
leverage offered by Jackson-Vanik, the bill galvanized Jews and democratic dissidents in the 
Soviet Union, who felt “intoxicated with the optimism” of the Jackson’s human rights legislation 
and increased their activism against the Soviet government as a result.206  Perle recalled having 
                                                 
203 Korey, “Jackson-Vanik and Soviet Jewry,” 123; see footnote 177 for earlier explanation. 
204 Interview with Richard Perle, December 2009; Beckerman, 298.   
205 Lazin, “Freedom of Choice,” 410, Appendix 2.  From the high of 51,333 exit visas granted in 1979, 
numbers lowered precipitously by 1981 to 9,448, followed by 895 in 1984.  The number of emigrants rose again 
with the beginning of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika (economic restructuring) and glasnost (promotion of a more 
open society) in 1987.  A discussion of doubts relating to Jackson-Vanik’s efficacy will occur in the following 
chapter.  In our interview, Perle compared the drop in emigration rates to “climate change,” arguing that while 
numbers dipped for several years, they soon resumed at substantial levels. 
206 Natan Sharansky, Fear No Evil (New York: Random House, 1988): 83.  The KGB even admitted to 
Sharansky that the Jackson Amendment had caused the USSR “great damage.”  See Sharansky, 65. 
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met “any number of Soviet Jews who said they believed they owed their freedom to the 
Amendment.”207   
In addition to stimulating resistance within the Soviet Union, Jackson-Vanik established a 
clear precedent for the United States—and soon the international community—to pressure the 
USSR publicly into permitting emigration by citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
In an effort initiated by NGOs and intellectuals, propelled by Senator Jackson, and embraced by 
American and Russian Jews, the Soviet Jewry Movement played a critical role in establishing the 
fundamental premise of human rights activism: that the internal affairs of countries are not only a 
legitimate topic of international relations, but in fact central to them.  That notion combined with 
several other factors to expose the Soviet Union’s crumbling infrastructure—both economic and 
ideological—that increasingly plagued the Communist empire throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 










                                                 
207 Interview with Richard Perle, December 2009. 
208 Interview with Douglas Feith, December 2009; Interview with Stephen Herbits, January 2010. 
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Chapter IV: A New Kind of Pressure 
 Undoubtedly to their later regret, Russian authorities failed to note the white, taxi-like 
Volga sedan as it departed the Sovetskaya Hotel in Moscow, then hosting nineteen members of 
the U.S. House of Representatives on an official tour of the USSR.  Had the KGB paid careful 
attention, they would have spotted New York Times Moscow bureau chief Christopher Wren at 
the driver’s seat.  Known for facilitating Western contacts with Soviet refuseniks and dissidents, 
Wren planned to escort another foreign dignitary to the headquarters of Moscow’s human rights 
activists, an apartment located in the Southern part of the city.209 
 Wren quickly realized that his passenger that day in early August 1975—
Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick (R-NJ), head of the Congressional delegation’s committee 
appointed to investigate emigration and human rights issues—would prove a unique guest.210 
Upon arriving at the apartment, Fenwick met Valentin Turchin and Yuri Orlov, leaders of 
Moscow’s embattled chapter of Amnesty International, and Veniamin Levich, a prominent 
Jewish refusenik.  Though she merely intended to fulfill her responsibility as committee chair to 
record accounts of Soviet repression, Fenwick realized that documentation alone would no 
longer suffice.  “I felt, my G-d, it’s like being on a transatlantic steamer in the middle of a 
terrible storm, and seeing people go by in rafts, and we are trying to pick them up, but can’t,” she 
later recalled after the meeting.  “But at least we have our searchlights on them.”211   
                                                 
209 Christopher S. Wren, “House Delegation Sees Soviet Jews,” The New York Times, August 11, 1975.  
This particular Congressional delegation was led by then-Speaker of the House Carl Albert (D-OK).  The 
Sovetskaya Hotel in Moscow, reserved for official visitors to the USSR, became a frequent meeting point for U.S. 
Congressional representatives and Soviet dissidents, who would travel to the hotel to introduce themselves.   
210 Amy Schapiro, Millicent Fenwick: Her Way (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2003): 168-9.  A 
full account of Fenwick’s journey with Wren, as well as further biographical information, can be found in 
Schapiro’s book. 
211 William Korey, The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the Helsinki Process, and American Foreign 
Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993): 22.  As Wren recounts, eighteen Jewish refuseniks soon validated 
Fenwick’s conviction.  Having heard of her visit to Turchin, Orlov, and Levich, they flocked to the Sovetskaya 
Hotel to meet with Fenwick and her fellow members of Congress.  Shocked by their courage in defying Soviet 
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* * * 
Signing Into a Human Rights Trap 
Fenwick soon resolved to provide the dissidents and refuseniks with a more permanent 
searchlight.212  At their gathering in Moscow, Fenwick and Orlov had discussed means to 
pressure the USSR to comply with the human rights provisions of a recently-signed treaty: the 
Helsinki Final Act.  The product of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE)—a consortium of thirty-three European nations as well as the United States and Canada 
convened in 1973 to solidify continental détente—the Final Act struck a quid pro quo between 
the longstanding Soviet desire to solidify its control of Eastern Europe, and Western European 
insistence upon the improvement of Soviet human rights.213   
The Act contained three sections, or “baskets,” with the first two covering security and 
economic affairs and the last addressing humanitarian issues, as well as a later crucial provision 
                                                 
authorities, Fenwick asked them, “how do you dare to come see us here?”  “Don’t you understand?” they asked her.  
“That’s our only hope.  We’ve seen you, now the KGB knows you’ve seen us.”  Korey explains that the Soviets 
were less likely to persecute refuseniks who had visited U.S. representatives. Their response later guided Fenwick’s 
strategy for addressing Soviet human rights violations in Congress.  See Wren, “House Delegation Sees Soviet 
Jews.” 
212 Equally significant to Fenwick’s thinking, Korey, Beckerman, Shapiro, and Wren all note, was her visit 
with a specific refusenik, Lilia Roitburd of Odessa—a meeting arranged by the NCSJ.  Roitburd told Fenwick how 
her husband had been fired from his engineering job and publicly denounced as an “imperialist puppet” by their 
town’s local newspaper after he applied for an emigration visa.  Soviet authorities then arrested him at the Odessa 
airport for attempting to meet U.S. Senators Jacob Javits and Edward Kennedy, then touring the USSR, and charged 
with striking a militia officer.  Though Soviet officials informed Lilia that her husband would be held for a week, 
they quickly filed a criminal case against him which threatened five years in prison.  Lilia pulled out a photograph of 
herself from before her family’s ordeal began and showed it to Fenwick.  The striking distinction between the young 
and healthy woman in the picture and her ravaged appearance as a result of her predicament—a difference of only 
six months—brought tears to the Congresswoman’s eyes.  “I still have nightmares about it,” Fenwick later 
recounted.  Upon returning to Washington, Fenwick told herself, “We’ve got to do something for Lilia.”  See Korey, 
The Promises We Keep, 22-3; Beckerman 338-9; Shapiro 170; and Wren, “House Delegation Sees Soviet Jews.” 
213 The CSCE began as a Soviet initiative in 1954 and floated as a notion between the North Atlantic Treaty 
Alliance (NATO) and Warsaw Pact for fifteen years.  Moscow hoped to prevent the emergence of West Germany as 
a military power, reduce the presence of the United States in Europe, and, most significantly, gain recognition for 
and assure the status quo of Soviet control over Eastern Europe.  Initially opposed by NATO, the idea gained 
traction as the desire for détente prevailed in both the USSR and Western Europe.  Early communiqués and 
preparatory meetings established that Western nations would agree to meet the Soviet demand for “inviolability of 
borders” in exchange for negotiations over freer movement of people, information, and ideas.  The conference 
officially assembled in Geneva in September 1973 and lasted through July 1975, culminating in the signing of the 
Final Act.  See Korey, The Promises We Keep, 5-6. 
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for “review conferences” to track implementation of the treaty.  Basket III called for European 
nations to permit free flow of information across borders, cooperate in cultural and educational 
initiatives, and, perhaps most significantly, “facilitate freer movement and contacts” and pay 
“particular attention” to reunification of families,” a clause which served as euphemism for free 
emigration.  
The Soviets unsurprisingly disclosed their intention to disregard Basket III after the 
signing of the Final Act on August 1, 1975.214  Likely believing it could easily shirk the Act’s 
human rights elements,, however, Moscow treated the Helsinki as if it enjoyed juridicially-
binding character.  Soviet Premiere Leonid Brezhnev repeatedly declared his nation’s intention 
to implement every understanding reached by the CSCE, while State newspapers and journals 
declared that the Helsinki principles should be “made a law of international life” and take on the 
significance of “a binding international document.”215  Soviet leaders felt so confident in 
securing a positive outcome from the Helsinki process that they republished the entire Final Act 
in the official paper, Izvestiia, without removing the Basket III conditions.216 
Orlov keenly recognized that Western nations could exploit the USSR’s enthusiastic 
attempt to legalize and obligate itself to Helsinki.  He told Fenwick that while the Final Act’s 
language remained disappointingly vague regarding human rights—especially lacking a clear 
call for the right to leave—it offered an unprecedented opportunity to engage the Soviets on 
                                                 
214 The Soviets attempted to stifle the stringency of the Final Act’s human rights stipulations from the 
beginning of the CSCE negotiations by attempting to create “out clauses” within the document that would allow the 
them to invoke the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs as a response to human rights oversight.  See 
Stephen Roth, “The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and Soviet Jewry,” Soviet Jewish Affairs, 
Vol. 4 No. 1 (1974): 10.  
215 Korey, The Promises We Keep, 11-12.  Soviet desires to elevate the Final Act to the status of a binding 
treaty came despite explicit indication otherwise.  Both the United States and Britain opposed any notion of a legally 
binding treaty.  Britain coined the term “Final Act” to create the presumption that the final document did not take on 
the character of a legally binding treaty, and both countries ensured that qualifications regarding its non-binding 
nature be inserted throughout the process. 
216 Beckerman, 315.  Soviet dissidents and refuseniks were reportedly stunned by Helsinki’s humanitarian 
provisions.  See Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration, 232. 
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rights violations because they had signed it and declared it important.  Moscow’s perception of 
Helsinki, he told Fenwick, “[gives us] something to work with.  If the Soviet government said 
that [Helsinki] [is] important, it [is], in fact, important.”217 
The Congresswoman from New Jersey wasted no time upon returning to the U.S.  On 
September 9, 1975, she introduced a bill in the House which proposed the formation of a 
“Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,” designed “to monitor international 
compliance with the [Helsinki] Final Act” and provide Congress and its constituents with “the 
wherewithal to evaluate compliance with the Helsinki declaration.”  She suggested that the 
Commission comprise of bipartisan Congressional membership and include representatives from 
the executive branch—one from the State, Defense, and Commerce Departments.  Fenwick 
believed that the Commission should “concentrate its efforts” on evaluating compliance with 
“those intangible humanitarian elements of the declaration.”  “I believe the success of the 
Conference…can only become evident through the [monitoring and] implementation of the 
agreements,” she told her colleagues.  Fenwick hoped that by ensuring a significant role for 
human rights in U.S. foreign policy and international affairs more broadly, the Commission 
would solidify the precedent recently set by Jackson-Vanik.218 
                                                 
217 Additionally, the Preamble to the Final Act’s guiding principles section declares the “determination” of 
the participating states “to respect and to put each [basket] into practice,” and expressly states that “all [baskets] are 
of primary significance.”  The Act also required signatory countries to act “in conformity with…the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,” which included a far more stringent demand for the right to leave in Article 13-2.  
Though the Soviets had never ratified the Universal Declaration, they now seemingly obligated themselves to it 
through Helsinki.  Brezhnev himself seemed to anticipate trouble on the human rights front several weeks after the 
Accords were signed, telling Fenwick’s Congressional delegation that the first two baskets of Helsinki held a 
“binding nature,” while the human rights clauses would be “fulfilled according to the agreements reached on the part 
of the participating states.”  See Sidney Liskofsky, “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki 
Declaration),” American Jewish Committee Reports on the Foreign Scene, No. 14 (January 1976): 5, in American 
Jewish Committee Archives, Box #206, Folder #4, Collection of AJC, New York, NY, as well as Korey, The 
Promises We Keep, 10, 12. 
218 Congressional Record, 94th Cong., Vol. 121, Rec. 28036, September 9, 1975.  Fenwick noted that the 
establishment of the Commission was particularly important given that the first Helsinki evaluation conference was 
scheduled to take place in Belgrade in 1977.  She hoped the Commission would provide Americans with the “clear 
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* * * 
Soviet Jewry Sets the Stage 
Much as Soviet Jews themselves inculcated Fenwick’s interest in enforcing the Helsinki 
Accords as a lever against Moscow, the Soviet Jewry Movement in the United States would 
prove integral to her Commission’s creation.  The bill initially rode Congressional discontent 
with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s indifference toward human rights, earning rapid 
endorsement from 96 co-sponsors in the House and Fenwick’s fellow New Jersey Republican, 
Senator Clifford Case, who introduced her legislation in the Senate.219  Yet momentum for the 
Commission soon stalled.220  The National Conference on Soviet Jewry—fully converted to the 
Jackson-Vanik approach of publicly leveraging human rights against Moscow to secure Jewish 
emigration—entered the fray to resuscitate Fenwick’s bill.  Jon Rotenberg, the NCSJ’s 
Washington director and a Capitol Hill veteran with intimate ties to the House and Senate, 
lobbied both halls of Congress and ensured hearings in both chambers.221   
                                                 
and accurate information as to the progress in implementation of the accord” in preparation for the Belgrade 
Review. 
Fenwick belonged to a school of American opinion that wanted U.S. pressure forcefully exerted against 
Soviet repression and détente to be rooted in human rights improvement in the USSR.  The first major victory for 
this foreign policy position was the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.  The creation of the Commission—backed by many 
of the organizations and interest groups that championed Jackson-Vanik—represented a second blow to Kissinger’s 
policies.  See Madeleine K. Albright and Alfred Friendly, Jr., “Helsinki and Human Rights,” in The President, The 
Congress, and Foreign Policy, ed. Edmund S. Muskie, Kenneth Rush, Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: 
University Press of America, 1986): 287-8. 
219 When introducing the bill before the Senate, Case emphasized the role that “Congress should be able to 
play…in the all-important area of human rights, which all too often appear to be of only secondary concern to the 
executive branch.”  See Albright and Friendly, 292.  
220 The bill languished in the House Committee on International Relations through November 1975.  It 
faced opposition from two angles.  First, President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger feared the Commission’s 
proposed overlap with the executive branch, and considered the Commission an undue attempt to intrude upon the 
executive’s prerogative to set foreign policy.  Secondly, skeptical Cold Warriors believed that Helsinki represented a 
Western capitulation to the Soviets.  In their view, Western nations received vague, unenforceable promises 
regarding human rights improvements in return for conceding the concrete right to protest Soviet domination of 
Eastern Europe.  Indeed, a Wall Street Journal editorial on the eve of the Helsinki signing exclaimed “Jerry, Don’t 
Go!” urging President Gerald Ford not to attend, while a New York Times editorial declared that “nothing signed in 
Helsinki will in any way save courageous free thinkers in the Soviet empire.”  See Beckerman, 339; Albright and 
Friendly, 289; Editorial, Wall Street Journal, July 23, 1975; Editorial, New York Times, August 1, 1975. 
221 Albright and Friendly, 293-4. 
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The NCSJ doubled its efforts on behalf of the bill once discussions regarding its passage 
began.  Jerry Goodman testified in its favor before Congress, informing a House subcommittee 
that “the Final Act…has begun to contribute to the advancement of human rights generally—and 
to oppressed Jews in the Soviet Union in particular.”222  Given that the Soviets declared their 
intention to comply with all of the Final Act’s provisions, Goodman noted, their continued 
denouncement of Jackson-Vanik as “interference in internal Soviet affairs” seemed at best 
“inconsistent.”    Goodman, like Fenwick, recognized that the Soviet Union’s “primary 
[advocacy]” for the Helsinki Conference offered an opportunity to “contrast Soviet behavior with 
the obligations it undertook in signing the Declaration.”  He unequivocally endorsed Fenwick’s 
bill as a means “to monitor the Helsinki Declaration with particular regard to the provisions 
relating to Cooperation in Humanitarian Fields.”  The AJC agreed,  referencing both the Ingles 
Report and Uppsala Colloquium on the Right to Leave and To Return as precedents for the 
“establishment of intergovernmental and governmental mechanisms to monitor the 
implementation of the Helsinki Declaration’s human rights principles.”223 
Goodman’s testimony proved crucial to the bill’s eventual approval in June 1976.  
Congressman Dante Fascell (D-FL), chair of the Committee before which Goodman spoke and 
later the first head of the proposed Commission, told his colleagues that the NCSJ’s evidence 
highlighting Soviet intimidation of exit-visa applicants “provides the reason for the legislation 
now before us.”224  The moral coup that secured the bill’s victory, however, came again from 
Soviet Jewry activists.  Just before the bill’s final vote in the House, Fenwick announced that a 
                                                 
222 The NCSJ believed that Basket III of the Final Act offered a crucial new frame of reference for pressing 
Moscow on the question of the right to leave.  See Korey, The Promises We Keep, 25. 
223 Testimony by Jerry Goodman before House Subcommittee on International, Political, and Military 
Affairs regarding Helsinki Final Act, 5/4/76, Jerry Goodman Papers, Box #7, Folder #4, Collection of the American 
Jewish Historical Society, New York, NY; Sydney Liskofsky, “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(Helsinki Declaration),” p. 20, AJC archives. 
224 William Korey, “From Helsinki: A Salute,” in A Second Exodus: The American Movement to Free 
Soviet Jewry, ed. Albert Chernin and Murray Friedman (Massachusetts: Brandeis University Press, 1999): 127. 
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few days earlier, several Moscow human rights activists—Yuri Orlov, Andrei Sakharov, and 
Anatoly Sharansky chief among them—had declared the creation of the Moscow Helsinki 
Watch, established to review Soviet human rights practices from within the USSR.  Fenwick told 
Congress that the refuseniks and dissidents in Helsinki Watch “are hoping [like us] that 
[Helsinki] will not just be another empty piece of paper.”225  Both Fenwick and Helsinki Watch 
sought to wield the Final Act against Moscow’s human rights violations with public vigor rather 
than diplomatic delicacy. 
 
Figure 8: Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick (R-NJ) and Senator Clifford Case (R-NJ) observe as President Gerald Ford 
signs legislation authorizing the creation of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, better known as 
the Helsinki Commission.  Fenwick and Case were the only two members of Congress present, due to the administration’s 
attempt to downplay a bill which it had consistently opposed as an intrusion on its authority. Clifford Case archives, 
University of Rutgers.  http://www.libraries.rutgers.edu/rul/exhibits/case/Ethics/Ford_Fenwick.jpg (accessed 3/20/2010). 
The Commission established by the bill—soon called the Helsinki Commission—formed 
a symbiotic and often dependent relationship with the Soviet Jewry Movement once it began 
                                                 
225 Korey, The Promises We Keep, 28.  Soviet Jews had already recognized the potential impact of the 
Helsinki Accords before the official founding of either Moscow Helsinki Watch or the U.S. Helsinki Commission.  
According to Korey, throughout the end of 1975 and into 1976, more than one-third of the total number of petitions 
and appeals sent by activists to the Kremlin or abroad framed their arguments for exit visas within the context of 
Helsinki.  See Korey, “From Helsinki: A Salute,” 125-6. 
Note: for more information on the formation, activities, and demise of Moscow Helsinki Watch and its 
sister chapters across the USSR, see Sharanksy, Fear No Evil; Beckerman, 317-337; Korey, The Promises We Keep, 
48-52. 
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operations in October 1976 under the direction of Congressman Fascell.226  Commission staff 
leader Spencer Oliver promptly hired longtime NCSJ employee and emigration expert Meg 
Donovan, who ensured that the Helsinki Commission adopted her former organization’s 
commitment to advocating for the right to leave.  Indeed, the Commission’s first extensive 
research project and opening hearing addressed Soviet emigration policies.  After Moscow 
rejected the Commission’s request for a formal visit—citing interference with its internal 
affairs—Oliver hired eight researchers fluent in Russian and decided to travel to Israel to 
interview recent Soviet émigrés instead, producing thoroughly-researched statistical data 
regarding Soviet restrictions on the right to leave.227  The report established the Commission’s 
reputation as a respected repository on Soviet human rights violations. 
Human rights assumed a pivotal role in U.S. foreign relations when Democratic President 
Jimmy Carter assumed the presidency in January 1977.  His election removed any latent tension 
between the White House and the Helsinki Commission.  Indeed, Carter utilized language 
proposed by Commission Chairman Fascell in his inaugural address, emphasizing the importance 
of Helsinki’s human rights provisions.228  After Carter entered office, Meg Donavan took charge 
of the Commission’s rapidly expanding caseload, and recommended that the it place special 
emphasis on the right to leave.  To overcome the Final Act’s deliberately ambiguous treatment of 
the emigration issue, Donovan and her fellow staffers prepared a careful analysis of Helsinki’s 
                                                 
226 The Helsinki Commission also established close relations with Yuri Orlov’s Moscow Helsinki Watch.  
Orlov wrote to the Fenwick in September 1976, informing her that his organization would forward its findings to the 
newly-established Commission.  Fascell replied in late November that his Commission looked “forward very much 
to receiving more of [Orlov’s] reports in the months to come.”  See Korey, The Promises We Keep, 35. 
227 Korey, “From Helsinki: A Salute,” 128; Beckerman 342. 
228 Carter declared the importance of Helsinki in his speech, whose text was in all caps: “The promises 
made in Helsinki must be kept—especially those that promise to recognize basic human rights and to provide for 
greater movement of people, information, and ideas among nations.”  Fascell became a close advisor to both 
President Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, with whom he consulted regularly.  See Beckerman, 341; 
Korey, The Promises We Keep, 36-8. 
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text, which demonstrated that the Final Act’s drafters clearly sought to imply the requirement for 
free emigration within the document.229   
Thanks to the NCSJ and Donavan, the Helsinki Commission incorporated the study into 
its Final Act implementation records, permanently elevating the right to leave among all of its 
human rights concerns.  By carving “a place on the international agenda for questions of human 
rights,” Fascell declared during an early Commission session, Helsinki ensured that “the right to 
leave one’s country and to return to it…is now a right whose observation is as much a key to 
good standing in the international community of nations as the right of one government to be 
safe from attack…from its neighbors.”  The NCSJ and its devotion to the cause of emigration, 
Fascell stated, “is the father—or at least the godfather—of the [Helsinki] Commission.”  Soviet 
Jewry, it seemed, had become synonymous with human rights.230 
* * * 
“A World Court in Continuous Session” 
 The establishment Soviet Jewry Movement played an important role in the rise and 
solidification of human rights as a central factor in U.S. foreign relations.  The next decade, 
however, would determine whether Soviet Jewry organizations and the U.S. government would 
extend that contribution to the international arena.  The first test of the new U.S. dedication to 
human rights occurred at the initial Helsinki review conference in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, from 
October 1977 to November 1978.  There, the U.S. delegation combated Soviet intransigence to 
establish the preeminence of human rights to the Helsinki process.  
                                                 
229 Korey, “From Helsinki: A Salute,” 128-9. 
230 Remarks by Representative Dante Fascell (D-FL) to NCSJ On Early Achievements of Helsinki 
Commission, 10/26/76, Jerry Goodman Papers, Box #7, Folder #4, Collection of the American Jewish Historical 
Society, New York, NY; Beckerman, 342. 
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President Carter emphatically signaled his commitment to addressing Basket III by 
appointing former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg to lead the U.S. delegation to 
Belgrade.231  A prominent Soviet Jewry advocate for several decades and known for his often-
confrontational style, Goldberg’s nomination represented a potential departure from the 
traditional U.S. negotiating stance during the Helsinki process.232  The State Department officials 
preferred quiet diplomacy, adhering to the diplomatic norm of eschewing direct condemnation of 
a country by name or referencing specific violations of Basket III.  Goldberg, however, insisted 
that “the East account for its failure to honor the accord’s [human rights] promise,” which he 
believed “[ranked] above all others.”  In Goldberg’s view, Western countries bore “heavy 
responsibility” to the dissidents in the USSR who drew inspiration from Jackson-Vanik and the 
Helsinki Accords.  By emphasizing Basket III, he later argued after the Conference, “We have 
given hope to dissenters in Prague and the Soviet Union and others in Eastern Europe that they 
are not overlooked.”233   
Goldberg debuted his new confrontational approach as soon as private sessions between 
the participant states began on October 18.  Breaking all convention, he took to the podium to 
condemn the trial of four members of Charter 77, Czechoslovakia’s Helsinki Watch organization 
founded by Vaclav Havel.  The chamber erupted in shock as the Czechoslovakian and Soviet 
representatives vigorously protested, with the delegate from the USSR telling his peers that the 
                                                 
231 Carter’s choice of Goldberg came by accident.  Carter initially invited Goldberg to the White House to 
discuss ongoing peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt, given Goldberg’s expertise as the U.S. Ambassador to 
the U.N. during the 1967 Six-Day War and his key role in drafting Resolution 242, which ushered in the end of the 
conflict.  Carter immediately sought to appoint Goldberg as his envoy to mediate the negotiations, but faced 
resistance from both Secretary of State Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who thought the 
outspoken Goldberg would undermine their efforts in the region.  Persuaded, Carter attempted to save face by 
shifting Goldberg, who had already agreed to the Middle East posting, to lead the American delegation to Helsinki.  
Korey, The Promises We Keep, 69; Beckerman 356.  
232 Goldberg played an early and critical role in the Soviet Jewry movement.  After unsuccessfully 
attempting to persuade Soviet officials to reform their anti-Jewish policies in 1963, Goldberg convinced Jewish 
leaders in the United States to form an umbrella organization for Soviet Jewry—what soon became the American 
Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry (AJCSJ).  See p. 24-5 of this thesis.   
233 Beckerman, 358-61; Korey, The Promises We Keep, 79. 
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explicit citation of the Charter 77 case “does not make us smile here.”  Goldberg’s statement, he 
proclaimed, “is nothing other than an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of [the USSR].  
This is not the forum for such statements.”234 
Goldberg refused to capitulate.  While the number of cases he chose to cite remained 
low—totaling a mere eight throughout the rest of the conference—he raised sensitive cases and 
devoted particular attention to persecution of Jews and dissidents across the Soviet bloc who 
collaborated in forming Helsinki Watch associations.  Most controversially, perhaps, Goldberg 
challenged the Soviets to answer for their incarceration of Anatoly Sharansky—a Soviet Jew 
who bridged the refusenik and dissident communities by serving as spokesperson for the 
Moscow Helsinki Watch.  Arrested on charges of colluding with the CIA, Sharansky spent 
months in prison forbidden from contacting the outside world or retaining counsel for his 
defense.  Despite repeated Soviet objections, Goldberg incessantly demanded that the USSR 
answer for its “semi-blackmail policy” of using a leading Soviet dissident to force President 
Carter to forsake his human rights campaign.235 
                                                 
234 Korey, The Promises We Keep, 82-3. 
235 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Scharansky Trouble Upsetting Soviets?” Sarasota Herald-Tribune, 
December 26, 1977.  Sharanksy’s case quickly transformed into a beacon for multiple constituencies interested in 
securing greater human rights in the Soviet Union.  Originally a Jewish refusenik whose emigration application to 
Israel had been denied by Soviet authorities, Sharansky soon entered the broader Moscow dissident community and 
acted as a link between the two factions.  He first served as an assistant to Andrei Sakharov, offering assistance as an 
English translator, and later became founder and spokesman of the Moscow Helsinki group with Sakharov’s 
blessing.  While some in both communities distrusted or resented the ease with which Sharansky traveled between 
the two communities—the Israeli Liaison Bureau, in particular, thought Sharansky’s insistence on linking human 
rights and the Jewish emigration movement might undermine the Jewish effort—Sharansky believed that 
“embracing [his] identity in the name of freedom secured” both movements.  By forming Moscow Helsinki Watch, 
he became the most visible link to the outside world for both refuseniks and democratic dissidents.   
Sharansky’s subsequent arrest for espionage—he would soon face trial for treason—created an 
international sensation, and made Sharansky the defining symbol of both Jewish emigration and human rights.  
President Carter himself issued an unprecedented public announcement that Sharansky had “never had any sort of 
relationship, to our knowledge, with the CIA.”  See Beckerman, 300-20; 354.  For more on Sharansky’s biography 
and role as refusenik and dissident, see Sharansky, Fear No Evil and Sharansky, Defending Identity: It’s 
Indispensible Role in Protecting Democracy (New York: Public Affairs, 2008). 
On a Columbia-related note, several prominent U.S. public intellectuals and Congressmen organized an Ad 
Hoc Commission on Justice for Sharansky as the Belgrade Conference commenced in October 1977.  The chairman 
of the commission was Columbia University President William McGill, who stated in his opening address that “with 
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Goldberg’s public stand, however, did not produce the concrete effect that he sought.  
The Soviets merely agreed to reaffirm the original Accords and rejected the over 100 American 
proposals for additions to Basket III, while neutral states and even NATO allies expressed 
discomfort with his citations of individual cases such as those of Sharansky and Orlov.  Goldberg 
returned home discouraged, believing that any further salvos against the USSR on human rights 
would require greater public awareness in the United States concerning Soviet Basket III 
violations.236  Yet by establishing the primacy of refusenik and dissident plight to the fate of 
détente with the support of establishment Soviet Jewry Movement, Goldberg broke “the silence 
barrier” surrounding open discussion of human rights.237  Through Helsinki, he began the 
process of internationalizing the principle pioneered by Jackson-Vanik—that a nation’s internal 
affairs constitute an essential aspect of international diplomacy.238  
                                                 
respect to matters involving fundamental freedom, there is a growing sense in the world that our concerns no longer 
may be isolated by national boundaries.”  See Proceedings of the Ad Hoc Commission on Justice for Anatoly 
Sharansky, Senate Hearing, 10/20/77, Jerry Goodman Papers, Box #18, Folder #1, Collection of the American 
Jewish Historical Society, New York, NY.   
236 Goldberg returned to the United States convinced that ignorance in the United States of the plight of 
Soviet and Eastern European dissidents could be alleviated by an American NGO that borrowed its example from 
the Helsinki Watch groups.  He met with President of the Ford Foundation and former Kennedy and Johnson 
National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, and convinced him to fund a new NGO that would provide detailed 
information about Communist repression in the West.  Bundy allocated $400,000 per year to the newly constituted 
U.S. Helsinki Watch, run by Robert Bernstein and Jeri Laber.  The U.S. Helsinki Watch collaborated closely with 
Helsinki Watch groups in the Soviet bloc and published careful research regarding Soviet human rights violations.  
Vaclav Havel, the head of Czechoslovakia’s Charter 77 and later the country’s first post-Communist president, 
visited the offices of Helsinki Watch in New York upon his first state visit and told them that “perhaps without you, 
our revolution could not be.”  Helsinki Watch would later change its name to Human Rights Watch, and remains one 
of the leading human rights NGOs in the globe.  See Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration, 237-239.   
237 Massachusetts Congressman Robert Drinan noted the Jewish establishment embrace of Helsinki in a 
speech before Congress about the second Brussels Conference for Soviet Jewry, telling his colleagues that “the big 
development at Brussels II was the beginning of the exploitation by the delegates of the implications of the Helsinki 
agreement.”  See Representative Robert Drinan on The Next Milestone for Soviet Jews: The Meeting of 35 Helsinki 
Nations in Belgrade, 1/26/77, American Jewish Committee Archives, Box #205, Folder #1, Collection of AJC, New 
York, NY. 
U.S. Helsinki Commission Chair Dante Fascell, as quoted by Korey, The Promises We Keep, 98. 
238 The NCSJ contributed to Goldberg’s presented evidence and continued its close cooperation with the 
U.S. Helsinki Commission, especially vis-à-vis the right to leave.  The organization strongly endorsed Goldberg’s 
public castigation of Soviet human rights abuses.  Jerry Goodman testified before Congress in June 1978 that “by 
securing rights for Jews in the USSR, we are in fact helping secure the rights for all people, in the USSR and 
elsewhere.  Their struggle becomes our struggle.”  Later, he declared that “the fight for free people was a 
commitment expressed by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg and the U.S. delegation at the recent Belgrade 
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Goldberg’s replacement at the next Helsinki review Conference in Madrid, Max 
Kampelman, ensured that public diplomacy on human rights remained a dominant feature of 
international affairs.  As the session commenced in November 1980, Kampelman announced his 
intention to arraign the Soviet Union in a “world court in continuous session,” recognizing that 
Helsinki was “playing an increasing role in the US-Soviet Relationship and in East-West 
relations.”239  The new Ambassador drastically expanded upon Goldberg’s eight case citations at 
Belgrade, working with his staff to cite a total of sixty-five named cases in the first six weeks of 
the conference, many of them Helsinki Watch Group members.  Kampelman devoted particular 
attention to freedom of emigration, teaming with several other Western allies to criticize various 
restrictions on the Jewish emigration from the USSR—marking perhaps the first time in an 
international setting that so many nations pledged their allegiance to shame the Soviets regarding 
the right to leave.240 
The establishment Soviet Jewry Movement’s far more concrete presence at Madrid 
contributed to these unprecedented efforts.  Jerry Goodman announced at the outset of the review 
conference an “acceleration” of NCSJ coordination with the U.S. government during the 
conference, in an attempt to “bolster” human rights advocacy.241  Both the NCSJ and activist 
Union of Councils for Soviet Jewry established permanent offices nearby the conference hall, 
                                                 
Conference to review the implementation of the 1975 Helsinki Act.”  See Jerry Goodman Testimony Before Public 
Hearing of U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, 6/20/78, Jerry Goodman Papers 
Box #6 Folder #6, Collection of the American Jewish Historical Society, New York NY. 
239 Korey, The Promises We Keep, 115.  Wives and relatives of jailed Soviet dissidents and trapped 
refuseniks gathered at Madrid and mingled with representatives of Western NGOs in rallies, demonstrations, press 
conferences, and review sessions.  Leaflets and posters covered Madrid, which the French newspaper Le Monde 
dubbed the “city of dissidence.”  Korey attributes the rise in activism to Spain’s democratic character (as contrasted 
to Yugoslavia’s dictatorship), as well as changed Western public opinion toward Moscow in the wake of further 
internal repression and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.  See Korey, NGOs and the Universal 
Declaration, 240-1. 
Remarks from Max Kampelman to Congress, 3/24/82, Jerry Goodman Papers Box #9 Folder #5, Collection 
of the American Jewish Historical Society, New York NY. 
240 Korey, The Promises We Keep, 132-3;  
241 NCSJ Program Highlights, December 1980, Jerry Goodman Papers Box #9 Folder #1, Collection of the 
American Jewish Historical Society, New York NY. 
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utilizing the forum to advocate publicly and lobby quietly for Soviet Jewish emigration.  
Kampelman himself regularly visited the centers to confer on strategy, obtain new 
documentation on Soviet abuses, and communicate with refuseniks via telephone.242  In a telling 
indication of the establishment Soviet Jewry Movement’s transformation since it countered 
Kahane by embracing freedom of emigration as a universal value, the AJC produced a fact sheet 
which exclaimed that “human rights are not an internal affair!”  “The right of any individual to 
leave his country,” the document continued,  
Is an internationally recognized human right, upheld by the Helsinki agreement and 
international law, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, as well as the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
which was ratified by the Soviet Union.  Human rights are self-evident and transcend 
political boundaries.243 
 America’s continued struggle to secure the right to leave—spurred by the persistent 
encouragement of the Soviet Jewry Movement—secured the ultimate dream of right-to-leave 
advocates during the 1989 Helsinki review conference in Vienna.  The session’s document 
rebuked former Soviet emigration practices by obligating governments to inform applicants 
refused exit visas as to the reason for refusal and provide them with judicial and administrative 
remedies.  It further urged nations to abjure from invoking “national security” justifications to 
deny exit visas arbitrarily—a tactic employed by the Soviets for decades that served as the most 
frequent excuse to prevent free emigration.244  Vienna’s most sweeping revolution, however, 
came in far simpler terms: for the first time during the Cold War, the Soviet bloc and all other 
Final Act signatories recognized that “everyone shall be free to leave any country.”245   
                                                 
242 Beckerman, 454. 
243 AJC Fact Sheet on Soviet Jewry (undated), American Jewish Committee Archives, Box #205, Folder 
#3, Collection of AJC, New York, NY. 
244 See p. 60 of this thesis for discussion of Soviet emigration restrictions and the use of “national security.”  
The Soviets denied three-quarters of emigration visas based on national security concerns. 
245 Korey, The Promises We Keep, 259-60. 
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 Soviet recognition of the right to leave dovetailed with its increasing liberalization to 
produce the most significant wave of Jewish emigration since the beginning of the Cold War.  
While only 914 Jews left the USSR in 1986, nearly 100,000 exited amidst the Vienna 
proceedings in 1989.246  The struggle initiated by Jose Ingles, William Korey, and young Jewish 
activists, bolstered by the Uppsala Colloquium, utilized by Senator Henry Jackson, and then 
embraced by the establishment Soviet Jewry Movement, at last appeared complete.  The right to 















                                                 
246 Lazin, “Freedom of Choice,” 410. 
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 The atmosphere in Washington D.C. seemed miraculously warm on December 8, 1987.  
As Soviet Premiere Mikhail Gorbachev entered the White House that morning, U.S. President 
Ronald Reagan welcomed him jovially.  “My first name is Ron,” he said.  “We can call each 
other [by our first names] when we’re in private session.  “Mine is Mikhail,” Gorbachev genially 
replied.  Reagan’s disarming informality suited the agenda of the leaders’ impending summit—
the first nuclear weapons reduction treaty in the history of the Cold War.247    
 As the two men took their seats, Gorbachev undoubtedly expected to discuss arms 
control.  Rather than launch nuclear negotiations, however, Reagan opened the discussion with a 
deceptively casual remark.  “You know, there was a rally on the Mall the other day,” he told his 
counterpart.  A visibly perturbed Gorbachev understood the reference.  Two days previously, 
250,000 people from across the United States rallied outside the nation’s Capitol in an 
unprecedented display of solidarity for Soviet Jewry.  Singing “Let My People Go,” the 
demonstrators roared as Vice President George Bush, Senator Al Gore, Elie Wiesel, and recently 
freed refuseniks such as Anatoly (now Natan) Sharansky stood on stage together.248   
Gorbachev sought to avoid the subject.  “I heard about [the rally],” he answered, “Why 
don’t you go on and talk about arms control?”  “Mikhail,” Reagan responded,  
More than 250,000 people walked past this building two days ago of all different stripes 
and varieties.  Both [Houses of Congress] and both parties spoke to them.  The American 
people spoke—as much to me as to you.  They told me that [freedom of emigration] must 
be an issue an issue of priority for the U.S. as it must be for you.  What are you going to 
do about it?249 
                                                 
247 David K. Shipler, “The Summit: Reagan and Gorbachev Sign Missile Treaty and How To Work For 
Greater Reductions,” New York Times, December 9, 1987. 
248 Interview with David Harris, February 2010.  Now president of the American Jewish Committee, Harris 
served as the national coordinator for the Washington Soviet Jewry rally. 
249 Reminiscences of Richard Schifter in Deborah Hart Strober and Gerald S. Strober, The Reagan 
Presidency: An Oral History of the Era (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 2003): 361. 
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The President’s ultimatum represented the apotheosis of human rights upon the international 
stage.  To Reagan, the legitimacy of any nuclear accord depended on the Soviet Union’s ability 
to “keep its word with respect to existing international obligations on emigration.”  As he told 
Morris Abram—organizer of the Uppsala Colloquium fifteen years previously and Reagan’s 
close confidant—if the USSR refused to comply with human rights provisions, it could not “be 
trusted with respect to arms.”250  With a significant de-escalation of the Cold War at stake, 
Reagan placed the right to leave above the most urgent challenge to superpower relations.  
Human rights had become integral to matters of global security.   
 
Figure 9: Former Soviet refusenik Ida Nudel (left) passes a torch to Helen Jackson, widow of Senator Henry Jackson, at 
the “Freedom Sunday” March on Washington for Soviet Jewry on December 6, 1987.  See National Conference on Soviet 
Jewry photo gallery, http://www.sovietjewry.org/gallery_photo.php?photo=39 (accessed 4/3/10).  
 Abram’s voyage from Uppsala to Washington captures the critical role played by the 
Soviet Jewry Movement in advancing human rights by advocating freedom of emigration.  Only 
recently the providence of activists and legal scholars, the right to leave now defined the agendas 
of diplomats and heads of state.  His journey from ivory tower to oval office also reflected the 
Soviet Jewry Movement’s multifaceted contribution to free emigration: one scholarly, the other 
political.  Upon converging, these two streams combined the intellectual foundation and 
                                                 
250 Beckerman, 465. 
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institutional influence necessary to concretize the right to leave and render it—and by extension, 
human rights—such a consequential force in international affairs.  
 The mainstream Soviet Jewry Movement did not readily embrace the emigration battle, 
let alone its contextualization as a human right.  Initially viewing the plight of Soviet Jewry 
within the framework of the African-American civil rights struggle, establishment leaders sought 
to persuade the USSR—quietly, if possible—to fulfill its constitutional pledges of equal rights to 
Soviet Jews.  Yet the increasingly apparent desire of Soviet Jews to emigrate combined with the 
disintegration of the American civil rights movement to render the civil rights paradigm 
increasingly irrelevant.  Meir Kahane’s Jewish Defense League entered the vacuum and usurped 
the establishment’s authority by bathing the Movement in violence and tribal exclusivity.  
Kahane irrevocably altered the effort by demonstrating that quiet diplomacy would never enjoy 
the same influence on the Soviet Union as public pressure, and introducing the first open demand 
for total Jewish emigration from the USSR.   
 The establishment belatedly responded to the yearnings of Soviet Jews for emigration and 
the threat posed by Kahane’s JDL when it established the National Conference on Soviet Jewry 
(NCSJ) in 1971.  Though it easily eclipsed the JDL in financial security and mainstream appeal, 
the NCSJ failed to confront the JDL on its most potent level—that of ideology.  It could not 
combat Kahane’s theoretical platform with sanctimonious condemnations of violence alone.  
Directionless, the potentially influential political machinery of the NCSJ floundered as Kahane 
continued to offer the only compelling—albeit bloody and revanchist—vision for the Movement. 
 Senator Henry Jackson soon rescued the NCSJ from its malaise by requesting its political 
support for his Amendment linking U.S. trade to Soviet freedom of emigration.  Yet Jackson 
offered the NCSJ more than a legislative agenda.  His bill packaged the demand for free 
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emigration from the USSR in the revolutionary language of human rights, granting the 
establishment the ability to co-opt Kahane’s tribalist conception of emigration with a universal 
appeal.  The NCSJ neutralized the JDL by dedicating its support to the Jackson Amendment.  
The establishment recaptured the Soviet Jewry Movement from Kahane, then, through the realm 
of ideas.   
 Yet the Soviet Jewry Movement did not simply contribute its political support to the 
Jackson Amendment, but provided its legal foundation.  Over ten years previously, a cadre of 
activists and scholars—many who operated within the establishment Soviet Jewry Movement but 
enjoyed little impact on its public agenda until 1972—began formulating a sophisticated body of 
thought regarding the right to leave.  Soviet Jewry experts such as William Korey offered vital 
contributions to Jose Ingles’ landmark U.N. report on the status of free emigration, which 
established the notion of free emigration as a “gateway” to securing the “effective enjoyment of 
other human rights and fundamental freedoms.”  Soviet Jewry activists collaborated with human 
rights advocates and legal specialists from across the world to champion that notion nearly a 
decade later at the Uppsala Colloquium on the Right to Leave and the Right to Return.  This 
thesis demonstrates that Ingles and Uppsala—both borne from the periphery of the Soviet Jewry 
Movement—provided direct ideational inspiration for the Jackson Amendment, and, soon 
thereafter, the Helsinki Final Act.   
Indeed, the Jackson Amendment crystallized the Soviet Jewry Movement’s political 
machinery with its intellectual innovation.  The NCSJ lobbied aggressively throughout the 1970s 
and 80s to unite a broad coalition behind the right to leave, which served as a “gateway” not only 
to secure a plethora of additional rights, but an entry point for every concern with Soviet internal 
policy.  The alliance eventually included anti-Communist hawks such as Jackson and European 
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nations seeking a tangible quid pro quo from the USSR in return for détente; Western and Soviet 
democratic activists who, like Ingles, saw the right to leave as an assurance of all other basic 
rights; and of course, Soviet Jews themselves, who drew extraordinary inspiration from Jackson-
Vanik and Helsinki.  By exploiting Soviet desires—trade credits with the Jackson Amendment, 
and recognition of status quo borders in Europe with Helsinki—the NCSJ-built coalition utilized 
the right to leave as a means of wielding concrete instruments toward ethical ideals.   
The Soviet Jewry Movement’s efforts, both politically and intellectually, established a 
broad consensus surrounding two essential notions: that the Soviet Union’s internal affairs 
constituted a valid international concern, and that the USSR would only improve treatment of its 
citizens in response to sustained public pressure.  The repeated, continuous, and precise 
recitation of repression in the USSR, especially regarding restrictions on emigration, would 
expose the bankruptcy of the Soviet system.  As a Soviet bloc diplomat admitted to Morris 
Abram in his 1971 New York Times editorial on the right to leave, “The USSR…is proclaimed 
by its leaders as the perfect society.  If anyone chooses to leave, this is a blot on the claim.”251  
The Soviet Jewish Movement’s struggle for emigration undermined the basic tenets of the 
Communist system.  It forced the Soviet Union to accept its international obligations and 
abandon its long-held faith in the inviolability of borders.  The right to leave, then, offered one 
final “gateway”—in securing the emancipation of Soviet Jewry by the end of the Cold War, it 
served as a means of fostering universal acceptance of human rights accords. 
* * * 
Policymakers and intellectuals continue to deliberate the role of human rights in foreign 
affairs, both in the United States and in the international community.  The debate remains fraught 
                                                 
251 Morris Abram, “The Right to Leave: Soviet Union Defies Basic Human Right Adopted by the U.N,” 
New York Times, January 22, 1971. 
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with complexity, carrying a bevy of examples to bolster both human rights supporters and 
skeptics.  Yet the Soviet Jewry Movement and its promotion of the right to leave offers a 
compelling example of NGOs and governments successfully wedding practical politics with 
moral ends.  In securing the freedom of Soviet Jews—and, on some level, the Russian people 
more broadly—the Movement demonstrated that while bullets, money, and diplomacy mattered, 
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